Homeland Security Affairs Journal, Volume VI - 2010: Issue 1, January by Naval Postgraduate School Center for Homeland Defense and Security (CHDS)
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Center for Homeland Defense and Security (CHDS) Homeland Security Affairs (Journal)
2010-01
Homeland Security Affairs Journal, Volume VI -
2010: Issue 1, January
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School




Notes from the Editor 
 
Risk, preparedness, intelligence, public health – these are just a few of the issues 
facing homeland security in the past year and addressed in this issue of 
Homeland Security Affairs. 
In “Changing Homeland Security: Twelve Questions from 2009,” Christopher 
Bellavita examines hundreds of news headlines as a way of reviewing the past 
year. He presents these as “puzzles,” using this word as Thomas Kuhn did to 
describe what spurs progress in science. In this case, what puzzles – as 
demonstrated by these headlines – will spur progress in homeland security? 
Some of these puzzles, including those concerning strategy, terrorism, 
information sharing, recovery, and risk management are addressed by our 
authors. 
Philip Palin argues that homeland security in the U.S. lacks a “grand strategy” 
similar to the Cold War’s strategy of containment. Resilience as been suggested as 
an over-arching goal, but what, asks Palin, does this mean? Modeled on George 
Kennan’s “Long Telegram” (credited with originating the idea of containment as 
a grand strategy), Palin’s essay “Resilience: The Grand Strategy” offers one 
approach to tackling the homeland security puzzle. 
In “Jihad Dramatically Transformed?” author David Tucker questions one 
assumption that may drive strategy, challenging Marc Sageman’s claim that use 
of the internet has transformed Islamic jihad as it relates to terrorist activity. 
Sageman believes the internet “has dramatically transformed the structure and 
dynamic” of terrorism by “changing the nature of terrorists’ interactions.” 
Analyzing the available research, Tucker challenges this assertion. 
Another assumption is challenged by S.Y Chen and Thomas Tenforde: that the 
early phase of a nuclear event (initial response and rescue) is the most critical 
when establishing guidelines for response. In “Optimization Approaches to 
Decision Making on Long-Term Cleanup and Site Restoration Following a 
Nuclear or Radiological Terrorism Incident,” Chen and Tenforde suggest the 
most difficult task following an event may be the eventual recovery of affected 
areas. To this end, the authors analyze the recently published DHS Protective 
Action Guides, which provide guidance for long-term recovery issues, and 
evaluate the need for further research in this area. 
Gary Cordner and Kathryn Scarborough suggest another area for future 
research with the study presented in “Information Sharing: Exploring the 
Intersection of Policing with National and Military Intelligence.” Posing six 
hypothetical scenarios to fourteen police/intelligence experts, the authors 
identify some of the issues that inhibit the sharing of information between police 
and national and military intelligence operations. Chief among these are 
uncertainty about what should be shared and inconsistency in how information is 
shared. 
But what if the available information can neither prepare for nor prevent 
catastrophic events? This is, in part, the question posed by Ted Lewis in “Cause-
and-Effect or Fooled by Randomness?” Drawing on decade-old ideas from a 
variety of disciplines, Lewis develops an unconventional theory of infrastructure 
criticality and suggests that catastrophic incidents (often) occur because of 
randomness – not strictly cause-and-effect. 
Regardless of cause, one effect of potential catastrophic events is to generate 
worry and dread on the part of Americans. In “Factors Affecting the 
Amplification or Attenuation of Public Worry and Dread about Bioterrorist 
Attacks,” Lulu Rodriguez and Suman Lee present the results of their study of 
what variables – technical/rational or normative/value – predict public worry 
and dread. Data from a national sample suggests the need to provide the public 
with information, through the most effective channels, to maintain a sense of 
trust in the ability of government and individuals to provide protection in the 
event of a bioterrorism attack. 
The responsibility for providing this information – and for dealing with the 
many issues facing homeland security in 2010 – will fall to the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS). In “Same Priorities, Different Perspectives: Tom 
Ridge and Michael Chertoff on Homeland Security,” Stephanie Cooper Blum 
offers a comparative analysis of books recently published by the first two 
secretaries of DHS. 
Finally, in this issue, we offer a counterpoint to Robert Harney’s “Inaccurate 
Prediction of Nuclear Weapons Effects and Possible Adverse Influences on 
Nuclear Terrorism Preparedness” (published in the September 2009 issue of 
Homeland Security Affairs) in a Letter to the Editor from Rocco Casagrande and 
others. 
As always, we welcome your comments, discussion, and contributions to the 
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Changing Homeland Security: Twelve Questions From 2009 
Christopher Bellavita 
Everything we hear is an opinion, not a fact. Everything we see is 
a perspective, not the truth.  Marcus Aurelius (121-180) 
 
Aviation bracketed both ends of 2009. 
On January 15, 2009, US Airways flight 1549 landed in the Hudson River. No one 
died. The captain was called a hero. 
On December 25, 2009, Northwest Flight 253 landed in Detroit after a passenger 
tried to ignite a crotch bomb. No one died. The rapidly formed conventional wisdom 
claims the failure to prevent the passenger from boarding the plane means "the system" 
– presumably the homeland security system – failed. 
It was that kind of year for homeland security: several close calls, some heartbreaking 
incidents, but no catastrophes.  
After eight years, the homeland security enterprise remains unable to guarantee 
Americans will be safe from terrorism. Americans are not even safe within the protected 
confines of an army base. When seen through the ax-grinding lens of media, anything 
less than perfect security must be defined as failure. There is no time for nuance in the 
24/7 news cycle. 
After eight years, are we any closer to having a secure homeland – whatever you 
choose to mean by that – then we were on September 10, 2001? 
I do not know anyone who believes we – as a nation – are less prepared now than we 
were eight years ago. And that includes being better prepared to prevent an attack. 
I also do not know anyone who can provide objective evidence about how much 
better prepared we are now to prevent and respond to threats. We have anecdotes and 
intuitions. But we have nothing much more convincing than that. 
Why we have not measured the benefits gained from the billions in spending remains 
a central puzzle in homeland security. I am using "puzzle" in the same way Thomas 
Kuhn used it to describe what generates progress – or at least evolution – in science.1 
What Kuhn called normal science – basically conventional ways of thinking and 
working – succeeds by further developing an already accepted body of knowledge. 
Normal science is good enough until a crisis occurs.  
A crisis can take the form of a puzzle (or wicked problem) that cannot be resolved 
using standard ideas or methods. Something new is called for. That something can 
trigger a revolution in knowledge.  
Crises stimulate progress in science. The same process might also help the continued 
evolution of homeland security as a professional discipline. 
It remains a conceit to call homeland security a "discipline." It is overly generous to 
even call it a pre-paradigm discipline. Still, it is difficult to look at 2009 through 
homeland security eyes and not see "puzzles" that have been with us since 2001.  Can 
any of these puzzles be solved, or at least more effectively framed?2  
BELLAVITA, 12  QUESTIONS FROM 2009  
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HOW THE 12 QUESTIONS WERE DEVELOPED  
For this “2009 Year in Review” essay, I examined homeland security-related news 
stories collected during 2009 by the Homeland Security Institute.3 I identified and 
categorized approximately 400 stories.4 The categories were initially derived from my 
subjective analysis of the stories. I modified the categories in September and December, 
after discussions with Naval Postgraduate School homeland security master's degree 
students.   
The result is a largely personal list of twelve questions. In my view, they frame some 
of the important homeland security puzzles highlighted by events in 2009. 
1. Why is it so difficult to make risk-based decisions in homeland security?  
2. Why are we unable to measure the relationship between homeland security 
expenditures and preparedness? 
3. Why is illegal immigration a homeland security issue? 
4. Why is FEMA still a part of the Department of Homeland Security? 
5. What can the nation realistically expect from its intelligence apparatus? 
6. How does technology contribute to homeland security, and how does it make us 
more vulnerable? 
7. Are the direct and indirect costs of security – for example aviation security -- 
worth the benefits? 
8. How important is cyber security? 
9. Can the values of security and privacy be complementary, or must they be 
competitive? 
10. Under what conditions will the United States torture people? 
11. Is it necessary to understand Islam to develop an effective counterterrorism 
policy? 
12. What can the homeland security enterprise learn from the apparent success 
managing the H1N1 pandemic? 
These obviously are not the only homeland security questions that create puzzles for the 
discipline. Several additional ones are included at the end of this essay.  You probably 
have your own favorites. We welcome learning about them. 
Homeland security can develop if the various professions that contribute to 
homeland security approach a tentative consensus on framing and exploring the 
discipline’s central puzzles. Perhaps there can even be agreement on a solution or two. 
In each of the sections that follow, I present several of the news headlines that 
illustrate each topic area (generally in chronological order), and then briefly discuss 
some of the dimensions of the question. The list of news stories used for this analysis is 
included in the appendix. Links to the full stories can be found in the Homeland 
Security Institute’s newsletter archive.5 
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Before the questions, however, here is a sample of some of the 2009 issues that 
demonstrate the breadth of what constitutes homeland security.   
Some Homeland Security-Related Headlines from 2009 
• US Airways Flight 1549 Splashed Down in the Hudson River 
• Napolitano Takes DHS Reins 
• Maine Man - Shot by Wife - Had ‘Dirty Bomb’ Materials and Links to White Supremacists 
• 10 Dead in Alabama Shooting Spree 
• 14 Dead in Binghamton, NY, Immigration Center Shooting 
• 271 Million Pounds of Pharmaceuticals Dumped Illegally into Waterways that Often 
Provide Drinking Water 
• Swine Flu Strikes Mexico, Spreads Around the Globe 
• Five Sentenced in Fort Dix Plot 
• Five of Six Guilty in Sears Tower Plot 
• White House National Security and Homeland Security Staffs Merge 
• Gunman Shoots Two in Washington, DC, Holocaust Museum 
• 7 North Carolina Men Planned ‘Violent Jihad’ Abroad, Says FBI 
• National Dialogue on the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review 
• CDC Downplays White House Swine Flu Forecast of 90,000 deaths 
• FBI Raids Suspected al-Qaeda Cells in Denver and New York 
• ICE Revises 287 g Agreement With State and Local Law Enforcement 
• Military Psychiatrist Kills 13 People at Fort Hood 
• Chicago Man Charged in Mumbai Attacks 
• Passenger Tries to Destroy Northwest Airlines Flight 253 
Preventing terrorism was homeland security’s original goal. That evolved into 
preventing terrorism and attending to an incident category called “all hazards” – often 
equated to the traditional concerns of emergency management. Public health issues, 
specifically pandemics, became an important part of homeland security in 2009, even if 
the H1N1 virus did not quite fall within the domain of homeland security.  
Last year, homeland security also renewed its vows to national security.  The preface 
to the Department of Homeland Security’s 2010 budget summarized the Obama 
Administration’s idea of homeland security:  
My highest priority is to keep the American people safe. I believe that homeland 
security is indistinguishable from national security – conceptually and 
functionally, they should be thought of together rather than separately. Instead of 
separating these issues, we must create an integrated, effective, and efficient 
approach to enhance the national security of the United States.6 
In 2009, homeland security continued to be an elastic idea. 
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QUESTION 1: Why is it So Difficult to Make Risk-based Decisions in 
Homeland Security? 
• Four Arrested in Animal Rights Attacks 
• “Mumbai Model” of Swarming, Smaller-scale Terrorist Violence is Emerging Globally 
• Southern Poverty Law Center Counts 926 Hate Groups in U.S. 
• Air Force One Flyover Alarms New York City 
• CDC Stops TB-Infected Traveler From Germany 
• U.S. Border Corruption Cases Grow 
• Are Biohackers a National Security Threat? 
• 2,000 Old American Dams: a Multibillion-Dollar Threat 
In 2009, U.S. residents were threatened by border violence, pandemics, violent 
extremists, improvised explosive devices, a dirty bomb (or at least the possibility of 
one), random shootings, cyber attacks, threats to the food supply, severe winter storms, 
tornadoes, fires, floods, old American dams, and radioactive Canadians. 
Is there an appropriate way to think about and prioritize those risks? 
A well known symbolic generalization in homeland security is R = T x V x C; risk is 
the product of threat, vulnerability, and consequence.7 
Both the Bush and Obama administrations agree that homeland security decisions – 
especially resource allocation decisions – should be risk-based (or at least risk-informed 
if one is realistic about the role of politics in deciding who gets what). 
That is the theory.  A 2009 analysis concluded, however, that 
Despite the best efforts of numerous experts from government, industry and 
academia, fully effective and transparent integration of risk assessments into... 
homeland resource allocation decision-making remains an elusive goal.... the risk 
construct...[Risk = Threat x Vulnerability x Consequence] is logical, intuitively 
appealing, and consistent with conceptualizations of risk used in other domains.8 
But the data to make the risk equation work in the case of terrorism and other homeland 
security risks are practically never available. Consequently, in practice, risk 
management seems more symbol than science or art. 
The United Kingdom, with a population that is only 20 percent of the U.S. 
population, created a "national risk register." It represents an "assessment of the 
likelihood and potential impact of a range of different risks that may directly affect" the 
United Kingdom.9  
The Risk Register provides a chart (reprinted below) of "the position of each group of 
risks relative to the others, in terms of likelihood and impact.”10 
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The chart shows relative risk, and lacks the specifics need to allocate resources. It too is 
symbol, not science. But having something like that for the U.S. might be an effective 
way to encourage a national conversation (or a regional or local one) about risks and 
what to do about them.11  
Perhaps homeland security does not need equations to have productive conversations 
about risk. Maybe risk as symbol is sufficient. 
QUESTION 2: Why Are We Unable to Measure the Relationship Between 
Homeland Security Expenditures and Preparedness? 
• More than 90% of U.S. Rail Security Funds Remain Unspent 
• U.S. Funds to Fight Mexican Drug Trafficking Mostly Unspent 
• FEMA Awards $970 Million in Fiscal Year 2009 Preparedness Grants 
• FEMA Hasn’t Measured Improved Urban Preparedness, Says GAO 
• DHS Allocates $1.8 Billion in Preparedness Grants 
• Governors Protest Changes to FEMA Grant Programs 
• U.S. Is Not Ready for a Radiation Incident, Says GAO 
• FEMA Community Preparedness Programs’ Results Are Not Measured, Says GAO 
BELLAVITA, 12  QUESTIONS FROM 2009  
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Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8 required an annual report about the status 
of the nation's preparedness. 
In 2006, the post-Katrina emergency reform act required a "comprehensive system to 
assess on an ongoing basis, the nation's prevention capabilities and overall 
preparedness."12 
I know of a half dozen pilot efforts to satisfy the HSPD-8 mandate and at least one 
experiment to meet the post-Katrina reform act requirement. Unless I have missed the 
results of these pilot efforts, none have been turned into an operational program. I have 
not seen anything even approaching an assessment of the nation's preparedness, let 
alone a comprehensive assessment. And let alone even more assessments that link 
expenditures to preparedness. 
We spend money on homeland security-related projects without objective evidence 
about what – if anything – the taxpayer receives for billions of dollars. If we continue 
paying homage to objectivity as a homeland security value worth pursuing, what is 
getting in the way?13 
Many smart people have worked this issue for years. In speaking with them, the 
difficulty seems (depending on who one speaks with) to rest with political will, 
technological capability, knowledge gaps, science, sociology, continuous change, and a 
host of other factors that turn an engineering-type task into complexity soup. 
But assume for a moment that we can measure national, and state, and regional, and 
local preparedness. What do we do with the answers? What impact would that 
knowledge have on future resource allocation?  
Do additional funds go to those jurisdictions that are not as prepared as their threats 
and vulnerabilities warrant? Is lack of preparedness rewarded?   
Are jurisdictions who meet their preparedness targets given resources to help sustain 
readiness? Or are they penalized with fewer resources, so more funds are available to 
improve preparedness elsewhere? 
How to link spending to outputs and outcomes is a wicked homeland security puzzle. 
QUESTION 3: Why is Illegal Immigration a Homeland Security Issue? 
• Net Flow of Illegal Immigrants Drops to Zero 
• Refugee Immigrants Delayed Inappropriately by U.S. Immigration Laws 
• Houston Deputies Round Up 1,000 Immigration Suspects a Month 
• Another ICE Detainee Dies (83 dead in past 5 years) 
• DHS (INS) Discloses 10 More Detainee Deaths 
• ICE Agents Were Pressured to Meet Arrest Quotas 
• Immigration Courtrooms Backlogged 
• U.S. Expands Immigration Checks to All Local Jails 
• Illegal Immigrants Settling in Different States 
• Jailed Immigrants in US Get Little Access to Legal Help 
Illegal immigration obviously is an important economic, social, and political issue in the 
United States. But why is illegal immigration a significant homeland security issue? 
BELLAVITA, 12  QUESTIONS FROM 2009  
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A few years ago a Congressman said, “If you don't know who's coming into the 
country, like illegal immigrants, then you don't know what's coming into the country, 
like terrorist weapons.”14  
I think that is the dominant view about why illegal immigration is an important part 
of homeland security. Terrorists enter the country illegally. Then once they are here, 
they wreck havoc across the country killing hundreds, maybe thousands.  
If that is close to the narrative justifying immigration as a homeland security concern, 
it is appropriate to subject programs aimed at preventing illegal immigration to the 
same benefit cost logic Congress wants applied to preparedness efforts. 
There are at least two well-known examples of agents who prevented potential 
terrorists from entering the country.  One immigration agent (Jose Melendez-Perez) 
prevented the twentieth 9/11 hijacker from joining the nineteen others.15 A Customs 
agent (Diana Dean) stopped a man crossing the northern border, planning to detonate 
explosives in the Los Angeles airport.16 Arguably, both examples are more about border 
control than illegal immigration.   
How many similar examples could be cited (openly or not)? What homeland security-
related benefits are derived from programs aimed at stopping illegal immigration? Not 
in theory, but in fact?  
There are examples of alert bankers recognizing and reporting potential terrorists-
related financial transactions.17 Those examples ought not to suggest the federal banking 
system should become a part of the Department of Homeland Security.   
One might make a more compelling case that the FBI's intelligence function should 
be a part of DHS. Obviously that is unlikely to happen. But why not? What does 
constitute a legitimate homeland security issue?  Even conceptually, are there any 
explicit criteria that need to be met?   
Illegal immigration is clearly a major domestic problem. And doubtlessly there are 
some links between immigration and national security. But DHS was put together rather 
quickly and, in retrospect, with questionable logic.18  
At some point it makes sense to check the assumptions underpinning what is and is 
not a homeland security issue. And as a part of that, what organizations should or 
should not be part of DHS. 
QUESTION 4: Why is FEMA Still a Part of DHS? 
• North Dakota Floods Prompt Massive Response 
• Some Ignore Siren as Tornado Kills Three in Mena, Ark. 
• New Orleans Sanitation Director Publishes “How to Maximize FEMA Funding After a 
Natural Disaster" 
• Quakes, Tsunami, and Storm Hit South Pacific, Samoa, American Samoa and Tonga 
• Katrina Victims Lose Temporary Housing 
• Detroit Public Schools Seek Disaster Funding 
• Natural Disasters Were at 10-Year Low in 2009 
BELLAVITA, 12  QUESTIONS FROM 2009  
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At times it seems as if homeland security is a huge animal waiting to be fed with 
something important. When there's a terrorist incident, homeland security is all 
terrorism, all the time. This pattern was demonstrated most recently after the 
Northwest Flight 253 incident. 
But there is not that much terrorism in the United States. And the homeland security 
animal still needs to be fed. That’s where emergency management comes in. 
But when terrorism returns, emergency management seems like a foster child no one 
pays attention to. 
One of the major unknowns at the end of 2008 was what would happen to the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) under the Obama Administration. 
Would it be kept inside DHS or would it be restored to what some believe is its rightful, 
and most effective, place: as a stand-alone, cabinet-level agency?  
During deliberations about whether to remove FEMA from DHS, one analyst noted 
that if that were to occur it would mean DHS would be almost exclusively a law 
enforcement agency. That seems to have been viewed as a negative. 
Homeland security originally was intended to prevent terrorism. Including FEMA in 
DHS was largely an afterthought. But now that several years have passed since the 
decision was made, it seems like it would be too disruptive to unmake it.19 
Practical people – including many of the nation's top emergency management leaders 
– have accepted FEMA's role within DHS and are working to make it successful. "That 
battle’s not worth fighting anymore," one emergency management executive told me a 
few months ago. 
But an observation from this journal’s 2008 Year in Review article continues to 
unsettle: 
The question of FEMA in or out has centered mainly on which bureaucratic 
organizational arrangement best serves the need for an effective agency to lead 
federal efforts to support state and local governments during major disasters.... 
[The] more important issue is to what degree does having FEMA in DHS detract 
from the Secretary's primary role of preventing the next terrorist attack and 
protecting the nation?20 
QUESTION 5: What Should the Nation Realistically Expect From its 
Intelligence Apparatus? 
• U.S. Terrorist Watchlist Grows to 1 Million Names 
• Almost 1,000 Officials Attend Fusion Center Conference 
• Obama Picks Panetta to Head CIA, Brennan for Counterterror Advisor 
• Intellipedia’s Informal Status Slows Growth 
• Missouri Information Analysis Center report on the “Modern Militia Movement”  
• Virginia Fusion Center Points to Universities as Terror Breeding Grounds 
• DHS Withdraws Report on Rightwing Extremism 
• FBI Investigative Data Warehouse Stays Secret 
• North Central Texas Has Mom-and-Pop Fusion Center 
BELLAVITA, 12  QUESTIONS FROM 2009  
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• Fusion Centers Get Access to Classified Defense Information on Terrorism 
• CIA Invests in Monitoring Online Social Media 
As I write this, the intelligence community is taking the hit for not sharing information 
about a Nigerian who bought a ticket to Detroit with cash, checked no baggage, and 
whose father reported him as having radical tendencies. 
Northwest 253 gives new life to another favorite – although seriously misleading – 
homeland security metaphor: the need to connect the dots.21  
As 2009 came to an end, there were more "intelligence" entities post-9/11 than there 
were before the al Qaeda attacks. Fusion centers abound. The FBI has a database with 
something approaching two billion records. A RAND Corporation report on U.S. 
intelligence systems includes a stunning graphic that illustrates how complex the system 
has become.22 
What should the American people reasonably expect from its network of collectors, 
analysts, writers, disseminators, and users? How should the effectiveness of the 
intelligence system be measured? What kinds of mistakes will be tolerated? 
Thirty years ago, Richard Betts wrote about why intelligence failures are inevitable.  
He believed the problem was less about the intelligence process, and more about 
context. He claimed, “Policy premises constrict perception, and administrative 
workloads constrain reflection. Intelligence failure is political and psychological more 
often than organizational.23  
In 2006, Philip Bobbitt analyzed the role of intelligence in the 9/11/01 attack and the 
decision to invade Iraq. He argues that what failed was not the intelligence system, but 
the intelligence process.24 We are using a twentieth century process to engage threats in 
a twenty-first century environment.25 
In Bobbitt’s view, the twenty-first-century intelligence challenge is to discover "how 
to develop rules that will effectively empower the secret state that protects us without 
compromising our commitment to the rule of law."26  
Flight 253 – like September 11, 2001 – resurfaces fundamental questions about the 
intelligence infrastructure. Is it possible to move beyond secrecy, compartmentalization, 
and the conventional cycle of intelligence? Or is the system we have now, with some 
tinkering at the margins, good enough for homeland security?27 
QUESTION 6: How does Technology Contribute to Homeland Security, and 
How Does it Make Us More Vulnerable? 
• Biometric Federal ID Cards Behind Schedule 
• Texas Border Webcams Fall Short 
• Is In-Flight Internet A Terrorist Threat? 
• TSA Can’t Reset PINs on Thousands of Transportation Workers Identification Credential 
• Videogame Technology ("Depiction") Helps With Disaster Planning 
• DHS Plans Body Odor Biometrics 
• DHS Tests Brain Music for Emergency Workers 
• TSA Scraps Puffing Bomb Detectors 
BELLAVITA, 12  QUESTIONS FROM 2009  
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• Blimps for Cellphone Relay and Surveillance 
• U. of Illinois Studies ‘Second Life’ for Emergency Training 
• Defense Agency Plans EMP-Resistant Network 
• Pentagon Wants Cyborg Insects to Detect Chemicals 
• DHS and States Test ‘Virtual USA’ for Real-Time View of Emergencies 
• Chip Turns Phones Into Chemical Detectors 
• Iraqis Intercept U.S. Drone Videos 
A few months after September 11, 2001, a writer for Atlantic was waiting for a flight at 
Seattle's airport. As he checked in, "someone ran through the metal detector and 
disappeared onto the little subway that runs among the terminals."28 
Authorities emptied all the terminals and rescreened everyone, including people who 
had already boarded the airplane.  
Something similar happened on Sunday, January 3, 2010 at the Newark airport. A 
man went the wrong way through the exit door, triggering delays, evacuations, 
rescreening and "seven hours of chaos... on one of the busiest days of the year." 29  
Airport security – as this example and Northwest 253 illustrate – is an example of a 
homeland security technology that, when it fails, fails badly. 
Bruce Schneier, a security technologist, suggests all security technology should be 
subject to two basic questions: "What problem does it solve? What problems does it 
cause, especially when it fails?"30  
I wonder if and where that discussion happens. 
QUESTION 7: Are the Direct and Indirect Costs of Security – Specifically 
Aviation Security – Worth the Benefits? 
• TSA to Search More Air Passengers at the Gate 
• TSA Begins ‘Secure Flight’ 
• 80,000 Air Passengers on TSA ‘Cleared’ List 
• Whole-Body Scans Will Replace TSA Metal Detectors 
• Clear Lanes – Fast Pass Through Airport Security Lines – Calls It Quits 
• Canadian Air Passengers Keep Their Shoes On 
• Airport Risk Assessments Are Incomplete, Says GAO 
• TSA Limits Passenger Searches to Security Reasons 
• TSA Airport Screening Manual Leaked 
• Cargo on Passenger Planes Is Still Not Secure, Says DHS Inspector General 
One analyst recently calculated that the odds of being on a plane involved in a terrorist 
incident "had been one in 10,408,947 over the past decade."31  
Several years ago, another respected analyst estimated TSA screening procedures 
created over $32 billion worth of opportunity costs each year for passengers.32  
The number of terrorist incidents prevented by TSA procedures is unknown, and 
probably unknowable. So it is difficult to calculate the benefits of aviation security 
spending. Here is yet another area where the dominant logic that claims spending 
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should be related to benefits is up for question, where symbol is more valued that 
science. 
How much money is it worth spending to prevent the next aviation-related terrorist 
incident? 
Assuming the answer is not the accounting equivalent of "whatever it takes," how 
does the nation determine the appropriate level of spending for aviation security? And 
once that puzzle is solved, can the logic be applied to other parts of the homeland 
security enterprise? 
Are there ways to reduce costs and still get an acceptable level of security? 
Answering questions like these requires thinking about what constitutes an 
acceptable level of terrorism in the United States. I don’t mean the risk of terrorism, but 
actual incidents. Are we a sufficiently resilient nation to absorb an improvised explosive 
device on a domestic flight or two? Certainly we would prefer zero IEDs. But at what 
cost? 
I don’t think we can ignore these questions. We ask them either explicitly or through 
our behavior implicitly. 
QUESTION 8: How Important is Cyber Security? 
• Mumbai Police Want Open Wi-Fi Shut Down 
• Taliban and al-Qaeda Websites Use U.S. Hosts 
• Cyber-Spies From China, Russia and Elsewhere Penetrate U.S. Electric Grid 
• U.S. Power Grid Not So Vulnerable? 
• Top Cyber-Threat Comes From Chinese Computers 
• DHS Seeks Help From Hackers to Combat Cyber-terrorism 
• Most Federal Agencies Not Implementing Cyber-Security 
• Defense Dept. Establishes Cyber Command 
• Cyber-Attack Hits U.S. and South Korea 
• Commission Says Terrorists Could Use the Internet to Launch a Nuclear Attack 
• GAO Sees Widespread Cyber-Insecurities at Federal Agencies 
• Cyber-Attacks Against Critical Networks Increase 
• Howard Schmidt named as White House Cybersecurity Coordinator 
• Cyberterror: Not Yet a Real Threat? 
What is your position on cyber security as a homeland security issue? Do you practice 
safe computing in the privacy of your own room? 
Last year's headlines warned about the possibility of a nuclear attack launched 
through the Internet. Is that for real? Or more fear? 
It is not difficult to find people in government who see cyber threats as a major 
national security issue. When Secretary Chertoff left DHS, he said called cyber security 
the nation’s last major vulnerability. One of President Obama's final acts in 2009 was to 
appoint a cyber czar. 
Yet as noted in news stories and official reports, few agencies are doing much to 
mitigate the cyber threat. 
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As one of my colleagues at the Naval Postgraduate School notes, no Americans have 
yet been killed in a cyber attack. So why is this a homeland security issue? 
Do we need the cyber equivalent of a September 11, 2001 attack before the "threat" 
becomes real? What happens to America's exponentially increasing reliance on the 
Internet if that attack does happen? 
Does our nation have the capability to be proactive when it comes to homeland 
security? If Chertoff was correct in his assessment, why is the nation not united to 
mitigate this cyber vulnerability?   
Perhaps it is as someone wrote in last year’s review: action won’t happen until we 
bleed again. 
QUESTION 9: Can the Values of Security and Privacy be Complementary, or 
Must they be Competitive? 
• Court Affirms Wiretapping Without Warrants 
• NSA Spied on Journalists and Others, Claims Whistleblower 
• White House Says Cellphone Records Not Constitutionally Protected 
• Real ID on the Back Burner 
• NSA Intercepted Private Communications of Americans on a Scale that Went Beyond 
Legal Limits 
• FBI and States Expand DNA Databases 
• DHS Won’t Use Satellites for Domestic Surveillance 
• Being on Terror Watch List Keeps Few From Buying Guns 
• DHS Issues New Rules for Laptop Searches at the Border 
• Debate Resumes Over National ID Cards 
• Disputed E-Verify Rules in Effect 
Benjamin Franklin is credited with one of homeland security’s best known 
generalizations: "Those who can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary 
security deserve neither liberty nor security." 
Those who use this quote frequently include privacy as one of the essential liberties, 
meaning the separation of one's personal life from the concern of government agents. 
On the other hand, millions of people willingly sacrifice privacy before boarding a 
commercial aircraft. With the probable increase, after Flight 253, of full body scanners, 
even more personal privacy will be surrendered to government eyes. 
Must these values – privacy and security – be framed as a binary choice? What would 
it mean to have an acceptable mix of both? 
One writer believes the choice is a false one; we can have privacy and security, that "... 
it is possible to increase the powers of government [and increase security], and, at the 
same time, increase the rights of the people [including privacy]...."33 
I understand those words and the hope they intend. But it would certainly be helpful 
to have some examples. 
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QUESTION 10: Under What Conditions Will the United States Torture 
People? 
• U.S. Admits Torturing ‘20th Hijacker’ 
• 9/11 Commission’s Report Relied on CIA’s ‘Enhanced’ Interrogation 
• Red Cross Report Confirms 14 Detainees Held in the C.I.A. Program Were Tortured 
• CIA Destroyed 92 Video Tapes of Interrogations 
• Justice Dept. Releases Bush Administration Memos on Domestic Counter-Terrorism 
• Torture Memos Reveal Hundreds of Incidents and Doctors’ Complicity 
• Obama Administration Won’t Prosecute CIA Interrogators 
• Top U.S. Officials Can’t Be Sued for Post-9/11 Abuse, Says Supreme Court 
• Secret CIA Prison Revealed in Lithuania 
Some people still call it "enhanced interrogation." Others call it torture. Jane Mayer's 
2008 book, The Dark Side, described how the U.S. used torture in the early years of the 
terrorism wars.34 In 2009, many of the memos she referred to in the book were released 
by the Obama administration. Those memos and subsequent revelations supported 
almost all of Mayer’s significant claims about torture. 
The current administration passed on an opportunity to renounce rendition. It also 
urged the U.S. Supreme Court not to get involved in a case brought to the courts by four 
people who said U.S agents tortured them. However, the Obama administration says it 
will not torture. 
  A recent editorial noted, "politics and policy makers change and democracy 
cannot rely merely on the good will of one president and his aides.”35  So maybe we 
won’t torture now.  But what if…? 
Philip Bobbitt addresses what he calls "the awful subject of torture" in one of the 
most intellectually challenging but rewarding homeland security books I read in 2009: 
Terror and Consent: The Wars for the Twenty-First Century. 
Bobbitt write about what he calls "the notorious hypothetical of a ticking bomb:" 
thousands of lives are at stake and time is running out. He concludes, along with Judge 
Richard Posner, that in the extreme case of the immediately ticking time bomb, " torture 
is permissible.... It's an easy question."36  
Bobbitt then complicates the hypothetical and adds doubt about what the person in 
custody may or may not know, and whether she may or may not even be involved in 
what is now a very ambiguous situation. Is torture still an option? 
Bobbitt argues that public leaders must be willing to torture if that is what the 
evidence leads them to authentically believe is required. But they also have to be willing 
to try to justify their decision – after the fact – in a court of law. 
Bobbitt claims any public official "with the responsibility for protecting others must 
discharge that responsibility with an eye at first on the consequences.... If... anything 
else trumps this relationship, he or she should resign. A pacifist should not be asked (or 
allowed) to be a general."37 
What about a commander-in-chief? 
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QUESTION 11: Is it Necessary to Understand Islam in Order to Develop an 
Effective Counterterrorism Program? 
• 20 Somali-Americans Disappear From Minneapolis—for Jihad? 
• Most Muslims Oppose Attacks on Civilians and U.S. Military Presence 
• Two passengers with Names Linked to Islamic terrorism Were on the Air France Flight 
447 
• FBI Withdraws from Most Council on American-Islamic Relations Activities 
• Aafia Siddiqui – a U.S.-Trained Scientist Accused of Being an al-Qaida Operative 
• Obama Seeks “New Beginning” With Muslim World 
• Al-Qaida and al-Qaida Associated Networks Remain the Greatest Terrorist Threat to the 
U.S. 
I heard a British army officer, during a conference I attended last year, say "Al Qaeda's 
biggest victory was getting Islam and terrorism used in the same sentence." 
At the same conference, a Muslim scholar strongly objected to speakers who used 
“jihadist” to describe terrorists. 
"Jihad is a sacred idea to us," he said. "It should be carefully used and never applied 
to what murderers do." 
Said another speaker, "One must distinguish between Mohammed's early 
pronouncements in Mecca, when Jihad was encouraged, and the Prophet’s words during 
the Medina period, when as a political leader, he had different purposes, and war was 
permitted." 
I contrast this with retired Air Force General Thomas McInerney’s January 4, 2010 
suggestion the U.S. strip search Muslim men between the ages of eighteen and twenty-
eight because one of these men will blow up an airplane in the coming days.38 Since it is 
not clear what a Muslim man looks like, it is not immediately obvious how one would 
implement such a suggestion. 
More significantly, 2009 demonstrated to me how little I know – and others in my 
homeland security community know – about Islam. 
Shortly after an American Army major killed thirteen people at Fort Hood, Texas, 
websites resurfaced the idea of "sudden Jihad syndrome," a phrase first used in 2006 
"to describe Muslims that suddenly or unexpectedly turn against civilized, Western 
society and engage in acts of terror."39  
There is little doubt that 2009 witnessed an increase in what has been called 
"homegrown terrorism." Many of those involved appear at least on the surface to have 
some link to Islam. 
As one knowledgeable official summarized the growth of terrorism in the U.S. last 
year: 
It began with the FBI’s revelation, in February 2009, of Shirwa Ahmed as the first 
USA citizen to carry out a suicide bombing. This revelation led to a series of 
stories about the radicalization of Somali youth in Minneapolis and Seattle, and 
finally to the current homeland security concern over the “homegrown” terrorist. 
As we look back on 2009 the Amhed story was just the first of many. He was 
soon followed by Najibullah Zazi, Major Nidal Hasan, David Headley and 
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Tahawwur Hussain Rana from Chicago, and Ehsanul Islam Sadequee and Syed 
Haris Ahmed, recently sentenced in Atlanta. 
The list continues with Brooklyn-born Betim Kaziu who was charged with 
attempting to join a Pakistani-based Al Qaeda affiliate in hopes of killing U.S. 
troops; Michael Finton, a 29-year-old Illinois man who idolized American 
Taliban John Walker Lindh, and was arrested on charges of plotting to bomb a 
federal courthouse; Long Islander Bryant Neal Vinas who was arrested in July for 
allegedly training with Al Qaeda in Pakistan, joining rocket attacks on U.S. forces 
and giving “expert advice” on the subways and Long Island Rail Road. 
 Finally, the recent arrest of five American men in Pakistan on suspicion of 
trying to join militant Islamist groups triggered significant concern about 
whether the United States has become complacent about homegrown terrorism.40 
Is the United States at war with Islam? Or – as writers like Reza Aslan suggest,41 are we 
at war with interpretations of scriptures that keep Muslims, Jews, and Christians apart? 
What, if anything, should people in homeland security know about Islam?  
QUESTION 12: What Can the Homeland Security Enterprise Learn from the 
Apparent Success Managing the H1N1 Pandemic? 
• Nation Is Not Ready for Pandemic Flu, Says Congressional Report 
• States Not Ready for Pandemic, Says Federal Report 
• Swine Flu Strikes Mexico, Spreads Around the Globe 
• Swine Flu Spreads, but Not as Fast 
• Swine Flu Cases Surge Again 
• U.S. Still Not Ready for Pandemic Flu, Says GAO 
• Obama Declares Swine Flu a National Emergency 
• Swine Flu Scams Abound on the Internet 
• WMD Commission Asks Why H1N1 Vaccines Weren’t Available Before School Started 
• Swine Flu Vaccine Plentiful in Half the States 
• Pandemic Influenza Plan Needs Updating, Says GAO 
In Our Own Worst Enemy, Randall Larsen writes, "A national public-health system in 
the 21st century will be as important to national security as the Department Of Defense 
was in the 20th century. Unfortunately, America’s public health system is in very poor 
shape."42 
Larsen believes a central problem is no one is in charge of the entire system.43 He 
approvingly cites Dr. Elin Gorsky’s view that "Public health is organized to serve the 
health of individual communities with populations in the thousands, not coordinated 
health security of a nation of 280 million."44  
We are not out of the woods yet with respect to a potentially more virulent H1N1 
strain, another pandemic, or a biological attack. But so far, the way the nation's 
networked public health system has responded to the H1N1 challenge was perhaps the 
best homeland security story of 2009. 
John Donnelly, a Washington D.C. firefighter summarized what happened:45  
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The top story of 2009 is the H1N1 Flu and the reaction at all levels government to 
prepare for and combat the spread of the virus.  Lacking a single catastrophic 
event or a clear cut prevention of the same, my measure for determining the 
importance of an issue isn’t the immediate impact of the incident but what it tells 
us about our ability to prevent or respond to a catastrophic event. 
The H1NI virus gave us the opportunity this year to examine our capabilities 
as they relate to biological attacks or pandemics.  On many levels we succeeded, 
some examples of these successes include: 
! The early identification of the virus in Mexico and the subsequent risk 
communication about the virus, including messaging to properly name the virus. 
! The actions to increase anti-viral production and the successful use of Tami-Flu. 
! The ability of state and local governments to implement and deliver 
vaccinations. 
! The ability of local government to develop vaccine prioritization plans and 
implement the same without significant public push-back. 
Prior to the outbreak, the status of these capabilities were in question.  Since the 
outbreak, at the very least, we have now practiced these capabilities and been 
able to test plans and identify specific gaps.  In a sense - what doesn’t kill us, 
makes us stronger. 
One lesson validated here is under some conditions collaborative networks may be just 
as effective – if not more so – than hierarchies.  
What other lessons does the cautious success of the H1N1 response have to offer the 
rest of the homeland security enterprise? 
FINAL THOUGHTS  
As I wrote at the start of this essay, these twelve questions are just some of the puzzles 
suggested by homeland security events in 2009. The headlines in the attached appendix 
point to other issues that shape the evolution of homeland security, such as: 
• What should the military's role be in homeland security? 
• Can the homeland security enterprise be more effectively organized than it is 
right now? 
• What is the relationship between events in Afghanistan and Pakistan and the 
security of the United States? 
• Why haven't terrorists attacked our food supply? 
• Why is there a persistent gap between the preparedness of the American public 
and homeland security leaders’ expectations about how prepared the public 
should be? 
• How secure can the American border realistically be? 
Many people are working on these and related issues and have developed well-informed 
and argued positions. One of Homeland Security Affair’s goals is to provide an outlet 
for that scholarship. So we welcome your contributions and insights. 
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Homeland Security Headlines from 2009 
Note: Links to the articles associated with these headlines can be found at: 
http://www.homelandsecurity.org/NewsletterArchives.aspx 
January 2009 
4 Bombs Prompt Evacuation of Downtown Aspen, CO 
Iraq Takes Over Security in Baghdad’s Green Zone 
Homeland Security USA TV Series Begins 
US Airways Flight 1549 Splashed Down in the Hudson River 
Mumbai Police Want Open Wi-Fi Shut Down 
Obama Picks Panetta to Head CIA, Brennan for Counterterror Advisor 
Mexican Army Outgunned by Narcotics Cartels 
Coast Guard Drowning in Homeland Security Work? 
Terrorists and Commandos Eye Pakistan’s Nuclear Arms 
U.S. Admits Torturing ‘20th Hijacker’ 
New DHS Headquarters Site Approved 
Net Flow of Illegal Immigrants Drops to Zero 
Nation Is Not Ready for Pandemic Flu, Says Congressional Report 
Biometric Federal ID Cards Behind Schedule 
Obama Orders Military to Plan Drawdown in Iraq  
National Disaster Housing Strategy Issued by FEMA 
Two Chinese Men Get Death Penalty for Tainted Milk  
States Not Ready for Pandemic, Says Federal Report 
Obama Signs Order to Shut Guantanamo 
Court Affirms Wiretapping Without Warrants 
Napolitano Takes DHS Reins 
200 Unruly Passengers Convicted of Terrorism 
20 Somali-Americans Disappear From Minneapolis—for Jihad? 
U.S. Dealers Arming Mexican Drug Cartels 
NSA Spied on Journalists and Others, Claims Whistleblower  
Texas Border Webcams Fall Short 
Peanut Processor Knowingly Sold Tainted Products 
Two Ex–Guantánamo Detainees Resurface in al-Qaeda 
Neo-Nazi With Bombs Arrested in Alabama 
February 2009 
Northern Command Works to Anticipate Threats: Monitor 35 to 40 Daily ‘Events’ Across the Country 
Britain Suppresses Guantanamo Evidence After U.S. Threatens to Stop Sharing Intelligence  
9/11 Lung Illnesses Persist  
SWAT False Alarms Plague Responders and Victims 
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Obama Preserves Renditions  
Pentagon Wants Whole-Government Security Planning  
Another ICE Detainee Dies (83 dead in past 5 years) 
Obama Slams FDA for Its Handling of Peanut Case 
Kentucky Uses Earthquake Plan to Cope With Ice Storm 
Drug Gangs Threaten Tijuana Cops on Radio, Then Kill Them 
Wildfires Ravage Australia  
Maine Man - Shot by Wife - Had ‘Dirty Bomb’ Materials and Links to White Supremacists  
Pakistan Frees A. Q. Khan  
Pakistan Admits That Mumbai Attacks Were Partly Planned There 
Is In-Flight Internet A Terrorist Threat?  
TSA Can’t Reset PINs on Thousands of Transportation Workers Identification Credentials  
“Mumbai Model” of Swarming, Smaller-scale Terrorist Violence is Emerging Globally 
Cambridge, MA, Street Cameras Installed but Turned Off 
Former MI5 Chief Says Britain Exploits Terrorism by Exploiting People’s Fear of Terrorism 
Intellipedia’s Informal Status Slows Growth  
Napolitano Orders Topoff Review 
ICE Agents Were Pressured to Meet Arrest Quotas 
U.S. Military Offers Renewed Rapid Path to Citizenship 
U.S. intelligence and Military Community Acknowledge U.S. is Targeting Al Qaeda and Taliban  
Napolitano Describes DHS’s Path Forward 
U.S. Arrests 751 in Mexican Drug Cartel Raids 
Videogame Technology ("Depiction") Helps With Disaster Planning 
Four Arrested in Animal Rights Attacks  
Southern Poverty Law Center Counts 926 Hate Groups in U.S. 
Most Muslims Oppose Attacks on Civilians and U.S. Military Presence 
DHS Issues 2009 National Infrastructure Protection Plan 
March 2009 
U.S. Combat Mission in Iraq to End August 31, 2010 
Amtrak and British Transport Police Start Security Partnership 
U.S. Thinks Mexican Drug Cartels ‘on Par’ With Mexican Army 
Foreign Science Students Face Visa Troubles 
Ali al-Marri was Charged in a Federal Indictment with Two Counts of Providing Material Support  
Organized Criminal Groups are Increasingly Pirating Movies and Using the Funds to Support Terrorism 
Chicago Man Arrested for Allegedly Targeting Obama With HIV-Infected Blood 
CIA Destroyed 92 Video Tapes of Interrogations  
Craig Fugate named to head the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
Justice Dept. Releases Bush Administration Memos on Domestic Counter-Terrorism 
Khalid Shaikh Mohammed One of Five Prisoners Admit Planning 9/11 Attacks 
U.S. Terrorist Watchlist Grows to 1 Million Names 
Almost 1,000 Officials Attend Fusion Center Conference 
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U.S. Is Still Not Ready for Pandemic Flu, Says GAO 
Napolitano Appoints New Cyber-Security Chief 
DHS Plans Body Odor Biometrics  
10 Dead in Alabama Shooting Spree  
Everybody Loves to Watch the Texas Border on BlueServo.net, 
More Federal Agents Will Try to Block Weapons Flow to Mexico 
9/11 Commission’s Report Relied on CIA’s “Enhanced” Interrogation 
Red Cross Report Confirms 14 Detainees Held in the C.I.A. Program Were Tortured 
TSA to Search More Air Passengers at the Gate 
More than 90% of U.S. Rail Security Funds Remain Unspent 
CDC Stops TB-Infected Traveler From Germany  
GAO Investigators Get U.S. Passports Using Fake IDs 
White House says Cellphone Records Not Constitutionally Protected 
80,000 Air Passengers on TSA ‘Cleared’ List 
Taliban Get Pakistani Intelligence Help 
DHS Has Backlog of 75,000 Freedom of Information Requests 
DHS Screens 100% of Railcars Bound for Mexico 
FBI Withdraws from Most Council on American-Islamic Relations Activities 
North Dakota Floods Prompt Massive Response  
Missouri Information Analysis Center report on the “Modern Militia Movement”  
New Orleans Sanitation Director publishes “How to Maximize FEMA Funding After a Natural Disaster"  
April 2009 
14 Dead in Binghamton, NY, Immigration Center Shooting 
TSA Begins “Secure Flight”  
Real ID on the Back Burner  
Hezbollah Uses Mexican Drug Routes Into U.S. 
Uncertain Fate for Chinese Uighurs at Guantánamo  
DHS Asks Industry How to Improve its National Common Operational Picture (COP) 
Obama Outlines Afghan Strategy of Stability and Partnerships 
Most Mexican Guns Are Not Traced to the U.S. 
British Police Identify 200 Teens as Potential Terrorists 
Taliban and al-Qaeda Websites Use U.S. Hosts 
U.S. Funds to Fight Mexican Drug Trafficking Mostly Unspent 
Cyber-Spies from China, Russia and Elsewhere Penetrate U.S. Electric Grid 
Obama Picks Alan Bersin as New ‘Border Czar’ 
Whole-Body Scans Will Replace TSA Metal Detectors 
FEMA Awards $970 Million in Fiscal Year 2009 Preparedness Grants 
North Central Texas Has Mom-and-Pop Fusion Center  
After Peanut Recall Fiasco, FDA Signals Change in Food Safety 
Free Software Assists in Connecting to the Nationwide Health Information Network 
NSA Intercepted Private Communications of Americans on a Scale That Went Beyond Legal Limits 
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U.S. Power Grid Not So Vulnerable? 
School Shootings Decline, Shooters Remain Unpredictable 
TSA Email Alerts Screeners to Airport Security Test 
North Korea Says It Will Restart Nuclear Weapons Plant 
Top Cyber-Threat Comes From Chinese Computers 
CIA Bars Private Contractors From Questioning Terror Suspects 
Obama Administration Won’t Prosecute CIA Interrogators 
DHS Report Warns of U.S. Right-Wing Extremists 
llegal Immigrants Settling in Different States  
Austin, TX, and Phoenix Rail Transit Designed for Security 
‘Terrorism’ Undefined Releases Governments From Accountability, Says UN Lawyer  
NJ Police Exceed Rules on Questioning Immigrants 
Some Ignore Siren as Tornado Kills Three in Mena, Ark.  
271 Million Pounds of Pharmaceuticals Dumped Illegally into Waterways that Often 
Provide Drinking Water 
Torture Memos Reveal Hundreds of Incidents and Doctors’ Complicity 
FBI and States Expand DNA Databases 
FEMA Issues Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101 
DHS Seeks Help from Hackers to Combat Cyber-terrorism 
DHS Tests Brain Music for Emergency Workers  
FBI Names Domestic Terrorist (Daniel Andreas) to ‘Most Wanted’ List 
FBI Investigative Data Warehouse Stays Secret 
Food Emergencies Continue in 32 Countries 
Local and State Agencies Lack Resources to Ensure Food Safety 
Southern Low-Income Latinos Face Abuse 
May 2009 
Swine Flu Strikes Mexico, Spreads Around the Globe 
13 Dead in Azerbaijan School Shooting 
Australia Plans National Emergency Alert System 
Google Flu Trends Tracks Virus in Mexico 
UK Ends Combat Operations in Iraq 
Five Sentenced in Fort Dix Plot 
Virginia Fusion Center Points to Universities as Terror Breeding Grounds 
Air Force One Flyover Alarms New York City 
Almost 900 U.S. Swine Flu Cases, Two Deaths  
Math Model Can Help Spot Terrorism, Say Japanese Researchers 
Al-Qaida and al-Qaida Associated Networks Remain the Greatest Terrorist Threat to the U.S. 
State Department Releases Country Reports on Terrorism 2008 
Most Federal Agencies Not Implementing Cyber-Security 
Are Biohackers a National Security Threat? 
Explorer Scouts Train for Border Patrol  
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DHS Withdraws Report on Rightwing Extremism 
PDAs Let Air Marshals Communicate on Board Flights  
Oussama Abdullah Kassir Convicted of Starting al-Qaeda Camp in Oregon  
Katrina Victims Lose Temporary Housing 
Detroit Public Schools Seek Disaster Funding 
Five of Six Guilty in Sears Tower Plot 
6 of 7 Freed Guantanamo Detainees Shun Terrorism 
Sri Lanka Defeats Tamil Tigers 
Killer Chip’ Tracks Humans, Releases Poison If Those Humans Do Bad Things 
TSA Scraps Puffing Bomb Detectors  
Obama Restarts Bush-Era Guantánamo Tribunals 
U.S. Expands Immigration Checks to All Local Jails  
Top U.S. Officials Can’t Be Sued for Post-9/11 Abuse, Says Supreme Court 
Food Companies Often Unable to Guarantee Safety 
New North Korean Nuclear Test Increases Proliferation Threat 
DHA Report: America Can Learn From Israel’s Preparedness 
U.S. Relies More on Aid of Allies in Terror Cases 
Swine Flu Spreads, but Not as Fast 
Sci-Fi Writers Help Plot the Future of Homeland Security 
Supermax Prisons in U.S. Already Hold 33 International Terrorists  
U.S. Asks Firms to Make Swine Flu Vaccine 
White House National Security and Homeland Security Staffs Merge 
Two Passengers with Names Linked to Islamic Terrorism were on the Air France Flight 447 
June 2009 
Gunman Shoots Two in Washington, DC, Holocaust Museum 
British Schoolchildren Taught to Spot Terrorists 
U.S.-Philippines Partnership May Be Model for Fighting Terrorism Elsewhere 
Obama Seeks ‘New Beginning’ With Muslim World 
China’s Aggressive Quarantine Measures Virtually Imprison Healthy Travelers 
GPO “Mistakenly made Public” a 266-page Report Giving Detailed Information About 
Hundreds of Nuke Sites 
White House Issues Cybersecurity Review 
Swine Flu Cases Surge Again  
Cleared of Terror Charges, Florida Man Faces Deportation as Terrorist 
U.S. Still Not Ready for Pandemic Flu, Says GAO 
WHO Declares Swine Flu Pandemic 
Palau Takes Uighur Guantánamo Detainees 
More Maryland High Schools Teach Homeland Security 
Homeland Security Advisory Council Gets 10 New Members 
E-Verify Rule Postponed Again 
Immigration Courtrooms Backlogged 
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Pentagon Wants Cyborg Insects to Detect Chemicals 
American Indians Struggle for Northern Border Rights 
Iranian Election Disputed 
First Batch of Swine Flu Vaccine Produced 
Phone Failure Complicates Vermont Nuclear Drill 
Most States Lack Disaster Standards for Schools and Day Care 
Guantánamo Prisoner Ghailani Goes to Trial in New York 
DHS Allocates $1.8 Billion in Preparedness Grants 
Pass ID to Replace Real ID 
Padilla Can Sue Justice Dept. Attorney, Judge Rules 
British Utilities Vulnerable to Terrorism or Bad Weather 
DHS Won’t Use Satellites for Domestic Surveillance 
Being on Terror Watch List Keeps Few From Buying Guns 
Defense Dept. Establishes Cyber Command 
HHS Funds Research for New Way to Make Vaccine 
Defense Agency Plans EMP-Resistant Network 
Nashville Police Arrest Four Illegal Immigrants for Fishing Without License 
Clear Lanes - Fast Pass Through Airport Security Lines - Calls It Quits 
Bozeman, MT, Stops Asking for Job Applicants’ Social Network Web Passwords 
Blimps for Cellphone Relay and Surveillance 
U. of Illinois Studies “Second Life” for Emergency Training 
July 2009 
FEMA Hasn’t Measured Improved Urban Preparedness, Says GAO 
DHS Expands Collection of Data on Employees and Contractors 
FEMA Embraces Online Social Networking 
GAO Beats Security in 10 Federal Buildings 
Six Men Considered National Security Threats Kept Aviation License 
The Southern Poverty Law Center Finds 75 Right WIng Plots Since OK City Bombing 
Cyber-Attack Hits U.S. and South Korea 
Australia Abandons ‘”War on Terror” Phrase 
Marion, IL, Wants Guantánamo Prisoners 
DHS Cites Progress on 9/11 Commission Recommendations  
National Security Cutter Delays Will Affect the Coast Guard Through 2018 
Congressional Oversight of DHS Has Multiplied SInce 9/11/01 
Two Jakarta Hotels Bombed  
Sole Surviving Mumbai Gunman Pleads Guilty 
New York-Area Raids Violated Rights, Says Immigration Justice Clinic 
375 Agencies 91 Congressional Reps and Staff use Twitter 
Taliban Gets Most Funding From Overseas Sympathizers, Not Drugs 
Commission Says Terrorists Could Use the Internet to Launch a Nuclear Attack 
7 North Carolina Men Planned “Violent Jihad” Abroad, Says FBI 
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Napolitano Calls Public an "Asset in Our Nation’s Collective Security." 
FBI Says Bryant Neal Vinas Was a “Gold Mine” of Information 
Vulnerabilities Remain, and Limited Collaboration and Monitoring Hamper Federal 
Emergency Communications 
Federal Plans for WMD Response Need to Be Integrated 
Hizb ut Tahrir, Meeting in Illinois, Proclaims “Fall of Capitalism and the Rise of Islam” 
Richard Spires to Be DHS CIO 
Aafia Siddiqui – “a U.S.-trained Scientist Accused of Being an al-Qaida Operative” 
NBC's "Wanted" TV Program Pursues Terrorists 
Former CIA Director Defends Warrantless Wiretapping 
Infectious Diseases Research Needs to Stay Offshore, Not in Kansas, Says GAO 
Feds Interested in Using the Military During Emergencies 
August 2009 
National Dialogue on the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review  
U.S. Is at War With al-Qaeda, Not With Terrorism, Says White House 
Guantánamo Cases Make Little Progress 
Biolabs Are Slow to Improve Security 
Little Help for Mentally Ill in Post-Katrina New Orleans 
Pennsylvania Gym Gunman Revealed Plans Online 
DHS and States Test “Virtual USA” for Real-Time View of Emergencies 
New York 9/11 Survivors Still Show Higher Rates of Post-Traumatic Stress 
Southwest Border Needs a Comprehensive Approach 
U.S. Border Corruption Cases Grow 
Airline Crews Get Fingerprint IDs  
Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Sites Attacked in 2007-2008 
Disabled People Left Out of Disaster Plans, Says National Council on Disability 
Right-Wing U.S. Militias Resurgent 
U.S. Customs Catches Radioactive Canadians Every Day 
Chicago Man Arrested for Giving False Radio Instructions to Train Operators 
“Lone Wolf Initiative” Pursues Solitary Domestic Terrorists 
Canadians Create Mathematical Model for Surviving a Zombie Attack 
ICE Will Keep Arresting Illegal Immigrants It Catches While Hunting Others 
DHS (INS) Discloses 10 More Detainee Deaths 
Texting 911: Not a Substitute for Conversation 
Some Lawyers Prey on Illegal Immigrants 
Blackwater Helped CIA’s al-Qaeda Hunt 
Iraq Bombings Are Spiking 
Lockerbie Bomber Freed 
10 European Countries Will Accept Guantánamo Prisoners 
Players Battle ‘The Great Flu’ in Online Simulation 
Peak of California Wild Fires 
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Fake DHS Emails Contain Malware 
DHS Issues New Rules for Laptop Searches at the Border 
CIA Interrogators Could Face Charges Over Detainee Torture 
CIA Uses Blackwater to Arm Drones  
CDC Downplays White House Swine Flu Forecast of 90,000 deaths 
Debate Resumes Over National ID Cards 
2,000 Old American Dams: a Multibillion-Dollar Threat 
September 2009 
Lack of Translators Hurts U.S. Antiterror Efforts 
Swine Flu Deaths Are Higher in Kids Over 4, Says CDC 
Border Patrol Checkpoint Effectiveness Is Overstated 
Is It Time to Negotiate With the Taliban? 
Is the U.S. Funding the Taliban? 
Intellipedia Grows Slowly  
Many U.S. Colleges Report Swine Flu  
GAO Notes Lessons From Past Disasters  
Back Up Laptop Files Before Crossing Borders, Say Executives 
Border Patrol Begins Building Northern Secure Border Initiative Network 
Obama Extends 9/11 State of Emergency  
Disputed E-Verify Rules in Effect 
Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative Exceeds DHS’s Expectations 
Anti-Flu Drugs Not for Prevention, Says CDC 
Three Convicted in 2006 Airliner Liquids Bombing Plot  
DHS Breaks Ground on New HQ 
Northcom Should Involve Partners and States More in Exercises, Says GAO 
Pashtuns and Retired CIA Agents Hunt bin Laden 
Canadian Air Passengers Keep Their Shoes On 
Earth Liberation Front Sabotages Washington State Radio Towers 
NY National Guard Task Force Has Been on Duty Since 2001 
Coast Guard 9/11 Drill in Washington, DC, Creates Frenzy 
FBI Raids Suspected al-Qaeda Cells in Denver and New York  
Secure Border Initiative Delayed, Value of Border Fencing Uncertain, Says GAO 
Iran Is Not Building an A-Bomb, Says U.S. Intelligence Community 
Task Force Says Use at Most Three Colors in Alert System 
Court Refuses to Block E-Verify 
U.S. Is Not Ready for a Radiation Incident, Says GAO 
Fusion Centers Get Access to Classified Defense Information on Terrorism 
FDA Approves Swine Flu Vaccine; Ready by October 15th 
White House Wants to Delay Guantánamo Trials 
California School Teaches Truckers Antiterrorism 
START Puts Global Database of 80,000 Terrorist Events Online  
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Al-Qaeda Manual Prompts Warning to Police About Entertainment Venues 
Talking to the Taliban Wins Emmy 
FBI National Security Branch Analysis Center Has 1.5 Billion Records 
October 2009 
Al-Qaeda Recruits More Americans 
Quakes, Tsunami, and Storm Hit South Pacific, Samoa, American Samoa and Tonga 
Canada Spent $60 Million Trying to Deport 5 Suspects 
Feds Disrupt Two More Bomb Plots 
Al-Qaeda in Decline? 
Failed Saudi Assassin Hid Bomb Inside His Body 
States Get 6 More Weeks to Request Real ID Extension 
Pennsylvania Asks Agencies Whether They’re Ready for a Pandemic 
Fewer Illegal Border Crossings but More Deaths 
DHS Issues Annual Privacy Report 
Court Upholds Defense Dept. Anthrax Vaccination  
FBI WMD Coordinators Are Often Unfamiliar With Threats, Says Inspector General 
DHS Limits Immigration Arrest Powers for Maricopa County, AZ, Sheriff 
U.S. Emergency Alert System Is Unreliable, Says GAO 
FEMA Community Preparedness Programs’ Results Are Not Measured, Says GAO 
DHS Falls Short on Small Vessel Security, Says Inspector General 
Judge Frees Guantánamo Prisoner Because of False, Coerced Confessions 
Nevada puts Office of Homeland Security into the Nevada Division of Emergency Management 
Widespread Election Fraud in Afghanistan 
CIA Invests in Monitoring Online Social Media 
ICE Revises 287 g Agreement With State and Local Law Enforcement 
Obama Declares Swine Flu a National Emergency 
Massachusetts Man Arrested in Plot to Attack Shopping Malls 
Bioweapons Are a Bigger Danger Than Nukes, Says WMD Commission  
Cyberterror: Not Yet a Real Threat? 
National Guard Was Prepared to Shoot Down Errant Airliner 
Swine Flu Scams Abound on the Internet  
Swine Flu Strains Some Hospitals 
DHS Expands IdeaFactory  
Telecommuters in Pandemic Could Clog Web, Says GAO 
WMD Commission Asks Why H1N1 Vaccines Weren’t Available Before School Started 
Governors Protest Changes to FEMA Grant Programs 
‘Disaster Zone’ Practices Preparedness on Second Life 
November 2009 
Military Psychiatrist Kills 13 People at Fort Hood 
1,600 a Day Nominated for Watch List 
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Govt. Overstated Flu Vaccine Availability  
Airport Risk Assessments Are Incomplete, Says GAO  
Italy Convicts 23 Americans in CIA Rendition Case 
FBI DIOG Manual Details Surveillance Rules 
Working Group Seeks Ideas on Long-Term Disaster Recovery 
Cat in Iowa Catches Swine Flu 
Jailed Immigrants in US Get Little Access to Legal Help  
Radiation Detectors Deployed on Northern Border Ahead of Schedule 
TSA Limits Passenger Searches to Security Reasons  
CDC Ups Estimate of Swine Flu Deaths About 4,000 Americans - Not 1,200 - Have died since April 
UN Conference Examines Climate Change and Disaster Risk Reduction 
President Extends (1984) WMD Emergency for One Year 
Players Can Act as Terrorists in “Call of Duty” Video Game 
Refugee Immigrants Delayed Inappropriately by U.S. Immigration Laws 
Houston Deputies Round Up 1,000 Immigration Suspects a Month 
Canada Handed Over Innocent Afghans to Torture, Diplomat Testifies 
George W. Bush Ordered 2007 Cyber-Attack in Iraq 
Secret CIA Prison Revealed in Lithuania 
Sept. 11 Suspects to Face Trial in New York 
GAO Sees Widespread Cyber-Insecurities at Federal Agencies 
December 2009 
H1N1 Flu Vaccine Registry Is a Scam 
Cargo on Passenger Planes Is Still Not Secure, Says DHS Inspector General 
Drug Smugglers Using FAST Lanes At Border 
Chip Turns Phones Into Chemical Detectors 
U.S. Tries Taliban Buyout, Orders More Troops to Afghanistan 
India Marks 25th Anniversary of Bhopal Disaster 
Four in Minnesota Plead Guilty to Terrorism; Eight More Charged 
Swine Flu Deaths Rise Sharply Worldwide 
Most Companies’ Employees Cannot Work Remotely During a Crisis 
New Disaster and Terrorism Timelines Available 
Twitter Data Used to Plot Earthquakes 
Mature Las Vegas Fusion Center Leads to Homeland Security Office Downgrade 
TWIC Still Has Troubles, Says GAO 
TSA Airport Screening Manual Leaked 
Cyber-Attacks Against Critical Networks Increase 
Supreme Court Won’t Hear Guantánamo Torture Case  
12 bin Laden Family Members Hold FAA Licenses 
FBI Had 19,000 Matches to Watch List This Year 
Al-Qaeda Bombings Kill 127 in Baghdad 
Chicago Man Charged in Mumbai Attacks 
British Police Memo Warns of Radicalization in Nursery School 
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Natural Disasters Were at 10-Year Low in 2009 
Michigan Uses DHS Einstein to Protect Computers 
Iraqis Intercept U.S. Drone Videos  
48 State Legislatures Pass Immigration Laws in 2009 
DHS Integration Management Plan Is Years Behind, Says GAO 
Attack on Berkeley Chancellor’s Home Is Terrorism, Says Schwarzenegger 
Swine Flu Vaccine Plentiful in Half the States 
Illinois Prison to Host Guantánamo Prisoners and Trials 
Simplify Sensitive Information Controls, Says Task Force 
Pandemic Influenza Plan Needs Updating, Says GAO 
Howard Schmidt Named as White House Cybersecurity Coordinator 
Passenger Tries to Destroy Northwest Airlines Flight 253 
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Resilience: The Grand Strategy 
Philip J. Palin 
Homeland security does not have a Grand Strategy. There have been national strategies.  
There are a plethora of operational strategies. In The Edge of Disaster, Steve Flynn 
recommends resiliency as an over-arching goal.1 Many have murmured agreement and 
the word is increasingly common in speeches and other pronouncements. But as an 
official with responsibility for resilience recently asked in private, “What does it mean?” 
The military historian and theorist B.H. Liddell Hart argued, “While the horizon of 
strategy is bounded by the war, grand strategy looks beyond the war to the subsequent 
peace.”2 The grand strategy of the United States during the Cold War was captured in a 
single word: containment. The meaning of containment prompted considerable 
contentiousness, even while the insight the term provided is widely credited with 
strategic success.   
There is no serious dispute that George Kennan’s 1946 Long Telegram is the origin of 
containment as the touch-stone of our Cold War strategy. Recently, I authored a Long 
Blog3 trying to make strategic sense of resilience. Kennan eventually reworked his 
original, which Foreign Affairs published as “Sources of Soviet Conduct.”4 I appreciate 
the invitation from Homeland Security Affairs to offer a similar reworking of the Long 
Blog. 
 
In his Long Telegram,5 George Kennan outlines five related understandings. He 
observes reality, gives context to his observations, projects these findings on official 
policy, acknowledges the role of unofficial policy, and offers practical deductions… or 
what I would call strategy.  I will follow the same organizational schema: 
(1) Basic features of post-war Soviet outlook risks to the United States; 
(2) Background of this outlook perspective on risk; 
(3) Its projection in practical policy on official level; 
(4) Its projection on unofficial level; 
(5) Practical deductions from standpoint of U.S. policy. 
Kennan urges readers to recognize a Soviet take on reality. Kennan’s argument aims to 
engage, manage, manipulate — choose your verb — the orientation of our adversary.  
Sixty-plus years later, the most serious risks facing the United States are where a range 
of threats, some traditional and some novel, interact with several vulnerabilities Kennan 
did not face. Where Kennan focuses intently on the Soviet threat, our threats are more 
numerous and nuanced.  The recent National Intelligence Strategy (NIS) is helpful in 
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scanning the horizon.6 Can we derive the same sort of logical policy premises that 
Kennan found? 
PART ONE: Basic Features of the Principal Risks to the United 
States 
The principal risks are as follows: 
a) According to the NIS there are four nation-states that present a “challenge to U.S. 
interests.”  These are Iran, North Korea, China, and Russia. None present the near-
peer level of competition offered by the Soviet Union immediately after WWII.  
Individually or in concert these competitors can constrain the U.S. But even in 
unlikely combination these nation-states do not present the clear-and-present 
danger the Stalinist superpower seemed to threaten. (This shift, more a matter of 
human will than fewer warheads, also demonstrates the importance of keeping the 
nuclear genie contained.) 
b) Violent extremist groups, insurgents, and transnational criminal organizations 
“increasingly impact our national security” according to the NIS. But the capacity of 
these groups to threaten the U.S. with catastrophic harm is modest. We should not 
discount the potential terrorist or even criminal use of WMD.7 But a reasonable and 
sustained application of the precautionary principle should suffice to manage this 
risk (see Cass Sunstein).8 A debate regarding the specific meaning of reasonable and 
sustained could be entirely worthwhile. 
c) The global economic crisis has been identified by Dennis Blair, director of national 
intelligence, as the “primary near-term security concern” for the United States. 9 
The dependence of the Unites States on foreign holders of debt (especially China), 
efforts to replace the dollar as the principal international reserve currency, the 
prospect of U.S. hyper-inflation, and a growing sense of financial limitation all 
increase the nation’s  strategic vulnerability. 
d) Failed states and ungoverned spaces nurture possibilities available to violent 
extremists, insurgents, and transnational criminal organizations, according to the 
NIS.  Unconnectedness, ala Thomas P.M. Barnett, breeds all sorts of ugliness.10 
e) Climate change11 and energy competition will present new casus belli and heart-
wrenching humanitarian crises. The NIS treats the two as one significant source of 
instability. 
f) “Rapid technological change and dissemination of information continue to alter 
social, economic, and political forces, providing new means for our adversaries and 
competitors to challenge us” is how the NIS describes the threat.  The report goes on 
PALIN, RESILIENCE 
        
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME VI, NO. 1 (JANUARY 2010) WWW.HSAJ.ORG  
!
#!
to note, “While also providing the United States with new opportunities to preserve 
or gain competitive advantage.” 
g) Pandemic disease is listed by the NIS as “a persistent challenge to global health, 
commerce, and economic well-being.” 
Kennan also listed his “basic features” as running from (a) to (g). From seven basic 
features Kennan derived – or at least argued – four fundamental deductions. Kennan’s 
deductions de-mystify the strategic perspective of the Soviet leadership. It is a reality 
warped by ideology. But precisely because Soviet perception is so ideologically 
blinkered, it is predictable. Kennan argued the U.S. could best advance its interests 
when it acted with this predictable worldview as a principal target. 
Kennan could focus on threat analysis. Today the NIS outlines a much more 
complicated mix of threats and vulnerabilities. By any measure the U.S. is much 
stronger than it was in 1946. But we are also more vulnerable. Insight regarding external 
threat is no longer sufficient. We also require a self-awareness of vulnerability.  (Threat 
x Vulnerability) x Consequences = Risk. 
If the assessment of our context provided above – and by the National Intelligence 
Strategy – is reasonably accurate, the other-awareness advocated by Kennan is no 
longer sufficient. Many threats confronting the United States today are beyond 
the scope of accurate analysis or, even, consensus judgment. The unpredictability of the 
H1N1 pandemic is good evidence. The potential implications of climate change, resource 
shortages, and the range of weapons and targets available to our adversaries challenge 
the imagination and arguably exceed our analytical capacity. 
A colleague who served for many years in the intelligence community has critiqued 
the National Intelligence Strategy as fatally flawed because it is so far-reaching. In his 
view it is undisciplined in target-selection and thereby condemns the intelligence 
community to almost certain failure. Limited assets will be stretched too thin. 
His operational concern is undeniable. Yet I perceive the greater flaw is too narrowly 
defining threats as externalities. In 1946 the Soviet threat was clearly primus inter 
pares. In 2009 choosing among threats can seem a game of musical chairs. A deep 
knowledge of an other is helpful, but no longer sufficient. Other-awareness must be 
complemented with self-awareness. Risk emerges from threat and vulnerability.  
Threats are often beyond our reach, vulnerabilities are usually self-generated.  We 
require a deep understanding of our self.   
Kennan found four action principles flowing reasonably from his seven perceptual 
premises. For a Soviet leader who has confidence in his perception of reality, the 
prescriptions for action are self-evident.  Kennan encourages his Foggy Bottom masters 
to recognize the internal logic of the adversary’s worldview. Broadly accepting the 
worldview set out by the National Intelligence Strategy, I propose four action 
principles: 
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1. The United States is, by far, the most powerful single player on the 
planet.  More than most, we are masters of our own fate. We have the resources, 
systems, and culture to actively participate in shaping the future.  Yet some perceive the 
best days are behind us. Certainly many would say 1946 was golden compared to our 
reduced current condition. That could be a self-fulfilling prophecy, but here are three 
reassuring factoids:   
GDP compared to principal putative adversary:   
1950: U.S.: $1.45 trillion v. Soviet Union: $510 billion (1991 dollars)12 
2007: U.S.: $14.2 trillion v. China: $4.4 trillion13 
U.S. federal deficit as a percentage of GDP:14 
1946: 121.7 percent 
2009: 66.2 percent (projected) 
U.S. median household income (constant 2007 dollars): 15  
1947: $25,260 
2007: $46,207 
2. Despite our great power, the United States confronts a strategic 
context with even greater potential for instability than 1946. Today there are 
many more nodes of significant influence than in the immediate post-war period. The 
interactions — social, intellectual, economic, and political — between the various nodes 
constitute a rich web much greater than that of 1946. The spread of H1N1 was 
much faster than any prior pandemic16 and going viral is no longer limited to 
viruses. The pace of change has accelerated.  We have much more virtual proximity to – 
and real dependence on – decisions and actions occurring well outside the direct 
influence of the United States.  
3. As a result, the contemporary strategic context is much less predictable 
than 1946. Kennan’s fundamental thesis was that the ideological rigidity of the Soviet 
regime made it predictable and therefore manageable. There is evidence he was right 
and during the Cold War U.S. policymakers and strategists often (not 
always) were guided by this insight. But the range and type of challenges facing the U.S. 
today are not anywhere as predictable. Rather than a “simple” bi-polar (pun intended) 
world, we are surrounded by random outbreaks of mass neuroses and 
peculiar psychoses. 
4. With limited predictability regarding our threats, national policy and 
strategy should aim to optimize our adaptability to a range of risks.   
In setting out his four deductions Kennan is more concise – perhaps purposefully 
provocative – than the preceding. But then in Part 2 of the Long Telegram he analyzes 
“certain aspects” of what he has confidently exposed. He posits: “At bottom of Kremlin’s 
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neurotic view of world affairs is traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity.”  
(Telegraphing, like twittering, tended to dispense with articles.) 
 
PART TWO: Background of this Perspective on Risk 
Kennan argues that understanding the sources and symptoms of Soviet neurosis will 
allow U.S. decision-makers to avoid unnecessarily provoking our adversary and 
potentially take advantage of the Kremlin’s neurosis. An effective strategy engages 
perceived reality, even if the reality that matters is neurotic. 
Modern psychology has moved away from a mid-twentieth century notion of 
neurosis. When Kennan wrote, neurosis was understood as an unresolved conflict 
between unconscious motivations and explicit purpose. One psychologist explains, 
“Neurosis means poor ability to adapt to one’s environment, an inability to change one’s 
life patterns, and the inability to develop a richer, more complex, more satisfying 
personality.” 17 
The environment in which the United States finds itself has changed dramatically 
since 1946. Since, at least, the mid-1970s the speed of change has been rapid and the 
direction erratic. We have not adapted gracefully to the change. We resist changing our 
national life patterns. Similar to the Soviet leadership, so helpfully analyzed by Kennan, 
we are increasingly neurotic in our effort to justify inconsistencies between our self-
image and experience. 
The strategic context emerging from this period of rapid change has not, by-and-
large, been friendly to the attitudes and habits Americans developed immediately after 
World War II. We have become more and more dependent on increasingly expensive 
foreign sources of energy. Other nations, and alliances of nations, have emerged as 
competent competitors. Our comparative advantage in a wide array of fields has 
narrowed or we find ourselves at a disadvantage. An industrial economy has been 
succeeded by a consumer economy with its own precarious tendencies. Our financial 
indebtedness, both foreign and domestic, has increased dramatically. Our unequalled 
military prowess has been unable to forestall the first successful foreign attack on the 
continental U.S. since the War of 1812. Even the “defeat” of our Soviet enemy has not 
seemed to produce a practical return. We are undoubtedly the most powerful nation on 
the planet.  But it sure doesn’t feel like it. 
In Man and His Symbols, Carl Gustav Jung offers, 
In order to sustain his creed, contemporary man pays the price in a remarkable lack 
of introspection. He is blind to the fact that, with all his rationality and efficiency, he 
is possessed by “powers” that are beyond his control. His gods and demons have not 
disappeared at all; they have merely got new names. They keep him on the run with 
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restlessness, vague apprehensions, psychological complications, an insatiable need 
for pills, alcohol, tobacco, food — and, above all, a large array of neuroses… 
 Mankind is now threatened by self-created and deadly dangers that are growing 
beyond our control. Our world is, so to speak, dissociated like a neurotic…  Western 
man, becoming aware of the aggressive will to power of the East, sees himself forced 
to take extraordinary measures of defense, at the same time as he prides himself on 
his virtue and good intentions.18 
Jung does not — and certainly I do not — suggest resolving the neurosis by denying our 
good intentions or presumption to virtue. But neither will any resolution come from a 
willful denial of our struggle to square what we believe with what we have done or 
perceive we must do. 
We have in the Department of Homeland Security and its various concerns a totem 
giving form to a wide range of unresolved conflicts: liberty v. security, insider v. 
outsider, privacy v. transparency, individual v. community, local v. national, good v. 
evil… the list of dichotomies could continue. Never before has a single government 
agency served as a repository for so many potential neuroses.  It’s predisposition to 
neurosis is especially strong because of its domestic – we could say, self-absorbed – 
focus. 
Nearly a century has passed since Sigmund Freud wrote an essay (later to become 
Totem and Taboo) entitled “On Some Points of Agreement between the Mental Lives of 
Savages and Neurotics.”19 In this he offers that totemism is an elaborate, ritualized effort 
to resolve the deep ambivalence that exists in most fearing what we most love. In 
creating the totem we attempt to externalize and objectify the ambivalence that is the 
source of our neurosis. But without great care, the totem can merely institutionalize 
both ambivalence and neurosis. Something more is required to resolve the tension. Is 
this why St. Elizabeth’s has been selected for the new DHS headquarters?20 
Kennan’s key to defending the United States is to recognize and, when appropriate, 
exploit Soviet neuroses. To defend the United States and advance our interests in the 
twenty-first century we must attend effectively to our own neuroses. 
President Bush famously asked of the 9/11 terrorists, “Why do they hate us?”21 He 
answered the question, “They hate our freedoms: our freedom of religion, our freedom 
of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other.” The 
terrorists hate us for our virtues. While the values argument put forth by Mr. Bush 
should not be dismissed, Osama bin-Laden offers a considerably different rationale. 
It should not be hidden from you that the people of Islam had suffered from 
aggression, iniquity and injustice imposed on them by the Zionist-Crusaders alliance 
and their collaborators; to the extent that the Muslims’ blood became cheap and their 
wealth became as loot in the hands of the enemies. Their blood was spilled in 
Palestine and Iraq. The horrifying pictures of the massacre of Qana, in Lebanon, are 
still fresh in our memory. Massacres in Tajikistan, Burma, Kashmir, Assam, the 
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Philippines, Fatani, Ogadin, Somalia, Eritria, Chechnya and in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina took place, massacres that send shivers through the body and shake the 
conscience. All of this the world watched and heard, yet not only didn’t respond to 
these atrocities, but also, with a clear conspiracy between the USA and its allies and 
under the cover of the iniquitous United Nations, the dispossessed people were even 
prevented from obtaining arms to defend themselves.22 
These massacres are unfamiliar to most Americans. U.S. culpability for these horrific 
events will strike most as absurd. Yet Osama bin-Laden is not alone in finding 
Americans complicit in the unjust suffering of Muslim millions.  According to recent 
surveys, most Pakistanis readily agree.23  
Even in seeking to do good, we can cause suffering. In his assessment of our situation 
in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley McChrystal explains: 
Preoccupied with protection of our own forces, we have operated in a manner 
that distances us — physically and psychologically — from the people we seek to 
protect.  In addition, we run the risk of strategic defeat by pursuing tactical wins 
that cause civilian casualties or unnecessary collateral damage.  The insurgents 
cannot defeat us militarily; but we can defeat ourselves.24 
A United Nations report found that in the first six months of 2009, three hundred 
Afghan civilian casualties – roughly 30 percent of the total – were caused by coalition 
forces.25 During the same period the U.S./NATO coalition suffered nearly the same 
number of fatalities.26 In a September interview with 60 Minutes Gen. McChrystal said, 
“Since I’ve been here the last two and a half months, this civilian casualty issue is much 
more important than I even realized. It is literally how we lose the war or in many ways 
how we win it.”  
 In pursuing peace we have killed the innocent. In defending freedom we have 
imprisoned – and worse – those who have done us no harm. We have betrayed what we 
love in an effort to protect what we love. Yet it would be a serious error to see this 
as merely hypocritical or cynical. During the eight years of our current war there have, 
no doubt, been instances of hypocrisy and cynicism. But it is crucial to acknowledge 
these seeming contradictions as the inevitably tragic consequence of exercising power. 
Purity of purpose is hard enough.  Purity of practice is beyond our capacity. As Reinhold 
Niebuhr observes, 
The tragic element in the human situation is constituted of conscious choices of 
evil for the sake of good. If men or nations do evil in a good cause, they cover 
themselves with guilt in order to fulfill some high responsibility; or if they 
sacrifice some high value for the sake of a higher or equal one, they make a tragic 
choice. 27 
The powerful cannot avoid tragedy. It is innate to the nature of power. As our national 
power has multiplied, so has our tragic potential. But the American psyche struggles to 
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deny this reality. We point to innocent intention. We seek individual scapegoats —
Lynndie England or Dick Cheney — for our collective guilt. We propagate neuroses to 
obscure our role in tragedy.  
Our effort to escape tragedy is more threatening to our integrity of purpose — and 
essential innocence — than any tragic choice we undertake. In refusing to embrace the 
tragic, we invite a much more insidious condition. Niebuhr continues, 
If virtue becomes vice through some hidden fault of virtue; if strength becomes 
weakness because of the vanity to which strength may prompt the mighty man or 
nation; if security is transmuted into insecurity because too much reliance is 
placed upon it; if wisdom becomes folly because it does not know its own limits — 
in all such cases the situation is ironic… It is differentiated from tragedy because 
by the fact that the responsibility is related to an unconscious weakness rather 
than to a conscious resolution. 28 
The United States ought not deny the paradox inherent to power. It is self-deluding to 
indulge our neuroses in seeking to avoid the tragic. In Lear the plot is set when the old 
King is unwilling to accept Cordelia’s honest, if paradoxical, expression of love. From 
Lear’s vanity and denial unfolds catastrophe. (Ponder sea coast construction in 
hurricane country, urban wildfire, flood plain development, and much more.) 
There is plenty of death and disaster in Oedipus the King, but Sophocles’ masterpiece 
conforms closer to my own hope for the United States. By most measures Oedipus lives 
a happy and productive life. The trouble he causes is as unintentional as it is inevitable. 
And in contrast to Lear, the trouble caused by Oedipus emerges from nobility, not 
vanity. At the close of Oedipus at Colonus  the Theban king might even be said to 
transcend the tragic; but only after fully embracing his tragic condition.   
PART THREE: Its Projection in Practical Policy on Official Level 
In the third element of his five-part Long Telegram, Kennan shows how 
Kremlin neuroses can be used to predict official Soviet policies. I want to remove or 
reduce the influence of U.S. neuroses on homeland security policy and strategy. 
I have prescribed embracing the tragic. How would this untie the knots of our own 
neuroses? Four preliminary deductions have been offered: 
1. The United States is, by far, the most powerful single player on the planet.   
2. The United States confronts a strategic context even more unstable than 1946.  
3. As a result, the contemporary strategic context is much less predictable than in 
1946.  
4. With limited predictability regarding our threats, national policy and 
strategy should aim to optimize our adaptability to a range of risks. In other 
words, we should adopt a strategy of resilience. 
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If this strategic analysis is broadly accurate, it describes a situation many will find 
frustrating. In most cases, this frustration emerges from being unable to sufficiently 
influence — and certainly not control — our strategic context. Desire for control is 
closely linked to neurosis. In itself the pursuit of control creates the potential 
for cognitive dissonance. How does this jibe with our proclaimed national commitment 
to liberty? But without more control, how can we guarantee safety? 
In embracing the tragic we acknowledge very little can be guaranteed. No complex 
system can be fully controlled. Can goals be cultivated? Certainly. Encouraged?  
Absolutely. Influenced? Yes. Guaranteed? No – even the effort will amplify tragic 
consequence. The exercise of power – even when animated by noble purpose – will have 
surprising and, quite often, ignoble outcomes. Embracing the tragic gives us this 
foreknowledge. This foreknowledge need not constrain our exercise of power, but it will 
inform our expectations. It may also inform how power is exercised. 
Recognizing tragic potential, we accept the probability of surprise and 
the possibility of failure. In any community — with formal democratic traditions or not 
— this recognition encourages shared decision making. Key participants may try (and 
succeed) to manipulate the process, but even at worst the illusion of participation, 
collaboration, and shared deliberation will be fostered.  
Historically, tentative and limited participation in decision-making has often been 
extended, either through increments or revolution. Societies, cultures, and institutions 
that foster participation and 
collaboration in decision-
making seem to have a long-
term comparative advantage. 
There is a growing body of 
evidence that this comparative 
advantage emerges from how 
participative networks increase 
the feedback available to 
the system, thereby enhancing 
the ability of the system to 
maintain rough equilibrium. 
This is a key aspect of 
resilience. 
Systems that maximize feedback spawn learning. This builds knowledge, which can 
extend the boundaries within which the system maintains its equilibrium. This is not, 
mostly, a matter of formal learning, but rather the sort of learning by which complex 
systems adapt to their environment. The results can be chaotic, both figuratively and 
literally, but the outcome is enhanced resilience.   
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Defining Resilience in Action 
Consider this working definition of resilience: “(1) the ability of a system to absorb or 
buffer disturbances and still maintain its core attributes; (2) the ability of the system to 
self-organize, and (3) the capacity for learning and adaptation in the context of 
change.”29 A sense of the tragic tells us (and resilience directs our attention to) “systems 
experience changes that are unknowable and discontinuous, and involve sudden and 
dramatic flips.”30 
The last two quotes are from Governance and the Commons in a Multi-level World 
by Derek Armitage. This is one of hundreds of digital papers available from the 
International Association for the Study of the Commons. Resilience is a principal 
concern of this movement, closely related to Elinor Ostrom, the recent Nobel Laureate 
in Economics. 
Ostrom, Armitage, and others are carefully provisional in their conclusions. But 
several common attributes of the most resilient systems seem to be emerging. Drawing 
heavily on the Armitage paper, but with edits reflecting my own perspective, these 
attributes include: 
• Broad based participation, collaboration, and deliberation; 
• Multilayered and polycentric organizational structures; 
• Networked organizational structures with mutual accountability built into 
how the network functions; 
• Content-rich and meaningful interaction regularly occurring across the 
network; and 
• Facilitative and/or catalytic leadership (in sharp contrast with authoritative or 
control-oriented leadership). 
• All the preceding attributes and their activities produce knowledge of both the 
system and its environment.  
• All the preceding attributes contribute to individual and system-wide 
learning, which is the application of knowledge to maintaining and/or 
potentially extending the boundaries within which the system maintains its 
equilibrium. 
These are fundamental components of any effective resilience strategy.  Only when most 
of these attributes are reflected in strategy, operations, and tactics will our homeland 
security effort generate a long-term comparative advantage. (I have purposefully left out 
one other generally recognized common attribute: trust. This will be dealt with later.) 
When our attitudes or actions are contrary to these attributes, we contribute to our 
disadvantage. When our attitudes and actions are consistent with these attributes we 
enhance the resilience of whole system. 
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The less a system is characterized by these attributes, the more neurotic it will be; in 
other words the more dissociated from reality. Kennan recognized the deep neurosis of 
the Soviet Union’s centralizing, controlling, and excluding tendencies. He predicted its 
collapse. 
A bit more than a year after sending the Long Telegram, George Kennan reworked 
his analysis of Soviet neuroses and published “Sources of Soviet Conduct” as an 
unsigned piece in Foreign Affairs magazine. This revised and expanded text included a 
top contender for the most important single sentence of any strategy document of the 
Cold War: 
In these circumstances it is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward 
the Soviet Union must be that of long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of 
Russian expansive tendencies.31 
I have been trying to argue that in our current circumstances it is clear that the main 
element of any United States policy toward the risks we face must be that of long-term, 
patient but firm and vigilant extension of the boundaries within which we can achieve a 
kind of equilibrium. If this sounds odd, listen again to Brian Walker’s seven-minute 
explanation of resilience.   
This strategy is fully cognizant of our limitations, which I argue can best be 
approached by embracing the tragic. This is also a strategy that recognizes the potential 
of complex adaptive systems to preserve core identity in the midst of profound flux. 
While depending on your mastery of the previous literary analysis and the insights 
drawn from the study of the commons and complexity, I will take the risk of translating 
these arcane analogies into a direct – if very wonkish – statement of homeland 
security strategy.  
A STRATEGY OF RESILIENCE 
(With an Operational Example) 
 
The United States faces a range of natural, accidental, and intentional threats that 
cannot always be accurately predicted; as a result these threats cannot always be 
prevented. 
Accordingly, the homeland security strategy of the United States seeks to maximize 
individual, local, regional, and national capacity to: 
1. Absorb or buffer disaster while preserving and, if possible, advancing physical, 
psychological, social, economic, and constitutional integrity. 
2. Effectively observe and adapt to change while preserving or advancing physical, 
psychological, social, economic and constitutional integrity. 
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3. Learn and increase capacity to adapt to changes experienced at the local, 
regional, and national level and across social and economic sectors. 
The Secretary of Homeland Security, in cooperation with the President and other 
departments and agencies, shall undertake to: 
Support and facilitate community-based Risk and Resilience Assessments. 
These Risk and Resilience Assessments shall be undertaken on a voluntary basis. The 
Department of Homeland Security shall provide conferences, training, and expert 
facilitators to assist in completion of the Risk and Resilience Assessments. Completed 
Risk and Resilience Assessments shall qualify to compete for up to $1 billion in federal 
grants.  
Every level of government, major agencies of government, private sector 
organizations, and neighborhoods shall be encouraged to undertake Risk and 
Resilience Assessment. The Department of Homeland Security shall contract 
with well-established voluntary, not-for-profit organizations to serve as legal liaison and 
grant administrators for informal organizations or other parties (e.g., a 
neighborhood) wishing to participate in the Risk and Resilience Assessment process 
but not having status to receive federal funding. 
The Risk and Resilience Assessment process shall include local, regional, statewide, 
multi-state, and national workshops, conferences, and related digital resources to 
encourage participation, collaboration, deliberation, and interaction among those 
undertaking Risk and Resilience Assessments. 
The Citizen Corps program of the Department of Homeland Security shall be funded 
and organized to provide facilitation and expertise in the Risk and Resilience 
Assessment process. 
The Risk and Resilience Assessment process, as outlined above, shall be monitored 
by a team of expert observers/evaluators who will rapidly share lessons learned. A web-
based, peer-to-peer network will also serve as a dynamic and 
growing knowledge base for the Risk and Resilience Assessment Process. 
The Department of Homeland Security, the Center for Homeland 
Defense and Security at the Naval Postgraduate School, and the National Academy of 
Sciences shall cooperate in establishing the National Institute for Risk and Resilience to 
develop, conduct and encourage others to develop and conduct professional 
development, educational, and other learning programs related to Risk and Resilience. 
All parties completing Risk and Resilience Assessments shall be eligible to compete 
for a total pool of $1 billion per year in federal grants to address the findings of the Risk 
and Resilience Assessments. Every three months $250 million shall be awarded in the 
following tranches: 
• Up to five grants of $5 million each,  
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• Up to 25 grants of  $1 million each,  
• Up to 50 grants of $500,000 each,  
• Up to 100 grants of $250,000 each,  
• Up to 200 grants of $125,000 each,  
• Up to 1,000 grants of $40,000 each,  
• Up to 2,000 grants of $20,000 each, and  
• Up to 4,500 grants of $10,000 each.  
Recipients shall be chosen by majority vote of 500 electors drawn from nominations 
submitted by the governors of the states and territories of the United States and 
apportioned by population. After one year of service, 125 electors shall retire every 
three months and be replaced by a new class. (So that, of the inaugural class, 125 shall 
serve one year and nine months.) In this manner, beginning in the second year of 
operations, the electoral body will receive new members each quarter.  
 
The foregoing is less a proposal than a framing, and is offered primarily to demonstrate 
how the strategic principles set out might be practically implemented. There are real 
ways to encourage broad-based participation, collaboration and deliberation. It is 
possible, even for a large bureaucracy, to offer facilitative leadership and eschew 
authoritarian tendencies. It is possible to encourage local creativity and accountability. 
It might even be possible to encourage communities and the system to embrace tragic 
potential.  
I don’t expect the Department of Homeland Security, much less the entire homeland 
security establishment, to suddenly adopt a strategy of resilience. But the example is a 
doable, potentially powerful means of seeding resilience thinking and behavior. It would 
probably cost $1.3 billion per year. But please give more attention to how the attributes 
of resilience are being seeded. The seeds of the first season should multiply in 
subsequent seasons. With care – and some fortuitous emergence – we might even be 
creating a new commons, a widely-shared resource for enhanced understanding of risk 
and resilience. 
PART FOUR: Its Projection on Unofficial Level 
In the fourth part of his five-part Long Telegram, George Kennan addresses how Soviet 
neuroses play out in unofficial behavior. I have set out how the U.S. could reduce its 
neurotic stance on homeland security through official policy and strategy. But 
the effectiveness of the proposed measures depends on a range of unofficial attitudes 
and actions. Even if not precisely unofficial, effectiveness depends on serious 
PALIN, RESILIENCE 
        
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME VI, NO. 1 (JANUARY 2010) WWW.HSAJ.ORG  
!
*$!
engagement with messy, subjective, very human attributes that “official” policy and 
strategy often seek to exclude. 
In considering the example above, I hope readers worried whether sufficiently 
rigorous standards were established for awarding the proposed federal grants. It would 
be even more satisfying to be challenged on the competence of the 500 electors to assess 
the grant requests. (The number is based on the jury that convicted Socrates to death, a 
rhetorical gift to skeptics.) 
These concerns reflect our current official norms. These norms emerged from a 
salutary process, now more than a century old, to reduce the corrupt influence of 
personal preference and increase the role of expertise in making official decisions. I 
perceive these norms and their related processes have reached a stage of rococo 
decrepitude. Official norms now discourage community-based participation, 
collaboration, and deliberation. Our official norms now stand in the way of the kind of 
communication and other behaviors that create resiliency. 
Armitage et al. have identified key attributes of resilient communities. My previous 
listing did not include the potentially most important — and admittedly mysterious — 
attribute: Trust. In studying the commons, and in distinguishing between common 
resources that are over-harvested and those sustainably harvested, trust has been 
identified as an essential attribute of successful self-organization. In the literature 
trust is sometimes characterized as requiring two elements: a shared set of preferences 
and expectations of future interactions. 
This notion of trust makes enormous sense to a small town boy. I work best with 
those who broadly share similar goals and with whom I expect to continue working.  I 
work best with my friends. But our official norms — well beyond homeland security — 
have become so neurotic that friendship is actively discouraged. No wonder so many feel 
dissociated from our political culture, the process of governance, and — at worst — from 
reality itself. 
In a paper written last year, Elinor Ostrom explores the foundations of trust. In the 
monograph, Building Trust to Solve Common Dilemmas: Taking Small Steps to Test an 
Evolving Theory of Collective Action, the Nobel-winning political economist sets out 
that the following variables seem to be highly correlated with trust and cooperation: 
• Information about past actions is made available; 
• Repeated interactions occur with the same set of participants; 
• Participants can signal one another by sending pre-structured information; 
• Prescriptions are adopted and enforced that when followed do lead to higher 
outcomes; 
• Participants are able to engage in full communication (via writing or “chat room” 
without knowing the identity of the others involved); 
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• Participants are able to engage in full communication with known others (via 
face-to-face discussions or other mechanisms); 
• In addition to communication, participants can sanction (or reward) each other 
for the past actions they have taken; and 
• Participants can design their own rules related to levels of cooperation and 
sanctions that are to be assigned to those who do not follow agreed-upon rules.32 
Dr. Ostrom also reports that three variables seem to be highly correlated with lack of 
cooperation and the absence of trust: 
• One-shot interactions; 
• Full anonymity – current actions taken by an individual cannot be attributed to 
that individual by anyone else; and 
• No information is available to one participant about the others involved. 
Which set of variables more accurately represents your typical interaction with the 
Department of Homeland Security or other expressions of government? Perhaps we 
have the first clues for diagnosing the sources of our political discontent. Have our 
current norms and processes succeeded in excluding official corruption and cronyism? 
No, they have not. But in a tragedy-inviting effort to control the bad, we have 
undermined the good. We have discouraged broad-based participation, collaboration, 
and deliberation. We have discouraged effective communication. We have become 
suspicious of friendship. 
Our neurosis erupts in surprising ways and places. But we can resolve the neurosis 
with self-awareness, embracing the tragic, and self-consciously adopting the attitudes 
and behaviors most conducive to resilience. 
PART FIVE: Practical Deductions from Standpoint of U.S. Policy 
From the closing paragraphs of the Long Telegram: 
 
(3) Much depends on health and vigor of our own society. World communism is 
like malignant parasite which feeds only on diseased tissue. This is point at which 
domestic and foreign policies meets Every courageous and incisive measure to 
solve internal problems of our own society, to improve self-confidence, discipline, 
morale and community spirit of our own people, is a diplomatic victory over 
Moscow worth a thousand diplomatic notes and joint communiqués. If we cannot 
abandon fatalism and indifference in face of deficiencies of our own society, 
Moscow will profit–Moscow cannot help profiting by them in its foreign 
policies… 
(5) Finally we must have courage and self-confidence to cling to our own 
methods and conceptions of human society. After Al [sic], the greatest danger 
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that can befall us in coping with this problem of Soviet communism is that we 
shall allow ourselves to become like those with whom we are coping. 
 
KENNAN 
800.00B International Red Day/2 - 2546: Airgram 
 
Fundamental to Kennan’s foreign policy is an effective — we might even say, resilient — 
domestic policy. The stronger and more differentiated our internal condition, the less 
opportunity we give any external threat. As his later writings confirm — and is inferred 
by the final paragraph above — Kennan is not much concerned with the strength of 
domestic security. Rather, the social, political, and economic vitality of the nation is our 
best defense (and offense, too). The more we solve domestic “deficiencies” the stronger 
our international position.  
Much of our thinking and talking about homeland security is homeostatic. We focus 
on prevention and protection. We talk about recovery. We seem to seek to minimize 
change. It sounds like we are aiming to preserve the status quo. But this language 
obscures — and may actually complicate — achievement of our real goal, which is much 
more about adaptability, optimization, and growth. We want to solve our deficiencies. 
A complex system self-organizes around a point of equilibrium. This is good; we 
usually don’t want the system to lose its core characteristics. But do we really want to 
always return to the same or very similar point? (The Greek homoios = similar is the 
origin of homeo in homeostasis.) This has not been the goal — or historical experience — 
of the United States. We want the stable sense of being in the same place. But we have 
also wanted our equilibrium point to move (up) — economically and in regards to justice 
and freedom. It has been the American tendency to seek a kind of heterostasis, a 
stability that encompasses a depth and breadth of positive change. 
In Brian Walker’s seven-minute whiteboard talk, he tells us about the “basin of 
attraction.” This establishes the boundaries within which any system can self-organize. 
The narrower and shallower the basin, the more likely turbulence will cause the system 
to spill over its boundaries and become an entirely different system. Consider a 
shallow champagne coupe. Just a little turbulence and all is lost. 
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Better is a champagne flute. The depth of the basin is more suited for containing 
turbulence. The flute’s shape intensifies and directs the internal turbulence — bubbles 
and fragrance — for our pleasure. Even more conducive to resilience is the depth and 
breadth of a red wine goblet.  The basin generously accommodates the 
turbulence needed to aerate the wine. The more complicated the vintage, the more 
vigorous the turbulence, the more satisfying the taste.   
Two years ago, at the now traditional World Bank riot, a police commander applied a 
strategy of resilience to a tactical situation. It was toward the end of a long, hot day. A 
unit of riot police was being held in reserve outside the principal perimeter. The arrival 
of a television crew attracted an anarchist flash team intending to charge the police.  
Just as the anarchists finished the short war-dance that typically precedes a charge, 
the police commander barked into his radio, “Disperse!” The line of dark visors turned 
sharply toward their boss. Again he shouted, “Disperse!” And this time he waved his 
arms and wiggled his fingers as if to say, anywhere, I don’t care. The thin blue line 
dissolved. 
The anarchists, all pumped up from their noisy huddle, no longer had a target. They 
looked around in confusion. Their shoulders slumped. The television crew drove on. The 
turbulence had been given the space it needed to reach a new, but recognizable, 
heterostasis. 
Gordon Allport, a leading twentieth century psychologist, argued that human beings 
are able to transcend homeostatic bias. We can actively and creatively embrace tension 
as a means for change and personal growth. In choosing how to engage our environment 
– especially in organizing our choices around values and goals – we can change the set-
point for social and psychological equilibrium.33 Humans and our societies are, or can 
be, heterostatic. 
In developing and implementing a strategy of resilience we seek to deepen and widen 
the boundaries in which turbulence can occur while maintaining the essential function 
and form of our current system. Has this been — is this now — the goal of the 
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Department of Homeland Security? Does this resonate with the goals and objectives of 
the component agencies of the Department of Homeland Security? Is this a major 
outcome of our homeland security planning, training, exercising, grant-making, and 
preparedness programs? 
With a few possible exceptions, the answer has to be no. If any consistent 
strategy can be discerned it has much more to do with suppressing the likelihood of 
turbulence and responding to the messy consequences of turbulence, rather than 
accommodating the possibility (probability) of turbulence. In homeland security we 
have been much more focused on resisting change than adopting resilience. 
A major impediment to an authentic and meaningful adoption of resilience is the 
genesis-role of terrorism in spawning homeland security. We have fought – are fighting 
– a war against terrorists. As Liddell Hart explained, there are certain strategies 
appropriate for winning wars. There are others focused on securing the peace.34 
Resilience alone is not sufficient to succeed in the present war. We must go beyond 
resilience to constrain our adversaries, reduce their capabilities, preempt planned 
attacks, and protect ourselves. But we are unlikely to be entirely successful. The 
adversary can be foiled a thousand times. Disaster can unfold from a single failure. As 
President Obama warned in Oslo, “Terrorism has long been a tactic, but modern 
technology allows a few small men with outsized rage to murder innocents on a horrific 
scale.”35 
Resilience is uniquely suited to preserving our strategic advantage in the midst of 
such failure or in the case of natural and accidental disasters. Whatever the target of 
turbulence (physical, psychological, economic, political, cultural, or all-encompassing) a 
strategy of resilience dissipates the impact. 
Resilience opens space for turbulence to swirl. Freedom and diversity extends this 
space. Resilience is reinforced by participation, collaboration, and shared deliberation in 
a multi-layered democracy and multi-dimensional civil society. Strong networks of 
family, friends, and neighbors are the building blocks of resilience.  
In physics and mathematics the end-state of resilience is restored equilibrium. In our 
social context resilience is not so much a matter of maintaining equilibrium as creatively 
accommodating turbulence to achieve heterostatic outcomes. Returning to the working 
definition of resilience offered above, our strategic goal is to absorb – even to benefit 
from – disruption, self-organize in response, and learn to adapt effectively to new 
conditions. For me that is a good summary of the core attributes of the American 
national character… and our fundamental comparative advantage. 
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Jihad Dramatically Transformed?   
Sageman on Jihad and the Internet 
David Tucker 
In his book Leaderless Jihad,1 Marc Sageman claims, as the title indicates, that Jihad in 
the modern world is changing from a centrally organized and structured activity into a 
more dispersed, decentralized movement in which small groups self-organize to carry 
out attacks. Bruce Hoffman has challenged this claim and Sageman’s way of supporting 
it, arguing that al Qaeda central is alive and well.2 As is often the case in such disputes, 
in so far as the substance is concerned, there is truth on both sides.3 The kind of self-
organizing groups that Sageman describes do exist, and sometimes get help from 
overseas, but are not the only Jihad threat we face.   
As this debate rumbled on and became part of the debate over what to do about 
Afghanistan,4 two things became clear. First, neither Hoffman nor Sageman, or others 
weighing in, considered the strategic consequences of the network structure they are 
disputing about. There is a tendency to assume, for example, that networks are powerful 
organizational structures inherently difficult for industrial-age bureaucracies like the 
United States government to deal with. Sageman alludes to this larger argument by 
mentioning the “difficulty of national bureaucracies trying to combat terrorist market 
forces,” although Sageman does recognize some of the limits of so-called leaderless 
movements (pp. 145, 146).5 In fact, networks, or decentralized organizations and 
activities, have weaknesses; and hierarchies, or centralized organizations, have 
strengths that on balance give the latter distinct advantages against both al Qaeda 
central and the al Qaeda movement. 6 
The second point that became clear was that not enough attention had been paid to 
the claims that Sageman made about the role of the internet in the development of what 
he calls the leaderless Jihad movement. These claims are clear and quite strong. 
Sageman claims it is the internet that “has dramatically transformed the structure and 
dynamic of the evolving threat of global Islamic terrorism by changing the nature of 
terrorists’ interactions… Starting around 2004, communication and inspiration shifted 
from face-to-face interactions…to interaction on the internet” (p. 109). Assessing 
Sageman’s claim is important because if he is right, it would suggest that we switch 
attention and resources to combating digital recruitment. If he is wrong, then this would 
be a waste of resources. 
As Sageman presents his argument, it depends on two interrelated arguments. The 
first is that web sites presenting Jihadist propaganda or bomb-making instructions and 
other operational advice are not the engine driving extremist Islam. Sageman points out, 
for example, that bombs built only with instructions from web sites have either not 
exploded or have had limited effects (p. 113). More important, he discounts the effect of 
the propaganda on web sites in encouraging radicalization and commitment to the 
extremist cause. He denies that images found on these web sites have “intrinsic power to 
influence people into taking arms against the West.” Such images, Sageman claims, 
“merely reinforce already made-up minds” (p. 114). Sageman offers no evidence to 
support his denial of the importance of the images. What he does instead is to offer his 
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second argument: the interactivity of the internet (particularly forums and chat rooms) 
is changing human relationships in a revolutionary way and hence, he implicitly 
assumes, must be changing the way those who become extremists interact online. In 
support of this claim, Sageman cites one article and six terrorism cases he says show the 
revolutionary impact of the internet and substantiate his claim that the internet “has 
dramatically transformed the structure and dynamic of the evolving threat of global 
Islamic terrorism.” 
Before examining Sageman’s argument and his evidence in detail, we should note two 
general points. First, even if Sageman is right about the effects of internet fora and chat 
rooms, it would not prove that the propaganda images on web sites are not aiding 
radicalization. Sageman simply denies that they are, without offering any evidence, and 
presents a counter-argument about the web. There is no logical connection between the 
truth of his counter-argument and the falsehood of the claims about the propaganda 
value of the images on the web. Both could be true. In fact, as we shall see, there is some 
evidence to suggest that the web sites do aid in radicalization. Second, we should note 
that six cases is a very small sample. It is not reassuring to see someone who claims to 
proceed scientifically as others have not (p. 13), basing such large and strong claims on 
such a small sample. Sound generalization is always a problem in terrorism studies 
because terrorism is such a rare event that we seldom have a large number of well-
understood cases to base our claims on. Any scientific or even simply reasonable and 
candid analysis of terrorism should acknowledge this problem, however, and be modest 
in the claims it makes. 
We can begin the detailed examination of Sageman’s claims as he does by considering 
the effect of the internet on human relations in general. He states that “people’s 
relationships are being completely transformed through computer-mediated 
communications.” Sageman offers no support for this claim, except to make additional 
undocumented claims, for example, about the effects of anonymity. He proceeds, 
however, to draw conclusions about terrorism from these undocumented claims, 
arguing that the trust and intensity of emotion that is necessary for the sacrifices that 
terrorism requires can be generated online. At this point he states that “online feelings 
are stronger in almost every measurement than offline feelings. This is a robust finding 
that has been duplicated many times” (p. 114)  
In support of this broad claim, Sageman cites one article: a review of research on the 
effects of the internet on social life.7 The article does not state that “online feelings are 
stronger in every measurement than offline feelings” or that this is a robust finding. It 
states rather that in two experiments “those who met first on the Internet liked each 
other more than those who met first face-to-face.”8 (It also reports that, depending on 
assumptions about the social context, interactions on the internet can be negative, 
displaying lack of trust, for example.9) Overall, the article offers no support for the claim 
that the internet is transforming social life. For example, the article reports that 
research supports “the view that membership and participation in Internet groups can 
have powerful effects on one’s self and identity” but it also reports that “group processes 
and effects unfold over the Internet in much the same way as they do in traditional 
venues.”10 Instead of supporting Sageman’s claims, the article suggests that Sageman is 
wrong in stressing the transformational character of the internet. It reports that people 
tend to take online relationships offline into the non-internet world, for example.11 This 
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suggests that whatever the internet’s advantages, individuals still prefer face-to-face 
social life to online social life. Indeed, the article reports that “international bankers and 
college students alike considered off-line communication more beneficial to establishing 
close social (as opposed to work) relationships.”12   
Other research on the social effects of the internet published since the one article that 
Sageman refers to does not support Sageman’s claim that the internet is transforming 
people’s relationships. First, the internet does not appear to be displacing people’s social 
activity. People who use the internet are not less likely to have other forms of social 
contact. Internet use “appears to expand activity engagement rather than replace 
previous personal channel contacts [including face-to-face contact] or media use.”13 This 
research suggests that if Islamic extremists are replacing face-to-face contact with 
internet mediated contact, as Sageman claims, then they are doing something that 
others who use the internet are not doing.  
Other research offers a possible explanation for the continuing importance of face-to-
face interaction. A review of research on the social consequences of internet use among 
adolescents finds that such use is correlated with improvements in “social 
connectedness and well-being” but only when the internet is used “to maintain existing 
friendships.” When adolescents use the internet “to form new contacts and talk with 
strangers, the positive effects do not hold.”14 Whatever the reason for this, it does not 
seem to support Sageman’s claims about the transforming effects of the internet. 
Moreover, it casts doubt on his unsupported claim that strangers can form bonds of 
trust online as effectively as they can face-to-face. We should note, however, as the 
review of research just quoted does, that “internet research is still young and does not 
yet allow us to draw decisive conclusions.”15 
If research on internet use does not support Sageman, neither does the other 
evidence he uses, the six cases he refers to in his book. The table below summarizes 
what Sageman tell us about his six cases. 
 




 F2F Internet  
Crevice X X  
Madrid bombing16   Yes 
Hofstad X X  
Cairo bombing   Yes 
Operation Osage X X  
German bombing X X  
 
After presenting this evidence in narrative form, Sageman states “this clearly shows the 
change from offline to online interaction in the evolution of the threat” (p. 110). In fact, 
it does not. In two of the six cases that Sageman mentions, he tells us only that the 
terrorists got support from the internet (an inspirational document in the case of the 
Madrid bombing and bomb-making instructions in the case of the Cairo bombing). 
There is nothing new here. Terrorists did not begin using the internet for support in 
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2004. The 9/11 bombers used it, as did others before them. More important, “support” 
is not “interaction,” and it is interaction among terrorists that Sageman says the internet 
has “dramatically transformed.” Interaction did occur on the internet in the other four 
cases, but it also occurred face-to-face. How do we know which kind of interaction was 
more important? If terrorists are meeting as they have always done and then 
communicating online, which would be consistent with research on internet use, this 
does not suggest a dramatic change in terrorists’ interactions. It is important to note, 
then, that only in one case (the German bombing) does Sageman tell us the terrorists 
met first online. 
The reason Sageman does not mention terrorists meeting first online in the other 
cases is that it did not happen. In all the other cases, it appears the terrorists met first 
face-to-face.17 In fact, the evidence suggests terrorists tend to be friends, acquaintances 
or relatives, who then become radicalized and carry out an attack.18 In the course of this 
process, they may contact others online but Sageman presents no evidence that these 
online contacts are more important than the face-to-face contacts. In fact, the evidence 
suggests they were not. The groups formed face-to-face and then, to one degree or 
another, used the internet. But there is no evidence the internet was necessary for group 
formation, subsequent radicalization or carrying out an attack. The internet may make it 
easier to find accomplices in geographically dispersed places, coordinate with them, and 
get plans for a bomb, but terrorists did all these things before the internet existed. The 
internet may allow terrorists to improve their efficiency but the cases Sageman 
mentions do not show a transformation in how terrorists interact.19 Moreover, in three 
of the six cases that Sageman mentions, the face-to-face contact first occurred in a 
Mosque or an Islamic religious group, exactly the sort of thing that Sageman argues was 
not important after 2004 (pp. 109, 110). Only one of the cases Sageman mentions (the 
German bombing) supports his claim that the internet has changed interactions among 
terrorists. 
What about cases that have occurred since Sageman’s book appeared in 2008? There 
have been a number of cases over the past several years.20 Full details on these cases are 
not available but we can look at what we know about a few of the more prominent ones. 
Al-Shabab, an Islamic extremist group in Somalia, has apparently been recruiting 
among first- or second-generation Somali immigrants in the United States. It uses 
videos on the internet but also face-to-face contact. Some of those recruited and 
subsequently arrested have reported attending secret meetings, meeting people on 
basketball courts or at Mosques, or in chat rooms online. Al-Shabab also uses what one 
report described as networks of friends to help its recruiting efforts.21 Bryant Neal Vinas, 
an American citizen, converted to Islam in 2004, according to one report, because of al 
Qaeda videos he viewed online. He then attended a mosque, which members of the 
extremist group al Muhajiroun were known to frequent. He subsequently traveled to 
Pakistan, where a friend helped him to get in touch with al Qaeda. During his time in 
Pakistan, Vinas met others who hoped to carry out extremist attacks. Some had been 
recruited in Belgium in person by an al Qaeda recruiter, who also used the internet to 
recruit others.22 Najibullah Zazi, an Afghan immigrant, was arrested in connection with 
an investigation into a possible terrorist plot in September 2009. Although details in 
this case are particularly sparse, Zazi is reported to have attended a mosque with his 
family as he was growing up and possibly to have joined with others who left the mosque 
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when the Imam preached against al Qaeda. Another report claims he was in touch by 
phone with al Qaeda members in Pakistan.23 Four men from Newburgh, New York 
arrested for plotting to bomb a synagogue in New York City had prison and a mosque in 
common but no reported use of the internet or contact with al Qaeda recruiters.24 
Hosam Maher Husein Smadi met someone working for the FBI online and subsequently 
plotted with him and others working for the FBI to carry out a terrorist attack. The 
informants and Smadi did meet face-to-face while the planning the attack.25 
While sketchy and limited, none of the information we have on these recent plots 
suggests anything like what Sageman claims. Internet images sometimes appear to 
assist if not initiate the movement to extremism. Chat rooms play a role but rarely are 
the place terrorists first meet; face-to-face contact predominates. Mosques and other 
physical gathering places figure more prominently than the internet. In this limited 
sample, the internet appears to be a useful but by no means a transforming or even 
dominant means of mobilizing recruits for extremism. This is actually a point Sageman 
comes close to making himself at the end of his chapter on the internet (p. 121).  
In showing the complex interaction of social relations, the internet and recruiting, all 
of these cases show a marked resemblance to the summary description one analyst of 
the Madrid bombing has offered of those who carried out that attack: 
 
It was in Mosques, worship sites, countryside gatherings and private residences 
where most of the members of the Madrid bombing network adopted extremist 
views.  A few adopted a violent conception of Islam while in prison.  The internet 
was clearly relevant as a radicalization tool, especially among those who were 
radicalized after 2003, but it was more importantly a complement to face-to-face 
interactions.26 
 
Again, none of this suggests that Sageman’s claims about the internet and 
terrorism are true. 
Further evidence suggesting that Sageman’s claims are wrong comes from research 
done on the recruitment of foreign fighters from the Middle East and North Africa.  
Analysis of data captured in Iraq shows that 97 percent of a group of 177 foreign fighters 
met their recruitment coordinator “through a social (84 percent), family (6 percent) or 
religious (6 percent) connection.” Only 3.4 percent of the 177 foreign fighters mentioned 
the internet. Furthermore, when countries of origin for the foreign fighters were 
compared to the number of internet users in those countries, “more internet users 
correlated with lower numbers of fighters.” Finally, analysis shows that there is no 
correlation between countries that access extremist web sites and countries that produce 
foreign fighters.27 If the internet were an important tool of mobilization and 
recruitment, we would expect to see a correlation between accessing extremist web sites 
and numbers of foreign fighters.    
What holds true for the Middle East and North Africa might not hold true for other 
places with greater general rates of access to the internet and less of a supporting social 
and cultural network for extremists to rely on. In these places, one night argue, the 
internet might be the only place where would-be radicals could find the contacts and 
encouragement they need to join the extremist movement. Yet what is true of the Middle 
East and North Africa appears to be true of North America, judging by the cases 
TUCKER, SAGEMAN ON JIHAD 
 
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME VI, NO. 1 (JANUARY 2010) WWW.HSAJ.ORG  
 
6 
Sageman cites and the additional cases discussed above. “The internet plays a minor 
radicalization role…. Conversations, sermons, print and radio communication, family 
and social networks present foreign fighters with local justification for joining the 
jihad.”28 This finding accords with research that finds internet use tends to “activate the 
active;” that is, promote engagement and activity among those already inclined that way 
and focus attention on the local community.29   
One must conclude, therefore, both that Sageman offers no evidence to support his 
claim the internet is transforming how terrorists interact and there is little evidence 
elsewhere to support this claim. Perhaps over time, the evidence will emerge. In the 
meantime, we are stuck with the difficult task of focusing “on the social and religious 
networks” from which extremists emerge if we want “to interrupt or fragment face-to-
face recruitment.”30   
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Optimization Approaches to Decision Making on Long-Term Cleanup and 
Site Restoration Following a Nuclear 
or Radiological Terrorism Incident 
S. Y. Chen and Thomas S. Tenforde 
INTRODUCTION 
Potential radiological consequences that could result from terrorist acts are of great 
concern to both national security and public welfare, particularly for acts involving 
Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDD) or Improvised Nuclear Devices (IND). 
Accordingly, a series of relevant planning guidance documents has been developed by 
federal agencies, such as the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) through its 
authority under the Homeland Security Act of 2002, and are currently incorporated in 
the National Response Framework (NRF). While the initial planning effort has focused 
predominantly on protecting against or responding to activities related to the early (i.e., 
emergency) phase of an event for both first responders and the affected public 
populations, guidance on the late-phase recovery effort (i.e., activities leading to the 
eventual reoccupation of the contaminated areas) has not been adequately developed. 
One major consideration for developing such guidance is the need to encompass a 
potential array of seemingly limitless scenarios, ranging from a minor incident that 
causes only some “disruption” from an RDD, to a potentially severe incident causing 
“mass destruction,” such as the damage that could be caused by an IND.  
Regardless of the scenario, one common long-term concern is the potentially 
widespread radioactive contamination of either private or public property (particularly 
in highly populated metropolitan areas) that would require an extensive mitigation 
effort.1 Two major factors, among others, would likely weigh heavily in the decision-
making process: the large cost implications and the stakeholder acceptance of the 
cleanup goals, especially if a long time is required for site recovery.2 The challenge to 
develop suitable guidance for late-phase recovery efforts will therefore be influenced by 
these, as well as other, considerations in subsequent deliberations surrounding related 
issues.3 
A REVIEW OF HISTORICAL RADIOLOGICAL EVENTS  
Although there have been events involving the use of radioactive materials for malicious 
intent in recent history, they have been isolated incidents and few in number, and have 
had limited impact on society.4 It is thus useful to evaluate past radiological events that 
have caused significant releases, such as accidents involving nuclear facility operations 
or management of radioactive sources. Such events include accidents involving (1) 
nuclear power-generating facilities, (2) military and defense operations, and (3) 
radiation sources and transport.5 These events cover a wide spectrum in level of severity, 
ranging from limited environmental impacts or human trauma to significant casualties 
and environmental contamination. The lessons learned and experiences gained from 
past accident events can serve as valuable input in formulating a meaningful response to 
similar radiological issues in terrorist incidents involving RDD or IND.  
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Radiological events can cause varying degrees of harm to humans as well as the 
environment. To help characterize and communicate the significance of these events, 
the International Atomic Energy Agency, together with the Organization for 
Cooperation and Economic Development’s Nuclear Energy Agency, has published the 
international nuclear and radiological event scale (INES).6 The scale was designed to 
emulate such representations as the Richter or Celsius scales for earthquakes or 
temperature, respectively, and offer a better understanding of the magnitude of the 
potential impact. The INES scale comprises seven levels of severity (from low to high):  
Level 1, Anomaly;  
Level 2, Incident;  
Level 3, Serious Incident;  
Level 4, Accident with Local Consequences;  
Level 5, Accident with Wider Consequences;  
Level 6, Serious Accident; and  
Level 7, Major Accident.  
Events that are without safety significance are called “deviations” and are classified as 
Below Scale (or Level Zero). Three major descriptors are used to gauge severity for 
nuclear facilities: impact on people and environment, impact on radiological barriers 
and control, and impact on defense-in-depth (the latter two apply only to nuclear 
facilities). Accordingly, for any significant concern about radioactive release and 
subsequent contamination of the environment, the possible events would register a 
severity scale of at least Level 5 (i.e., releases that would require implementation of 
planned countermeasures) or beyond. Some of the more serious events (i.e., Level 5 
through 7) that attracted considerable attentions worldwide in recent history are the 
following. 
1. Accident at Three Mile Island Unit 2, Dauphin County, Pennsylvania, 
March 1979.7 Considered the worst accident ever in the U.S. commercial 
nuclear power industry, it released about 13 million curies of radioactive 
gases (i.e., relatively harmless noble gases) but only 20 curies of iodine-131 
(I-131) to the environment. Radioactive contamination was largely limited 
to the facility and its confines. It has been designated as an INES Level 5 
accident (accident with wider consequences).8 As a precautionary 
measure, pregnant women and preschool-age children within a five-mile 
radius of the Three Mile Island facility were advised to evacuate, and about 
140,000 residents voluntarily evacuated within days. Although the 
accident did not cause any significant impact on people and environment 
(only about one estimated long-term cancer fatality due to offsite 
releases), it did lead to significant damage to the reactor core. Since there 
was no contamination to public land as a result, the recovery activity was 
limited largely to the cleanup of the facility itself, which took several years 
and cost about U.S. $975 million. 
2. The Chernobyl Accident, Pripyat, Ukraine (Former Soviet Union) April 
1986.9 Likely the worst nuclear power plant accident in history worldwide, 
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the Chernobyl accident resulted in a widespread release of radioactive 
materials following a massive nuclear explosion that destroyed reactor 
Number 4. The accident released an estimated total of 380 million curies 
of radioactive material into the environment (including 49 million curies 
of I-131 and 2.3 million curies of Cesium-137 (Cs-137)).10 The accident led 
to fifty-six direct deaths (many of those were attributed to radiation 
exposure) and an estimated 4,000 long-term cancer deaths.11 An estimated 
336,000 people were evacuated within an extended “exclusion zone” of 
4,300 square kilometers.12 An estimated 2.6 million km2 of agricultural 
land was affected, with extensive contamination of the environment and 
the ecosystem.13 The release affected parts of the western former Soviet 
Union, Eastern Europe, Western Europe, North Europe, and also other 
parts of the world. Potential costs of the cleanup effort cannot be readily 
measured, although the initial estimate for Belarus alone in a thirty-year 
program to rehabilitate the affected areas was about U.S. $235 billion 
(thirty-two times the Ukraine’s annual budget at the time of the 
accident).14 As such, the accident has been characterized as INES Level 7 
(i.e., a major accident), because it resulted in “a major release of 
radioactive material with widespread health and environmental effects 
requiring implementation of planned and extended countermeasures.”15  
3. Cesium Source Accident, Goiania, Brazil, September 1987. 16  Perhaps the 
worst accident involving radioactive sources, this was the result of an 
inadvertent scavenging of a radioactive medical teletherapy (radiotherapy 
using external radiation beams) source (containing Cs-137) in an 
abandoned hospital. Since the accident was not recognized for several 
days, it was allowed to propagate further. It thus resulted in four deaths 
and injuries to several other people due to radiation exposure. In addition, 
part of the city was contaminated and required an extensive 
decontamination and remediation effort lasting several months, largely 
due to the lack of preparedness and specific guidance in responding to an 
unprecedented incident. A total of 1,200 curies of Cs-137 was accounted 
for in the contamination (out of a total of 1,375 curies in the original 
cesium chloride source), with an estimated contamination area reaching 1 
km2.17 Although the total final cost for the cleanup effort is not known, it is 
believed to be substantial. The accident has been designated as an INES 
Level 5 accident (accident with wider consequences).   
These examples also offer a useful glimpse into the potential severity levels for an RDD 
or IND incident, with a full blown RDD incident possibly at Level 5 (widespread 
contamination) and the IND incident at Level 6 or 7 (potential for causing major 
destruction). Of course, events of smaller scale could also occur and may result in only 
localized damage and have a more limited impact. However, regardless of the specific 
situation, each event would cause considerable disruption and possible trauma to the 
affected society in the short term, and present an expensive and long-lasting recovery 
challenge.  
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RESPONSE AND PROTECTIVE ACTIONS GUIDANCE 
Protective Actions and Guidelines 
In the United States, federal agencies have been planning responses to nuclear 
emergencies for decades.18 Historically the planning has focused primarily on 
emergencies involving accidental releases of radioactive materials, such as from nuclear 
power plants. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) first developed a Protective 
Actions Guide (PAG) manual in 1975. Following the Three Mile Island accident in 1979, 
President Carter issued an executive order establishing the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) as the lead agency coordinator for the nation’s 
radiological emergency response and preparedness. Under the arrangement, EPA was 
assigned the task of establishing PAGs for radiological response planning, and it issued 
the Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents 
with input from other federal agencies.19  
Following the terrorism acts of September 11, 2001, DHS was created by the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002, which consolidated twenty-two agencies (including 
FEMA) into one single federal agency. DHS has a threefold mission: to lead the unified 
national effort to secure America; to prevent and deter terrorist attacks and protect 
against and respond to threats and hazards to the nation; and to secure the nation’s 
borders while welcoming lawful immigrants, visitors, and trade.20 The Top Official 
(TOPOFF) exercise, also directed by Congress in response to the September 11, 2001 
terrorist attacks, was designed to strengthen the nation's capacity to prevent, protect 
against, respond to, and recover from large-scale terrorist attacks involving weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD).  
In response to this directive, DHS has conducted two exercises for attacks by RDD. In 
2003, the TOPOFF 2 exercise was conducted to simulate a terrorist attack involving an 
RDD in Seattle, Washington. In the TOPOFF 4 exercise of 2007, simulation of a full-
scale response to multifaceted threats was conducted – a coordinated attack in Oregon, 
Arizona, and the U.S. Territory of Guam. The TOPOFF 4 exercise was based on the 
National Planning Scenarios,21 designed for integrating federal, state and local partners 
in emergency planning (among the fifteen listed scenarios, Scenario 11 addresses a 
radiological attack by an RDD; the scenarios are now collapsed into a total of eight, with 
all chemical-related scenarios in one single core scenario, which is further differentiated 
by chemical agents in appropriate annexes per the Homeland Security Council). These 
exercises addressed policy and strategic issues involved in mobilizing prevention and 
response systems, and they challenged the ability of top officials to maintain a common 
set of operational goals during an incident of national significance. Following the 
TOPOFF exercises, the lessons learned were incorporated by DHS officials into the 
National Response Plan (NRP), which was later updated and then superseded by the 
current NRF in 2008. Both the NRP and the NRF were designed to provide guiding 
principles for a unified national response to disasters and emergencies.  
In an effort to provide guidance for responding to terrorist events involving RDD or 
IND, DHS established an interagency working group in 2003, the Consequence 
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Management, Site Restoration/Cleanup and Decontamination Subgroup (of the 
Working Group on RDD Preparedness) to address the need for unified federal guidance 
on RDD-related issues, with participation from eight other federal agencies. Following 
several years of deliberation, the guidance entitled Planning Guidance for Protection 
and Recovery Following Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) and Improvised 
Nuclear Device (IND) Incidents, was issued in 2008.22 The guidance provides PAG to 
support decisions on actions to be undertaken to protect the general public and 
emergency workers. The guidance includes information and regulations published by 
the EPA,23 which has incorporated relevant recommendations from the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA).  
The DHS PAG guidance on RDD and IND events generally follows the existing EPA 
PAG Manual for nuclear accidents. That is, the response is divided into three distinctive, 
yet somewhat overlapping, phases of an event. The early phase (or emergency phase) is 
the period at the beginning of the incident when immediate decisions for effective 
protective actions are required and when actual field measurement data are expected to 
be unavailable. It is generally associated with the initial plume passage and with short-
term exposures. Priority is given to provide lifesaving and first-aid actions to protect 
public health and welfare. Response measures include such actions as sheltering or 
evacuation of the public, as well as decontamination and administering prophylactic 
drugs. The period of this phase may last from hours to a few days.24  
The intermediate phase, which follows the early phase, is usually assumed to begin 
after the sources and releases are brought under control and field measurement data 
have become available for decision-making. The objective of the response is to prevent 
or avoid prolonged radiation exposure to the public. A high priority is given to such 
actions as restoring critical infrastructure or relocating the general public. The 
intermediate phase may last for weeks or months.25 
The late phase (or recovery phase), which follows the intermediate phase, represents 
the stage at which residual radiation levels from the event are reduced to acceptable 
levels, allowing a return to a state of normality, which may last for many years following 
the event occurrence. The PAG issued by DHS contain specific dose limits for response 
actions in both early and intermediate phases, but do not recommend specific dose 
limits for the late phase. Instead, the PAG recommends the late-phase cleanup be 
achieved through a “site-specific optimization process.” It states, “Because of the 
extremely broad range of potential impacts that may occur from RDD or IND…a pre-
established numerical cleanup guideline is not recommended as the best serving the 
needs of decision makers in the late phase.”26  
Scope of Response and Responsibility  
Responsibility for responding to RDD or IND incidents is currently specified under the 
NRF. The framework identifies the key response principles, as well as the roles of 
officials that organize responses ranging from local to regional to national levels.27 The 
scope and responsibilities of federal support are further prescribed under the 
Emergency Support Functions (ESF) within the NRF; fifteen support functions are 
established for all FEMA-managed incidents have been identified with responsible 
federal agencies (in collaboration with state and local governments cooperating with 
them): (1) transportation,; (2) communication; (3) public works and engineering; (4) 
CHEN AND TENFORDE, CLEAN—UP AND SITE RESTORATION 
 




firefighting; (5) emergency management; (6) mass care, emergency assistance, housing, 
and human services; (7) logistics management and resource support; (8) public health 
and medical services; (9) search and rescue; (10) oil and hazardous materials response; 
(11) agriculture and natural resources; (12) energy; (13) public safety and security; (14) 
long-term community recovery; and (15) external affairs.  
For the late-phase recovery issues specifically, the primary responsibility for 
radiological cleanup falls under ESF no. 10 (oil and hazardous materials response) with 
EPA as the lead coordinating agency. For issues related to long-term cleanup, and 
depending on specific contamination situations, it is likely that the effort may also 
overlap other support functions that are led by other agencies (such as ESF 14 on long-
term recovery led by DHS/FEMA), which would entail close coordination among these 
agencies in a particular response. 
LATE-PHASE RECOVERY GUIDANCE AND CONSIDERATIONS 
Cleanup Guidance 
Late-phase recovery response has been recognized as an integral and important 
component of a national response to radiological incidents, but specific federal guidance 
has been lacking.28 The DHS PAG guidance of 2008 represents the first prescribed by a 
federal agency on events involving terrorism. However, as noted above, in lieu of a 
specific PAG (such as a predetermined dose criterion for cleanup), a process was 
prescribed for deriving a long-term cleanup plan. It involves a site-specific 
“optimization” process, intended to bring a balanced approach to determining the 
appropriate cleanup criteria for the contaminated area. One key reason that no specific 
level was recommended for late-phase recovery is that the potential impacts of RDD or 
IND incidents vary widely from minor to severe, so it would not be practical to use 
predetermined criteria for the cleanup and site restoration efforts.  
This is an important departure from the conventional statutory cleanup processes, 
which have established specific cleanup guidelines based either on radiation dose or 
health risk levels.29 Nevertheless, any criterion chosen from the optimization process 
will still include consideration of existing federal statutory requirements on 
environmental cleanup (such as the EPA Superfund Program and the U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission’s [NRC] rule on license termination), along with other national 
and international recommendations.30 The final cleanup will likely be decided by a host 
of relevant variables to be taken into consideration, such as the extent and type of 
contamination, human and environmental health protection, technological feasibility, 
and costs, among others. The deliberation on cleanup goals and criteria will be 
conducted by a designated Planning Section Unit under the emergency management 
structure by incorporating appropriate technical entities and stakeholders in the 
decision-making process.  
Discussed in the following section are the fundamental approach and key elements to 
be considered for developing the optimization process.  
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Optimization Process and Considerations 
For late-phase response (i.e., long-term cleanup), the guidance prescribes a process for 
deriving a long-term plan, in lieu of a predetermined cleanup level, in which site-specific 
situations are properly balanced. This approach entails a site-specific optimization 
process for determining the appropriate cleanup criteria for the contaminated area. For 
example, cleaning up an extensively contaminated urban area (as one might postulate 
for an RDD or IND event) would entail considerable complex deliberations compared to 
cleaning up a contaminated industrial site (as often encountered in EPA Superfund 
activities). Among other things, there would be an overwhelming desire for the affected 
community (both for businesses as well as the general public) to return to its normal 
routines following a radiological event (from a highly interrupted state due to initial 
evacuation or subsequent relocation). This effort would necessarily entail considerations 
far beyond the scope that is currently encompassed in the Superfund cleanup process. 
The cleanup process pertaining to the event would thus warrant more flexible 
considerations and would take the form of a multifaceted approach, that is, the 
optimization process. Compared to either early- or intermediate-phase responses, the 
decision makers would have more time to deliberate on the late-phase recovery issues.  
The primary goal of optimization is to establish societal objectives that include 
possible future land uses, cleanup options and approaches, technical feasibility, costs, 
cost-effectiveness, infrastructures, local economy, and ultimately public acceptance. For 
example, a small-scale incident (such as confined within a city block) may receive an 
expedited cleanup effort (using a simple, pre-determined approach), while an incident 
causing extensive contamination (e.g., affecting tens of city blocks in a major urban 
area) may warrant considerable effort (e.g., in terms of costs and time), thus influencing 
the decision on the final cleanup criteria.  
The optimization approach is also exemplified in the selection of appropriate 
decontamination technology. A recent report by the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) cites the importance of developing guidance for identifying cleanup 
methods.31 The report pointed out that by not selecting appropriate cleanup technology, 
the decontamination effort may generate waste types that are more difficult to remove, 
thereby creating more wastes for disposal. For example, washing Cs-137-contaminated 
concrete walls with water may inadvertently enhance chemical affinity of the 
contaminant to the concrete surface, thus potentially increasing the quantity of waste 
generated (due to the need for additional decontamination efforts), in addition to 
creating secondary waste water streams. Or, applying chemical agents for 
decontamination may increase decontamination efficiency but also help generate mixed 
wastes (i.e., waste containing both hazardous chemicals and radioactive materials) that 
would increase costs for waste treatment and disposal. Thus a careful evaluation on the 
availability, effectiveness, and potential costs would necessarily entail a full 
understanding of the performance of a particular cleanup technology under 
consideration.  
The concept of optimization has been advocated by international and national 
regulatory and advisory bodies, and is also commonly practiced by all levels of 
government in decision-making processes. The International Commission on 
Radiological Protection (ICRP) has prescribed basic principles for protection against 
radiation.32 Of particular relevance is the fact that ICRP has advocated use of the 
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principle of optimization of protection, which maintains that the likelihood of exposure, 
the number of people exposed, and the magnitude of individual doses “…should all be 
kept as low as reasonably achievable, taking into account economic and societal factors.” 
This objective is commonly referred to as the ALARA (as low as reasonably achievable) 
Principle and has been affirmed by the National Council on Radiation Protection and 
Measurements (NCRP).33 The ALARA Principle has thus been a requirement in all 
existing regulations for control of radiation exposures, including the statutes on cleanup 
of nuclear facilities. A “graded” approach recommended by the Presidential-
Congressional Commission on Risk Assessment and Risk Management for 
environmental health risk management is also consistent with the optimization process 
and ALARA Principle.34 The graded approach is directly applicable to the highly varied 
situations that are both event- and site-specific in cases involving RDD or IND. 
Implementation of the cleanup decision thus requires input from all relevant 
stakeholders, taking into account a broad set of long-term objectives. 
Based on the above discussion, a number of areas have been identified as important 
for future development considerations. Such issues span from formulating applicable 
national policies, to advancing research and development in characterizing 
decontamination and cleanup technologies, improving understanding and ascertaining 
potential radiological impacts and implications, and finally, to developing effective 
decision-making processes and opportunities for stakeholder involvement. These are 
further discussed in the following sections. 
NEED FOR FURTHER DEVELOPMENT 
While the late-phase guidance developed by DHS offers a logical framework for the 
optimization process, it still lacks specificity and technical substance on how to reach 
cleanup decisions. In particular, given that the complexity of a cleanup is highly 
dependent on site-specific factors, several issues particularly critical to the decision-
making process require more in-depth consideration; for example, (1) how to 
characterize the governing cleanup principles, (2) how to factor in event conditions and 
other relevant parameters, (3) how to identify and prioritize options, and (4) how to 
achieve consensus between stakeholders and decision makers. A host of relevant issues 
need to be fully evaluated in order to facilitate decision making, ranging from policy 
assessments, to a basic scientific understanding of cleanup technologies and their 
limitations, to public relationships and communication.35 In fact, some of these 
problems have begun to surface in recent TOPOFF exercises.36  
Formulating Appropriate National Policies  
Although the scope and responsibility of the national response to events are well 
structured and prescribed under the NRF, individual policies that govern the operation 
of the responsible agencies in late-phase recovery have yet to be fully evaluated. The 
potential lack of coherent policies will likely hinder decision-making deliberations and 
therefore the efforts associated with site cleanup and restoration.37 Since we have little 
experience in addressing major radiological terrorism incidents, an evaluation of the 
relevancy and applicability of existing policies is warranted. Important issues are 
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property condemnation and economic assistance for the affected individuals and areas, 
waste storage and disposal, and recovery of critical infrastructure and facilities such as 
government buildings, major transportation arteries, and hospitals.38  
Two policies that need to be determined are disposal of the radioactive waste created 
during cleanup and the finality of cleanup objectives. With regard to radioactive waste 
disposal, decisions must be made about the disposal location and required acceptance 
criteria. Large volumes of very low-level contaminated radioactive waste (LLW) could be 
generated. Valuable lessons have been learned from past nuclear events, discussed 
earlier in this paper, where the decontamination activities involved mainly the removal 
of contaminated soils and dismantling of the houses that were deemed unsafe for 
dwelling. For example, in the event involving a cesium source in Goiania, Brazil (1987), 
the stored low-level waste (based on an ad hoc standard of 2 mSv/h dose rate) from the 
cleanup activities reached a total of 3,500 m3 (with a radioactive content of 1,375 Ci), 
which included contaminated soils, debris, and other materials.39 A temporary waste 
storage was used as a staging location (it was unclear where the waste was ultimately 
disposed of, as there was not an available disposal site at the time of the incident). 
This issue leads to consideration of expanding the current regulatory definition of 
LLW in the U.S. (substantially large amounts of LLW would be generated according to 
the current regulatory definition that contains no lower cut-off limits for radioactivity; 
in the Goiania case that limit was set at 2 nCi/g) and the possibility of using appropriate 
waste disposal sites (including existing commercial or government-owned radioactive 
disposal sites or alternative sites, such as local landfills for lower activity wastes).40  
Currently, there is an acute shortage of LLW disposal options in the nation. According to 
the Health Physics Society, “…the current shortfalls…are not attributable to any 
deficiencies in science or technology, but rather to the failure to garner the political 
resolve required to implement the Low-Level Waste Policy Act of 1980 (LLWPA)…as 
directed by Congress.”41 It would be prudent to identify and resolve such policy-related 
issues ahead of time. Toward this end, certain policies may need to be established in the 
process, including the possibility of invoking Presidential Executive Orders to expedite 
the disposal process (such as at DOE disposal facilities) as an emergency measure. Such 
policy issues warrant further deliberation and planning.  
With regard to the finality of the cleanup, it will be important to evaluate the cleanup 
requirements in existence now and to determine how to ensure that a site will not be 
subject to further cleanup actions in the future. An optimization process cannot be 
created without a comprehensive understanding and full resolution of these and other 
potential policy issues.  
Advancing Research and Development 
A large amount of experience and knowledge has been gained over the past few decades 
from cleanup activities conducted under various statutory requirements (including EPA 
Superfund cleanup activity, DOE efforts to remediate its former nuclear weapons 
complex, and NRC efforts to decommission its licensed facilities). However, as 
discussed earlier, significant differences do exist; thus the direct applicability of such 
experiences to RDD- or IND-related incidents must be thoroughly investigated.  
First on the list of concerns is the characterization of contamination. Current cleanup 
efforts tend to focus on alleviating the long-term contamination of groundwater (by 
CHEN AND TENFORDE, CLEAN—UP AND SITE RESTORATION 
 




emphasizing the subsurface transport) due to existing conditions such as subsurface 
contamination. On the other hand, the situation in an RDD or IND incident would 
primarily involve aboveground contamination and subsequent transport in the 
environment. Because of the relatively high mobility of many contaminants, factors that 
could influence redistribution of contamination are ground-to-air resuspension, 
particle-size distributions, human disturbance, and adverse weather conditions (i.e., 
weather effects on the characteristics and transport of contaminants). Analysis of these 
factors will entail applications of, and possibly changes to, current models of 
contaminant dispersion in order to adequately characterize the possible exposure 
scenarios in RDD and IND incidents.  
Second, current knowledge of cleanup technology is generally limited to 
contamination of confined industrial areas, but not the wide-area contamination in a 
heavily populated metropolitan area that might occur in an RDD or IND incident. 
Examples for these specific applications do not exist today, as relevant events have not 
occurred. Yet one can get a glimpse of the potential magnitude of effort involved by 
examining the activities that have taken place following a major nuclear accident. In the 
case of the Chernobyl accident, for example, several different kinds of decontamination 
techniques were used.42 These included flushing of buildings and paving, digging up and 
removing of soils, plowing of fields, and chemically treating building materials. A 
comparison of the effectiveness of these techniques for urban settings reveals large 
variations.43 For example, while washing down the road (for dry deposition) was 
identified as being effective, the same technique was found to be ineffective for 
decontamination of building walls.  
The variations under these circumstances have yet to be fully researched, verified and 
documented. In the aforementioned GAO report,44 it was pointed out that current 
research efforts have focused mainly on predicting the effects of radiation release 
through simulation, small-scale testing, and theory, otherwise lacking full-scale field 
testing and verification. The report also calls for more research in developing 
standardized guidance for technology deployment and for cost-effective guidance on the 
efficacy and effectiveness of cleanup technology. The availability and applicability of 
such information needs to be well developed, compiled, and documented.  
Third, the basic understanding of the fate and transport of radionuclides in the 
environment must be strengthened, particularly with regard to the modern urban 
environment. Examples include the surface water runoff from rain or washing from 
decontamination activities into drinking water or sewage systems, and the development 
of effective containment and treatment downstream from the event. More research is 
needed to provide such information in predicting the movement of contaminants in an 
urban environment that would serve to guide an effective response in the recovery phase 
activities. As in the case of technology discussed above, current knowledge in this 
subject area has not been specific to urban settings. 
In summary, extensive scientific endeavors are needed to investigate the interrelated 
“real world” issues, rather than simply focusing on a single physical phenomenon. These 
efforts would include (1) tracking the movement of radionuclides in the environment 
(e.g., from the streets to transportation systems to the drinking water or sewage systems 
in an urban environment); (2) the continued propagation of such contamination beyond 
the area of deposition; and (3) the accumulation of radionuclides, such as those that 
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might be encountered in an urban environment and that must be removed prior to 
reoccupation. A well-developed body of technology that is specifically applicable to 
event situations in urban settings would greatly help in formulating a sound cleanup 
strategy and thereby facilitate rapid recovery.  
Improving Understanding of Potential Impacts and Implications  
The important decisions leading to a long-term cleanup strategy would necessarily be 
risk-informed and aimed at achieving optimization. According to DHS guidance, the 
optimization process should include “potential future land uses, technical feasibility, 
costs, cost-effectiveness, and public acceptability.” The DHS guidance further states that 
“Broadly speaking, optimization is a flexible, multi-attribute decision process that seeks 
to weigh many factors.”45 While many consider RDD as “weapons of mass disruption” 
(even if they lack significant destructive force, they have a great potential to spread 
radioactive contamination), the exact magnitude of their potential impacts on society 
has yet to be assessed with certainty because of the large variability in possible 
scenarios.46 The potential impacts of IND incidents are even less certain,47 although they 
would likely be of greater magnitude than those of RDD incidents, potentially causing 
some casualties as well as widespread, substantial, long-term contamination. Above all, 
inaccurate predictions of potential effects could adversely influence nuclear terrorism 
preparedness, leading to erroneous decisions.48  
Aside from the potential impacts on human health, emphasis must be placed on 
characterizing the potential economic losses and the possible recovery costs (relatively 
large costs may be involved if a key metropolitan district is affected)49  that an RDD or 
IND incident may inflict on society — a challenge for which a substantial DHS-
supported research effort has been undertaken and for which further assessments are 
still needed.50 Additionally, the potential psychological impact on society is another 
factor that has to be fully understood and characterized.51 Other impacts also remain 
uncertain, including future land use options, waste generation and disposal, available 
cleanup technologies and approaches, public acceptability, and potential coverage of 
cleanup costs through insurance policies held by private property owners.52   
The long-term cleanup would entail extensive input and evaluation in the context of 
optimizing site cleanup and restoration in the aftermath of an RDD or IND incident. 
Many of these issues are exemplified by, and have been manifested in, the major 
radiological accidents discussed earlier (specifically the radioactive source accident at 
Goiania and the reactor accident at Chernobyl).  
Past experiences and the lessons learned from them reinforce the fact that there is an 
urgent need to develop a sound technical basis for applying optimization processes in 
late-phase recovery from a major radiological or nuclear terrorism incident. Research 
should be continued and also further expanded in areas identified as critical to 
developing basis for decisions in the process that is described in the following section. 
Developing Effective Decision-Making Processes and 
Stakeholder Involvement 
It is important to recognize that the optimization process for cleanup following an RDD 
or IND incident would be fundamentally different from the more familiar processes 
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employed under the current statutory cleanup requirements. Superfund, for example, 
requires meeting a preset cleanup criterion or risk goal together with prescribed 
procedures (e.g., through the remedial investigation and feasibility study, together with 
five years of follow-up monitoring).53 Most of the Superfund sites are located in 
industrial or suburban areas. The optimization process, on the other hand, is designed 
to address a far more complex issue than cleanup, since its predominant objective is to 
achieve a timely restoration of the affected site to “normality” (a condition that allows 
government and its citizens to resume their daily routines) following the creation of a 
highly perturbed state, particularly in a heavily populated metropolitan area.  
Important considerations that must therefore be factored into optimized decision-
making processes are identifying and mitigating potential health risks, addressing 
public financial burdens, restoring key infrastructures, and resuming normal 
commercial activities, as well as balancing the roles and interests of affected 
stakeholders. However, society as a whole has little experience with such processes.54  
Clarification of, and stepwise guidance for, developing and applying optimization 
processes would be helpful and is clearly necessary. While existing cleanup guidance 
may serve as a convenient benchmark, different cleanup criteria may result from 
application of an optimization process. A decision on any cleanup approach, of course, 
must be weighed against the potentially large costs to be borne by society.  
Thus, achieving “optimization” requires a transparent approach backed by a sound 
rationale that satisfactorily reconciles the potential constraints in balancing acceptable 
health and environmental risk goals with the costs involved. The development of such 
an optimization process would be the key to implementing the PAG guidance 
recommended by DHS. Toward this end, one may view the existing statutory cleanup 
requirements as being an integral component of the overall optimization process, one 
that would only distinguish the event-related conditions from those unrelated to the 
events (such as Superfund) in a self-consistent deliberative process. Recent activities in 
the decision-making process for incident response may offer further information on this 
complex decision process.55 However, a systematic approach will be required to develop 
a comprehensive framework and a more instructive process with illustrative examples, 
together with a sound scientific basis and an extensive stakeholder engagement, to 
achieve the objective.  
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
On the basis of these considerations, it appears that the current guidance issued by DHS 
presents a starting point for the long-term cleanup of sites contaminated by an RDD or 
IND incident. Nevertheless, further clarification and step-by-step procedural details are 
still required for both the development and implementation of optimization procedures 
for setting cleanup and site restoration goals. The most important issue to be addressed 
is identifying and defining the underlying elements for developing the principles and 
approaches in an optimization process to support the framework outlined by DHS. 
Further developmental work is required to support decision making, ranging from 
policy, to technical know-how, to impact assessments, to stakeholder interactions. For 
further input, some of the major issues should be vetted through a series of future 
emergency exercises designed to identify and resolve late-phase recovery objectives in 
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order to obtain meaningful feedback from stakeholders.56 To this end, the effort should 
be devoted to developing a systematic approach that encompasses the following areas: 
(1) characterization of event scenarios, (2) development of viable alternatives, (3) 
decision framework and process, (4) technical basis and key parameter sensitivity, (5) 
stakeholder engagement and involvement, and (6) event- and site-specific 
considerations. The GAO has called for the development of a national disaster recovery 
strategy;57 the optimization process should become a centerpiece of that strategy.  
In recent years, national advisory bodies such as NCRP have devoted considerable 
effort to developing general guidance related to homeland security. NCRP, for example, 
has developed a considerable body of guidance on preparing for, and responding to, 
RDD and IND. This guidance includes NCRP Report No.138 (2001), Management of 
Terrorist Events Involving Radioactive Material;58 Commentary No. 19 (2005), Key 
Elements of Preparing Emergency Responders for Nuclear and Radiological 
Terrorism;59 and Commentary No. 20 (2007), Radiation Protection and Measurement 
Issues Related to Cargo Scanning with Accelerator-Produced High-Energy X Rays.60 
NCRP is currently preparing a report, Responding to Radiological and Nuclear 
Terrorism: A Guide for Decision Makers. Another report related to environmental 
remediation management is NCRP Report No.146 (2004), Approaches to Risk 
Management in Remediation of Radioactively Contaminated Sites.61 The wealth of 
such information forms an initial basis for formulating decision-making actions 
involving response to RDD- or IND-related events. However, further development of the 
framework and guidance is necessary, particularly regarding decisions facing the 
daunting tasks associated with the aftermath cleanup activities following such an event.              
Thus timely development of guidance on the late-phase optimization process as 
espoused by DHS is very much needed by society, preferably well before any 
unfortunate RDD or IND terrorism incident occurs. 
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Information Sharing: Exploring the Intersection of Policing with 
National and Military Intelligence 
Gary Cordner and Kathryn Scarborough 
 
This article explores the intersection of (1) policing and police intelligence with (2) 
national intelligence and military intelligence. The premise is that for more than 150 
years, prior to the events of September 11, 2001, police intelligence had little connection 
to national or military intelligence. Basically, national intelligence focused on serious 
world-wide political and economic threats to the nation’s well-being; military 
intelligence focused specifically on military threats to the national security; the police 
focused their intelligence work on criminals who posed threats to individuals and local 
communities. A fairly clear division of labor was in place, based largely on the type and 
scale of threats. 
Since 9/11, however, it has become plausible that a small group of non-state actors, 
such as terrorists, could launch a serious attack against the nation using weapons of 
mass destruction, or even small arms, as in Mumbai. These individuals might live in a 
local U.S. community or halfway across the world, yet plan and execute a massive and 
violent attack against a local U.S. community. They might also commit ordinary crimes 
to help finance their larger intentions. In this new context of terrorism and asymmetric 
threats, a local police department might develop intelligence of significant interest to 
national and military intelligence, or vice versa. 
Important historical, conceptual, and policy issues associated with the intersection of 
national, military, and police intelligence are discussed more fully elsewhere.1 This 
article presents the results of a small-scale study in which subject matter experts were 
asked to respond to several scenarios related to intelligence and information sharing, 
asking both what should happen and what would actually happen. 
U.S. POLICING 
Policing in the United States is civilian (non-military), predominantly local (funded and 
directed by local governments), and extremely fragmented. It is not just that police are 
distributed all around the country2 – they mostly answer to local elected officials. The 
U.S. has almost 18,000 separate law enforcement agencies, roughly 16,000 of which are 
local. Of the remaining 2,000 agencies, the vast majority represent special jurisdictions 
(university police, transit police, park police, etc.), followed by state agencies, and lastly 
by federal non-military agencies. Out of 837,000 full-time sworn police personnel 
(armed with arrest authority), 74 percent work for local agencies, 13 percent work for 
federal law enforcement, and 13 percent work for state or special jurisdiction law 
enforcement agencies.3 
The two largest components of U.S. policing are both local: municipal police 
departments (cities, towns, townships, boroughs, villages) and county sheriff’s offices.4 
Two characteristics of these types of law enforcement agencies are absolutely essential 
for understanding their capabilities and contexts: most are small (77 percent have fewer 
than twenty-five full-time sworn officers)5 and they are all independent of each other. 
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There is no chain of command in the police industry – within individual agencies, yes, 
but among and between the 18,000 agencies, no.6 
Along with industry structure, it is important to note a thing or two about police work 
and police culture. Particularly at the local and state levels, police officers in the field 
frequently act alone and without immediate supervision. Much of their work involves 
making “low visibility decisions” – especially when an officer’s decision does not result 
in a report or an arrest (and most police actions and decisions do not), it is rarely subject 
to review. If an officer’s decision does not result in a report or arrest, it probably will not 
produce any official information for later analysis. As Peter Manning notes, 
“information in police departments can best be characterized as systematically 
decentralized. Often, primary data known to one officer are not available to other 
officers” because they are stored in the officer’s head or personal notes. Moreover, “all 
essential police knowledge is thought to be contextual, substantive, detailed, concrete, 
temporally bounded, and particularistic” while information in official reports and files is 
often viewed by officers and investigators as trivial, having been created and 
manipulated mainly for bureaucratic purposes.7 
Additionally, police agencies and police culture tend to celebrate and reward good 
arrests. Information and intelligence, by themselves, are not traditional units of police 
work, they are not measured, and producing them is not rewarded. Also, information 
that is not directly connected to an incident, crime, or case does not have a natural home 
in the typical police records system – there is no file to put it in. Incidents, crimes, and 
cases are traditionally assigned to individual officers (or detectives) who are evaluated 
on how well they handle and dispose of these events. Consequently, the tendency is for 
officers and detectives to hold information closely in order to use it later to enhance 
their own productivity. 
It is also important to recognize that U.S. police, not just the military and federal law 
enforcement agencies, engaged in intelligence-related abuses in the 1960s and 1970s.8 
Informants, undercover operations, and electronic surveillance were often used to 
gather information about civil rights and anti-war groups. Subsequent inquiries showed 
that many of the targets of these intelligence operations were not involved in any serious 
criminal behavior, but rather were engaged in political activities in opposition to 
prevailing government policies, such as the Vietnam War. Local police intelligence 
capabilities were significantly curtailed in the wake of exposes of these abuses, and in 
some jurisdictions have yet to recover.9 
The point of these observations is that the structure of U.S. policing, the nature of 
police work, some historical stumbles, and common features of police culture all seem to 
conspire against an intelligence-led approach to policing and the free flow of 
information.10 To this we can add the traditional tensions between levels of policing in 
our federal system. State and federal law enforcement are often represented or 
perceived as more important and more professional than local police – much to the 
resentment of local police. Local police sometimes also fear state and federal agencies, 
because those agencies have the authority to investigate public corruption and civil 
rights violations in local communities. Specifically on the issue of information sharing, a 
common complaint is that it is a one-way street – local police provide information to 
their state and federal “partners” but get little or nothing in return. The following 
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anecdote from one of the subject matter experts who participated in this project 
illustrates the common local police experience and perspective: 
Person is stopped off I-35 North of Georgetown, TX. Subject has possession of 
numerous photographs of large venue HVAC systems, such as stadia and arenas. 
Subject is a Middle Eastern engineering student. First photos are of subject inside 
Reunion Hotel in Dallas, obviously shot by someone else. Subject alone when 
stopped. Digital photographs copied by police. Local police notify Secret Service 
because of proximity to Western White House. Secret Service tails subject until 
they lose him. THEN they notify FBI, which enters information into Threat 
Matrix. Local police notified after subject left the country. 
Frustration with federal-local information sharing has led the New York Police 
Department (NYPD) to station overseas personnel in eleven posts, including London, 
Paris, Abu Dhabi, and Amman.11 Their post-9/11 reasoning is that (1) their city is a likely 
target of international terrorism, (2) they are not confident that the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) or Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or other federal agencies will 
share important information with them immediately, and therefore (3) they want their 
own people on the ground around the world in the places where key intelligence might 
be uncovered. They also argue that local police in Tel Aviv or Madrid are more likely to 
share information with U.S. local police than with U.S. federal officials. 
In spite of all these longstanding and fundamental challenges, since 9/11 there is 
evidence of improved intelligence gathering and information sharing. Local police have 
been encouraged to collect and forward a new type of document, Suspicious Activity 
Reports (SAR).12 State-level fusion centers have been created to serve as the link 
between local agencies and federal/national agencies and networks;13 some of these 
have even been granted access to classified Department of Defense information 
systems.14 Local and state agencies have reported increased contacts with the likes of the 
FBI, CIA, Centers for Disease Control (CDC), Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), 
and National Guard.15 At the national level, reorganization of the intelligence 
community, increased emphasis on counter-terrorism in the FBI, creation of the 
National Counterterrorism Center, and establishment of an Information Sharing 
Environment all reflect serious attention toward intelligence and information sharing.16 
Numerous obstacles still exist,17 but the consensus is that information sharing is 
improving. 
THIS STUDY 
This study examines how terrorism-related intelligence and information is shared 
between local police, on the one hand, and state police, federal law enforcement, 
intelligence agencies, and the military in the post-9/11 era. It was understood that 
federal laws, state laws, secrecy provisions, and security clearances all affect what can be 
shared in different situations.18 Also, it was presumed that most local police had 
longstanding communication channels with state and federal law enforcement (whether 
effective or ineffective), but not with intelligence agencies or the military. Thus, if local 
police came into possession of information that might be of interest to a federal agency, 
intelligence agency, or the military, what would they do? Similarly, if the military or CIA 
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came upon some information in Central Asia with ramifications for a local community 
in Middle America, what would they do? 
Methodology 
Six short scenarios/vignettes were sent to a small non-random sample of subject matter 
experts in 2008. The scenarios were designed to represent a variety of realistic 
situations in which information sharing might be desirable and might or might not 
occur. The common ingredient in each scenario was a Kentucky connection, only 
because both authors taught at Eastern Kentucky University at the time. The main 
purpose was to ground the scenarios in a typical and realistic setting, without 
introducing the complexity that might ensue if the location was New York, Los Angeles, 
or Washington, DC. 
Responses to the scenarios were obtained from fourteen experts. Of these, ten were 
police executives (identified hereafter as PE) or police intelligence (PI) practitioners, 
two were associated with military intelligence (MI), one was associated with federal law 
enforcement (FE), and one was an academic expert (AE). The police respondents 
represented six different states while the other respondents were also distributed 
around the country. 
The small size of the sample significantly limits any claims of statistical validity, as 
does the weighting of the sample toward police respondents. It is best to think of this 
study as an initial exploration of information sharing among police, intelligence 
agencies, and the military without any pretense that it accomplished a scientific 
measurement of the phenomenon.  
Scenarios 
We asked the subject matter experts to respond to several hypothetical scenarios that 
combined crime, terrorism, and information sharing issues. Six scenarios were 
presented following some general instructions: 
Listed below are several hypothetical scenarios that might involve 
information sharing among local, state, and federal law enforcement, 
intelligence agencies, and military agencies. Each scenario has a 
Kentucky connection, but you may feel free to apply it to your own local 
jurisdiction. We would appreciate any insight you could provide regarding 
two things in each scenario: 
• What would probably happen today in regard to information sharing? 
• What should happen, in your opinion? 
Scenario A: U.S. Army forces in Afghanistan find a computer in a terrorist 
camp that contains images of a chemical plant in Ashland, KY. 
Scenario B: A CIA agent in Africa observes a U.S. citizen meeting with 
elements of Al Qaeda. It is determined that the U.S. citizen lives in 
Elizabethtown, KY, which is near Fort Knox. 
Scenario C: A police officer in Hopkinsville, KY, near Fort Campbell, is 
told by a citizen that she (the citizen) knows an active duty soldier who has 
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rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) in his garage. She says that he (the 
soldier) often talks about how easy it would be to shoot down a passenger 
airplane near the Nashville airport.  
Scenario D: A police officer in Lexington, KY, while handling a domestic 
dispute call at a residence in the city, sees quite a few interesting pieces 
of art. Casual inquiry reveals that the husband in the house is an Army 
reserve doctor recently returned from a tour of duty in Iraq. The officer 
wonders whether the pieces of art might be stolen antiquities.  
Scenario E: A police officer in Louisville, KY responds to a call at a private 
residence. The parents of a 15-year-old boy show the officer the boy's 
computer, on which they found an elaborate plan to assemble a fertilizer 
truck bomb and explode it outside an Army recruiting station in Cincinnati, 
OH. 
Scenario F: An FBI analyst develops an intelligence report that indicates 
that organized groups are smuggling significant quantities of cigarettes out 
of Kentucky for resale in northern states where taxes are higher, and then 
sending the profits overseas to groups that are affiliated with Hezbollah. 
SHARING BY AND WITH LOCAL POLICE 
The post-9/11 focus on local police has mainly been on their role as “eyes and ears” in 
local communities throughout the nation. In this respect they are seen as very important 
collectors of information, of raw data that can be fed into the intelligence process in 
order to help analysts and others “connect the dots.” Community policing is seen by 
some as an ideal local police strategy because it helps officers get to know their 
communities and builds trust, making it more likely that residents will share important 
information with the police.19 It has become common to refer to local police as “first 
preventers” who are most likely to be in a position to prevent a terrorist act, both by 
gathering information and by taking action, when appropriate. This first preventer role 
is paired with the more familiar “first responder” role to make a logical and meaningful 
package that (1) demonstrates the synergy between effective crime reduction tactics and 
counterterrorism and (2) encourages local police to take their counterterrorism role 
more seriously.20 
The National Strategy for Information Sharing reiterated this expanded role for 
local police and provided a few specific examples: 
These partners are now a critical component of our Nation’s security capability as 
both “first preventers” and “first responders,” and their efforts have achieved 
concrete results within their communities, as the following examples illustrate: 
• A narcotics investigation – conducted by Federal, State, and local law 
enforcement officials and resulting in multiple arrests – revealed that a 
Canadian-based organization supplying precursor chemicals to Mexican 
methamphetamine producers was in fact a Hezbollah support cell. 
• A local police detective investigating a gas station robbery uncovered a 
homegrown jihadist cell planning a series of attacks. 
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• An investigation into cigarette smuggling initiated by a county sheriff’s 
department uncovered a Hezbollah support cell operating in several States.21 
Scenarios C, D, and E all focused on suspicious activity discovered by local police. None 
apparently involved international terrorism, but one or two might involve domestic 
terrorism, one might involve transnational crime, and all three involved the military in 
some way. 
Most project interviewees agreed that the local police department in Scenario C 
should, and would, forward its information about the soldier with the RPG to federal 
and/or military authorities. There was some disagreement over details, such as whether 
the investigation should be handled by the appropriate Joint Terrorism Task Force 
(JTTF) or the military. Some variation in responses might have resulted because the 
scenario did not clearly specify whether the soldier’s garage was on or off the military 
base. One respondent indicated that the proper response should involve both 
information sharing and collaboration: 
The local police should investigate the soldier with members of the FBI and the 
military in a joint investigation since both criminal and possible terrorism 
activity may be involved. If follow up is warranted with the TSA and the Nashville 
airport, it should be the responsibility of the FBI. But in this case both criminal 
and national security intelligence may be obtained and can be disseminated to 
sworn law enforcement in the Nashville Airport area if a reasonable suspicion of 
an attack on a plane is detected. If the reason for wanting to shoot the plane is 
one of terror as opposed to some personal animosity, then the subject should also 
be entered into VGTOF (the Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File in 
NCIC). (PI) 
This same respondent, though, indicated that what would happen might be less 
collaborative – the local police would conduct an investigation and they might contact 
the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) or the Nashville airport. From an 
information-sharing and intelligence standpoint, the possibility of the local police 
department conducting its own investigation without informing any other authorities 
would be the least desirable response, but also problematic could be joint investigations 
if they were initiated outside post-9/11 information-sharing procedures. For example, if 
the police and the Fort Campbell MPs conducted an investigation, or if the police and 
the local FBI office conducted an investigation, the raw information might never make it 
to the local agency’s intelligence unit, the state fusion center, the applicable JTTF, or the 
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). One respondent noted: 
Sharing of information with the military is always a problem. There are also 
problems associated with local information that is sent to the FBI first instead of 
traveling through normal local reporting structures first. If suspect information 
goes directly to the FBI, or other federal entity, the information is not generally 
disseminated down to the local level in a timely manner. Unfortunately, when 
this occurs, local intelligence information is often lost. Additionally, vulnerability 
assessments could be updated and local law enforcement resources could be 
allocated towards prevention efforts when local intelligence is received in a timely 
manner. (PI) 
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Scenario D was at most criminal in nature (possible possession of stolen art from Iraq) 
but involved a military service member. Respondents seemed to be split about evenly on 
whether the matter would be handled strictly by the local police or referred to either 
military or federal law enforcement. Since the evidence that a crime had occurred was 
limited, some thought the likelihood of any action was minimal. Most seemed to agree, 
though, that the proper action would be to share the information with the military. For 
example: 
Contact with military investigators should be made by the local agency sharing 
what the officer observed. Military should investigate and provide a follow up call 
back to the initiating agency as to whether or not the art is possibly stolen. In this 
case, if the military determines that there is reasonable suspicion that the 
paintings are stolen, possession of those paintings is then a crime and 
intelligence reports on the subject can be shared between the military police and 
the initiating agency. (PI) 
Scenario E involved a possible threat to a military recruiting station. Because it involved 
the threat of explosives, it elicited a familiar difference of opinion about whether the 
proper federal agency to contact should be the FBI or the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
Firearms and Explosives (ATF). These two agencies have feuded for years over the lead 
federal role in explosives investigation, resulting in conflict between the agencies, 
competition over specific cases, and mixed signals sent to state and local law 
enforcement. A 2009 U.S. Department of Justice Inspector General’s report indicates 
that this situation still persists.22 
There was also a split of opinions on whether the local police would conduct their 
own investigation, whether they would hand it off to the FBI, whether the military 
would be notified in a timely manner, and whether a joint investigation would ensue. 
Two examples: 
My guess is this would be handled completely by local authorities. It appears to 
be only peripherally related to the military. Ideally, the recruiting commander 
would be contacted, which would probably result in contact from Army CID. The 
information should be shared here, but it may never get out of CID. (MI) 
The local agency would share the information with the FBI and in turn the FBI 
would most likely investigate the boy directly prior to contacting the military. If 
the FBI determines that the subject is indeed a possible threat, he would be 
entered into VGTOF. (PI) 
There was more agreement about what should happen in this scenario – information 
should be shared and a joint investigation should be conducted. Responses varied on 
whether the conduit for information sharing should be a regional or state fusion center 
or some other network such as the Terrorism Early Warning Groups (TEWG) that have 
been set up in some areas of the country. Since the scenario involved two local police 
departments in different states, as well as the military connection, established channels 
would seem to be important in making sure that information and intelligence sharing 
crossed state borders as well as agency boundaries. 
One respondent provided detailed information on additional steps that would be 
taken in his jurisdiction. This response strayed from the basic questions about 
information and intelligence sharing, but is worth reviewing because it illustrates the 
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kinds of concerns that local agencies have beyond just investigating a possible crime; 
they also tend to worry about others who might be involved, others who might have 
similar ideas, copycats, as well as fallout in the local community. 
The local police agency School Resource Officer (SRO) would be briefed and 
analysis would be conducted as to evidence of theft or purchase of various items 
needed to carry out any attack. Local police would also update local military 
recruiting stations and look for pre-incident indicators. A coordinated follow up 
with the military would be conducted.  
Since this type of information involves the internet and therefore could 
permeate our schools, our computer crimes unit would be used to monitor this 
type of activity as it relates to this suspect. Chances are if one student has this 
type of information, there are many more out there that may also be involved in 
criminal activity and not discovered by parents, schools, or others. The local 
police agency would not be satisfied with catching one student, but rather they 
would embark on an effort to educate parents and schools on how to be more 
vigilant at detecting these types of crimes. Specific computer and internet 
investigations into this activity may be warranted. (PI) 
STATE POLICE 
The post-9/11 environment has had potentially significant consequences for state police 
agencies.23 Each state has set up some type of homeland security apparatus to advise the 
governor and the legislature, oversee statewide threat assessment and infrastructure 
protection, receive and distribute DHS funds, provide training and assistance to local 
jurisdictions, etc. In many if not most states, the state police have naturally assumed a 
large role in these activities, since they are usually the largest state public safety agency 
(other than corrections, which has limited expertise on the counterterrorism issue and 
little responsibility for terrorism prevention, response, or investigation). The 
development of state fusion centers has also typically been with substantial state police 
involvement – the state police usually had a pre-existing intelligence unit,24 and they 
were often already serving as a principal point of contact for federal law enforcement 
and national intelligence agencies. 
Interestingly, though, none of the scenarios used in this project elicited many 
responses that involved state police per se. One or two responses included the state 
police among the range of agencies that should be notified about some information or 
threat revealed in the scenario. One respondent referred several times to the fact that 
the state police in his state dominate the new fusion center but that information sharing 
is no better than in the past. 
Our state police Intelligence Branch has been a failure for decades for agencies 
other than themselves. Even past state police intel commanders will admit that, 
because of the very nature of the state police to horde information and not share 
it with others. I have witnessed local intelligence meetings where the state police 
and at times the FBI have attended and the meeting starts with asking them what 
they have brought to share.  After hearing each of them (mostly state police) say 
they have nothing to report the group goes around the room and everyone says 
the same thing. A few words are given of thanks and the meeting has adjourned 
only to reconvene after the state police have left the building. Then the real 
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information is shared among the locals with a vow of not giving anything to the 
state police.   
We have many statutes that require us to report to the state police but none to 
require them to share information back to anyone. To state the problem simply:  
the state police have an inherent distrust for local LE and all local LE does is 
mirror that distrust right back at them. (PE) 
Several factors may account for the apparent low level of state police involvement in the 
new information sharing environment. One possibility is that the scenarios simply did 
not incorporate elements that would have made state police participation more relevant. 
A second is that state police are a relatively small slice of the law enforcement pie. Also, 
state fusion centers may have superseded state police agencies as the principal state-
level cogs in the system – if so, this probably just reflects how the new system is 
supposed to operate. Additionally, though, it is probably the case that many local 
agencies have their own direct connections to the JTTF, FBI, or other federal agencies, 
so that no state-level involvement is initiated in many situations. From an efficiency 
standpoint this may seem desirable; however, it might limit information sharing and 
intelligence development if pertinent information does not also find its way to broader 
networks such as the state fusion centers or the NCTC. 
FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 
Scenario F used for this project specifically involved intelligence developed by an FBI 
analyst relating cigarette smuggling and an international terrorist group. The general 
consensus of respondents was that the FBI would either keep the intelligence to itself 
and conduct an investigation, or they would collaborate with other 
federal/national/military agencies for additional information gathering and 
investigation. Two interviewees thought that the FBI would work with the ATF due to 
the cigarette (tobacco) angle. Three mentioned that the FBI would involve the 
appropriate JTTF, which might be a means of limited information sharing with local 
police, although the intelligence would probably be classified and therefore not widely 
shared. Also, one respondent indicated that the frequency of JTTF meetings might not 
be sufficient to count on them for timely information sharing. 
It is likely this will be a strictly FBI operation. Although it would be good for local 
authorities to know about the investigation, I don’t see it as necessary. It should 
be something that gets briefed in the next JTTF meeting. The difference in 
probably and should here is the frequency of the JTTF meetings. They should be 
no longer than quarterly (monthly is better) but I have heard that some JTTFs 
are meeting only rarely now. (MI) 
This scenario raises a typical “need to know” vs. “need to share” issue. The new 
information-sharing environment is supposed to put greater emphasis on need to 
share.25 One method for doing that, in this scenario, would be for the FBI to forward the 
intelligence report to the NCTC, which would presumably share it with other agencies as 
deemed appropriate. Another avenue would be to enter pertinent information in the 
NCIC VGOTF file. The former method would theoretically be more proactive, since it 
might result in intelligence about cigarette smuggling being widely shared with agencies 
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that could then use it in a variety of ways. The latter method would be more reactive – if 
an officer stopped a vehicle or person somewhere and made a NCIC query, they could be 
notified of the possible terrorism connection. 
One respondent pointed out the importance of collaboration with local police in a 
situation of this type: “the local agency should be involved to assist with intelligence 
information they may have on the location, undercover vehicle stops, etc.” (PI). Another 
potential value of following the “need to share” philosophy in this scenario was outlined 
by a different respondent. 
This type of generic information has been widely circulated for some time now; 
however, instead of working closely with local law enforcement agencies, this 
type of crime is typically worked solely by the FBI/JTTF for follow up. 
Since these types of crimes are not worked by local law enforcement officers, 
they lack the knowledge needed to effectively investigate crimes of this nature. It 
would be beneficial if more training was provided to local law enforcement in this 
area. Local law enforcement needs to recognize when this type of information 
should be forwarded to the appropriate intelligence agencies. More importantly, 
critical information on these types of crimes comes not only through reports or 
information analysis, but also through human sources. Human source 
development training should be enhanced to help local police officers develop 
homeland security sources at the local level. The private sector should also be 
better trained and utilized for recognition and timely reporting of suspicious 
criminal activity related to our homeland security. (PI) 
Information sharing by and with federal law enforcement agencies was potentially 
involved in all the other scenarios used in this project. As previously noted, one concern 
is that information shared directly by a local police agency with the FBI, while 
appropriate for handling a particular investigation, may not get the wider dissemination 
or availability it deserves unless it is also sent to the local agency’s intelligence unit, a 
fusion center, the NCTC, and/or the VGOTF. Also, cases involving explosives or 
cigarette smuggling should probably trigger collaboration between the FBI and ATF, but 
this may not always occur. 
Scenario A involved military discovery of information in Central Asia with a possible 
terrorism link back to the U.S. (images of a chemical plant). Several respondents 
indicated that this information would probably be transmitted to the FBI, but whether it 
would then be shared with local or state police in the threatened jurisdiction might be 
problematic. Among the responses were these: 
May make the FBI Threat Matrix, but will not be released to local law 
enforcement unless authorized at the “Secret” level. I do not expect that local law 
enforcement would be notified, albeit they should. (PE) 
The State Fusion Center will receive the information – if it is not classified as 
“Top Secret;” and if they do they will most likely only share with their state 
police.  At this point in time, the likelihood of the local police department or 
county sheriff being notified is slim to none. (PE) 
The information would flow from military channels to the FBI. The information 
would be classified and passed through to the local JTTFs. The information 
would stay at that level with no notification of the local agency … the [local] 
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agency should be contacted and the substance of the information should be 
passed on.  The source information does not need to be included. (PI) 
If the military chose to share this information, they would be forced to share it at 
the federal level which usually means the FBI. The FBI would assume 
responsibility for follow up and investigation. Local police agencies would have to 
rely on the release of information from a local FBI/JTTF office in order for the 
local police to be involved. Many local police departments do not have direct 
contact with FBI/JTTF offices. (PI) 
As responses to these scenarios illustrate, there remains a good bit of skepticism about 
the free flow of information from federal law enforcement agencies. Improved systems 
for information sharing have been established but they are not always used. The 2007 
National Strategy for Information Sharing and 2008 Information Sharing 
Environment provide additional enhancements that should continue the improvements 
already made. Traditional obstacles and barriers certainly remain even though progress 
has been made. 
Since 9/11, information sharing between the federal government and state and 
locals has improved. Most of the improvement has come through the FBI's Joint 
Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), which has tripled in number from 34 before 
September 11 to 100 today. In Los Angeles and other large departments across 
the country, there are active levels of communication and cooperation with the 
Department of Homeland Security and the FBI. 
Despite this progress, the level of cooperation seems to vary greatly, 
depending on the personalities of individual bureau and police chiefs. Too often, 
the FBI cuts itself off from local police manpower, expertise, and intelligence. 
More than 6,000 state and local police now have federal security clearances, but 
the historical lack of trust is still an issue. For example, many police chiefs 
complain of calls they get from their JTTF alerting them to a potential threat, but 
when they ask for the detailed information needed to launch an investigation, 
they are told by the bureau: "We can't tell you" or "You don't need to know." 26  
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES AND THE MILITARY 
This project’s Scenario B posed the situation of a CIA agent in Africa observing a U.S. 
citizen meeting with elements of Al Qaeda. This is a situation involving international 
terrorism, a covert observation made overseas, and information collected by a national 
intelligence agency. The respondents were mixed on whether the information would be 
kept by the CIA, shared with the military, or shared with the FBI. Most were fairly 
certain that local and state police in the citizen’s hometown and state would probably 
not be informed. 
Unless the CIA agent has a friend in the FBI in Kentucky, it is likely this 
information will not go beyond the CIA. What should happen is that both the KY 
FBI and Army Intelligence should be notified of the person and a joint 
investigation conducted to determine if there is any link to activities occurring in 
Kentucky. The FBI would likely run the investigation, but Fort Knox security 
should be notified and kept up on any potential links/threats to the base. (MI) 
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A peripheral check into the subject’s background would be performed by the CIA 
and without further results would cause the subject to be entered into a database 
accessed only by the CIA or Military. This information might be shared with Fort 
Knox but not with local agencies surrounding the base … The subject should be 
thoroughly investigated by the FBI including contacting local agencies to see if 
the subject might be wanted on criminal charges unrelated to terrorism. Often an 
arrest and follow up interview can provide an opportunity to obtain further 
information regarding the terrorism angle. The subject should also be entered 
into VGTOF through NCIC to alert local police once they have contacted the 
subject that he may be involved in terrorism activities. (PI) 
Currently, the information would not necessarily be disseminated to local law 
enforcement agencies in a timely manner. Information sharing on U.S. Citizens 
abroad is usually limited to local law enforcement sending local information up 
the intelligence chain about subject activities while they were in the U.S. Local 
police would not receive information directly from the CIA, but would rely on 
information passed from the CIA to the FBI and then hopefully to the local police. 
Information collected abroad would need to be sanitized to enable timely 
dissemination to local law enforcement. (PI) 
A consequence in this scenario of restricted information sharing up from the local police 
level was also anticipated by one police executive. 
The information will stay with the CIA and maybe will be shared with the FBI. I 
do not believe the information will be pushed down to any lower levels at this 
time. However, due to the nature of information not going up from the local level 
to the Fusion Center, there may be valuable information about this citizen in local 
police data bases and because of the lack of trust, lack of cooperation and lack of 
quality information sharing back and forth between local LE and state police, the 
information will therefore never be shared with the CIA. (PE) 
Scenario A is the only one that began with the military, in this case soldiers discovering 
a computer in a cave in Central Asia containing images of a U.S. chemical plant. Several 
respondents suspected that the information would be retained by the military, while 
others believed it would be shared with the FBI.  
The information should be forwarded by the DOD intelligence component 
through the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), which would forward it 
to the KY fusion center who then share it with all appropriate LE agencies in KY 
… [but] there is a good chance the NCTC would not receive the information. (AE) 
Given there is no information in the scenario about pending attack (only images), 
it is likely nothing would be done and no information shared until after [final 
analysis of the computer]. Usually, the Army/DOD is pretty good about getting 
information like this to the FBI. It would likely flow to the SAC with 
responsibility for Ashland. From there, it all depends on the relationship between 
the Kentucky FBI and local entities. (MI) 
This would be classified by the military at the Secret, most likely Top Secret level, 
and sent to analysis by Central Command. I do not expect to hear anything 
further on this in time to be actionable. May make the FBI Threat Matrix, but will 
not be released to local law enforcement unless authorized at the Secret level. I do 
not expect that local law enforcement would be notified, albeit they should. (PE) 
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None of the project interviewees expected any prompt information sharing with the 
local police in the chemical plant’s jurisdiction. Notification to the chemical plant’s 
corporate security seemed about as likely as to local police. One specific problem 
interfering with sharing of the information was its likely classification as secret or top 
secret. 
The issues are two-fold: first, although necessary for national security, the laws 
pertaining to sharing intelligence information between law enforcement and the 
military (posse comitatus) have not been updated and do not adequately address 
the loss of information in the critical need to exchange information. Secondly, 
instead of sanitizing information so it can be easily disseminated to law 
enforcement officers, similar information would usually be over-classified and 
therefore would never be disseminated to those who need the information the 
most. (PI) 
Despite the fact that this information would most likely be held closely and not promptly 
shared with local authorities (if shared at all), several respondents felt wider sharing 
would be beneficial. 
The differences between what is likely and what should be are these: (1) the 
information about the images should be initially released as soon as they are 
discovered (initial analysis). Doesn’t have to be extensive, but the authorities in 
Ashland should know about it early; (2) there should be some formal information 
sharing arrangements between DOD and FBI about cases like this (if they don’t 
already exist); (3) there should be an investigation opened by the FBI and locals 
to determine if there is something that should be investigated further indicating a 
potential attack and why the images were gathered.  (MI) 
This information should be shared with the FBI to evaluate as national security 
intelligence. Follow up should be completed by the FBI with any law enforcement 
agencies which may respond to a call for service in the event something happens 
to the plant. Since the information does not center around a person (yet), the 
right to privacy is not an issue and the intelligence generated from it may be 
shared. (PI) 
This type of information should be shared and analyzed at a variety of levels in 
order to obtain a better view of its relevance to local criminal activities. The 
information should be shared through timely channels and analyzed not only by 
the military, but at the national, state, regional, county, tribal and local levels. By 
viewing the information from a variety of perspectives, there would be a greater 
chance of filling the intelligence gap and turning information into actionable 
intelligence. Sharing information would also foster greater cooperation between 
agencies rather than local law enforcement learning about local threats through 
the National media. Timely sharing of information would also allow local law 
enforcement officers to implement a more effective collection plan of new 
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It seems apparent that procedures and protocols for counterterrorism information 
sharing have not achieved full implementation. Subject matter experts responding to six 
scenarios often differed in what they thought should happen, and often judged that what 
would happen would be less than full-scale information sharing. Most expected that 
investigations would be narrower and less collaborative than desirable. In many cases 
the experts thought information sharing would not be as systematic as it should, 
between and among intelligence agencies and especially with local police. Some 
opportunities to engage local police in intelligence gathering were not expected to be 
utilized because doing so might require intelligence agencies to take police into their 
confidence. Over-classification of intelligence was expected to interfere with information 
sharing. Often, the likelihood of information sharing was seen as dependent on the 
existence of personal contacts and relationships. 
Part of the explanation for differences in what should happen follows from the 
complexity of the inter-organizational environment surrounding counter-terrorism. The 
police system has 18,000 separate agencies, including 18,000 CEOs and, potentially, 
18,000 terrorism liaison officers. The number of national intelligence and military 
intelligence agencies is much smaller but each of these agencies is large and complex in 
its own right. This extremely large inter-organizational set exists within a maze of 
federal and state law, bureaucratic rules, traditions, customs, and politics. 
 Another part of the explanation is that the situation is new and evolving. Local police 
have little experience at counterterrorism or domestic/homeland security intelligence. 
Before 9/11 they had little reason to interact with national intelligence or military 
intelligence agencies. The notion of transnational crime was exotic enough for most 
police agencies – international terrorism seemed even less likely to affect Main Street, 
city hall, or hometown security. Now, suddenly, there are state fusion centers and a 
complicated information sharing environment of new alphabet-soup federal agencies 
including the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), NCTC, and the 
Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group (ITACG). 
Besides complexity and newness, though, there seems to be a great deal of residual 
resentment and tension clogging counterterrorism information-sharing channels, 
affecting what would happen in various scenarios. The “need to know” mentality still 
seems to outweigh the “need to share” mentality. Petty inter-agency jealousies seem to 
remain, as evidenced most recently between the FBI and the NYPD (whose 
counterterrorism chief is a former CIA official) in the Najibullah Zazi case.27 Local 
agencies still think of information sharing as a one-way experience, lacking confidence 
that state police, fusion centers, or federal agencies will share information with local 
agencies and officials when they should. 
At the state level, it seems absolutely essential in the new information sharing 
environment that fusion centers learn to function as state-wide entities rather than state 
police entities. In the former mode, they stand a chance of being perceived as serving all 
agencies in the state, and if they in fact disseminate useful information and products to 
all agencies, they should become critical assets for both intra-state and national 
information sharing.28 On the other hand, if they come to be seen as glorified state 
police units serving state police interests first and foremost, then they will provide little 
added value and will not substantially improve information sharing. Local agencies will 
tend not to participate, they will create their own fusion centers when possible, and they 
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will continue to create their own individual relationships with federal agencies in an ad 
hoc manner. This seems to be a very crucial distinction that is still being worked out 
around the country, with no guarantee of success. 
Beyond the state level, it is interesting that only two of the respondents consistently 
referred to the NCTC and information sharing environment throughout the scenarios, 
and none referred to the ITACG. The NCTC was established in 2004 and includes 
federal law enforcement agencies, national intelligence agencies, and the military among 
its partner organizations. As described on the NCTC website:  
NCTC serves as the primary organization in the United States Government for 
integrating and analyzing all intelligence pertaining to terrorism possessed or 
acquired by the United States Government (except purely domestic terrorism); 
serves as the central and shared knowledge bank on terrorism information; [and] 
provides all-source intelligence support to government-wide counterterrorism 
activities.29  
The NCTC is assisted by the ITACG, which specifically represents the interests of state 
and local law enforcement and related officials. Its purpose is to enable and facilitate the 
production of “federally-coordinated” terrorism-related information and products that 
are shared “through existing channels” with state and local agencies. The ITACG is 
billed as a temporary step in coordinating federal law enforcement and national 
intelligence communication with state and local agencies, “until such time as the ISE 
matures organizationally and culturally to satisfy those needs as a normal part of doing 
business.” 
Together, these new entities, along with the 2007 National Strategy for Information 
Sharing and the Intelligence Community Information Sharing Strategy,30 are 
supposed to assure that terrorism-related information and intelligence are shared more 
effectively among all the counterterrorism players, including state and local police, 
federal law enforcement, federal and state homeland security operations, the national 
intelligence community, and the military. The fact that much of this new architecture 
and strategy was not cited by most project respondents may reflect its newness, or it 
may indicate that old habits have yet to be replaced by new ones.31 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
This small exploratory study is not a firm foundation from which to offer any strong 
recommendations for improving intelligence and information sharing. Moreover, the 
complexity of the inter-organizational environment of law enforcement-related and 
homeland security-related information sharing is daunting, comprised as it is of 
thousands of local, state, and federal agencies, plus the military. One would be hard 
pressed to design a more complicated or challenging system. Fundamentally, of course, 
it is a system intended to limit the power of the government rather than maximize its 
effectiveness. 
A 2001 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on information sharing for 
critical infrastructure protection emphasized the importance of building trust between 
officials and agencies.32 Recommended techniques for building trust included regular 
interaction, consistent representation, appropriate vetting of participants, creation of an 
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atmosphere of mutual respect, and enforcement of information sharing norms. 
Additional recommendations included timely and secure communication, top 
management support, leadership continuity, penalties for failing to share information, 
and rewards for sharing. 
Beyond these basic principles, a few specific intelligence-sharing suggestions can be 
offered: 
• State fusion centers have to figure out how to serve their entire state, not just the 
state police. DHS might insist that these centers have governing boards with 
majority local representatives. That would help get local law enforcement buy-in and 
participation. State police could still house or run the centers, but they would have to 
be responsive to local interests in order to maintain the support of their governing 
board. 
• Model agreements between local law enforcement agencies and state fusion centers 
should be developed and implemented. These agreements could stipulate that the 
local agency will complete and submit SAR in a systematic and timely manner, but 
also mandate the fusion center to report back on SAR utilization and generally 
obligate the fusion center to operate on a “need to share” basis. 
• All agencies should adopt the “tear line” practice as a means of implementing “need 
to share.” This practice puts non-classified information found in intelligence reports 
below a “tear line” so that it can be disseminated more quickly and more broadly. 
Information that would compromise intelligence sources and methods remains 
“above the tear line” and still does not get disseminated except to qualified recipients 
who “need to know.”  
• JTTF meetings need to be held with reasonable frequency to keep local chiefs and 
commanders in the intelligence loop and to build and maintain the trust needed to 
encourage information sharing. If these meetings are held frequently, and if “need to 
share” is the operating philosophy, then local law enforcement suspicion and 
resentment can easily be minimized. 
As simplistic as some of these recommendations sound, they would probably be 
sufficient to resolve much of the gridlock associated with local law enforcement’s 
participation in counterterrorism intelligence and information sharing. That is because, 
with the exception of the NYPD and a very few other big city agencies, local police 
agencies do not see themselves in competition with each other or with state and federal 
agencies in the intelligence game. Most of them would like to play their role and do their 
part, as long as state and federal agencies cooperate and treat them fairly. 
At the federal level, the situation is different. Federal law enforcement and 
intelligence agencies often do seem to regard each other as the competition. They also 
seem to regard local law enforcement agencies as inferior or perhaps untrustworthy (or, 
in the case of the NYPD, as competition). Beyond systematic and persistent efforts at 
trust building, forceful action by the president, attorney general, DHS secretary, and 
Congress would seem necessary to overcome longstanding traditions and the 
political/bureaucratic pathologies that currently inhibit significant improvement in 
information sharing among the heavyweight agencies in the national intelligence 
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community, and between those agencies and their more humble counterparts in state 
and local law enforcement. 
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Cause-and-Effect or Fooled by Randomness? 




What is the nature of catastrophes? Can major incidents such as the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001, Hurricane Katrina, the 2003 blackout of the Eastern power grid, 
and the financial meltdown of 2008 be explained by cause-and-effect, or are they simply 
random events in world history? Scientists always look for cause-and-effect, action and 
reaction, logical explanations of the real world, but what if catastrophes are a product of 
randomness? Scientists have failed to accurately predict the consequences of 
earthquakes, hurricanes, and terrorist attacks even though a considerable amount of 
effort has been spent on methods of “prediction.” Can we explain catastrophic events as 
the product of some motivating incident or series of incidents, or are we simply fooled 
by randomness?1 
One achievement of western reductionist thought and indeed the scientific method 
itself is the implied ability to explain nearly everything that happens in the natural world 
as cause-and-effect; every cause has an effect, and effects can be traced back to their 
causes.2 If we understand the cause of earthquakes, floods, fires, and terrorist attacks, 
we can do something about them. At least this is the theory. But in practice, discovering 
the cause of catastrophe is mostly an exercise in hindsight. After the terrorist attacks of 
9/11 it was obvious to many in the Intelligence community that an attack was eminent. 
After Hurricane Katrina it was obvious that the infrastructure of New Orleans was long 
overdue for strengthening. After the 2003 blackout, the cause was easily identified and 
rectified. Understanding cause-and-effect is the first step towards prevention, hence the 
urgency for understanding why something disastrous happens. 
But there is another plausible explanation based on complex adaptive systems theory. 
This theory lies halfway between rational cause-and-effect logic and the unpredictability 
of “acts of God.” Essentially, it says that inevitable catastrophe is imbedded within many 
complex systems themselves. These so-called critical systems contain the seeds of their 
own destruction.  Moreover, critical systems move toward the precipice of catastrophe 
rather than away from it, by their very own nature. They are subject to evolutionary 
forces that shape them, and if these forces are not controlled, a critical system evolves 
from a “normal state” to a “critical state”. Because it is a property of the system and its 
evolution, rather than some external force, these systems reach a state of self-organized 
criticality (SOC) under their own power. SOC systems are perched on the edge of chaos, 
near a tipping point between normal operation, and disaster.  
According to the SOC theory, political systems that lead to terrorist attacks, financial 
systems that lead to resounding stock market crashes, electrical power grids that 
experience 100-year magnitude failures every decade, and hurricanes that wipe out 
entire cities are the result of a form of emergence called self-organized criticality. A 
small (random) perturbation in these systems can trip a major collapse, unexpectedly, 
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dramatically, and resoundingly. Because the cause is not obvious (until after the fact), 
and it is often a very minor perturbation, the collapse comes as a shock. Is it possible 
that an unfortunate event is psychologically surprising only because of its magnitude, 
and not because it is unexpected? 
What is the nature of SOC systems, how do infrastructure systems get that way, and 
what can be done to prevent the impending catastrophe? This article develops an 
unconventional theory of infrastructure criticality based on decade-old ideas from a 
variety of disciplines. First, the concept of SOC is explained using three simple 
simulations proposed by Chao Tang Per Bak,3 Mark Newman, and Amaral-Meyers.4 
Each simulation illustrates an aspect of SOC: self-organization, randomness as an 
underlying engine of disaster, and the role of interdependency or connectivity in 
complex systems.  
Next, the discussion shifts to an explanation of a general property shared by many 
major disasters: the fractal power law.5 Power laws turn out to be appropriate proxies 
for the insurance industry measure of likelihood called exceedence probability 
(probability an event will exceed a certain consequence). The power law exceedence 
probability curve is associated with nearly all hazards of interest to homeland security. 
This is no coincidence, but more intriguing is the realization that power law exceedence 
probability curves can be produced from purely underlying randomness. This supports 
the author’s conjecture that catastrophic incidents (often) occur because of randomness 
– not simply cause-and-effect.  
Third, application of the author’s random SOC theory to homeland security risk-
informed decision-making allows us to classify hazards as either low-risk or high-risk. 
Low-risk hazards are associated with risk that actually declines as consequence 
increases, while high-risk hazards are associated with risk that rises. This distinction 
depends on the rate of decline in exceedence probability, and suggests re-thinking of 
critical infrastructure resiliency strategies. But what strategy applies to each class? The 
author argues that a predominantly prevention strategy should be applied to high-risk 
hazards, because they are rare, while a strategy of response should be applied to the 
class of low-risk, high probability hazards. This dual-mode strategy is not entirely 
supported by the National Infrastructure Protection Plan of 2009,6 but makes sense if 
we believe in the NIPP’s risk-informed decision-making policy. 
Sand Piles, Sticks, and Nature 
Per Bak’s simple and elegant illustration of a self-organized system had little to do with 
homeland security, critical infrastructure, or risk-informed decision making. He was 
simply trying to understand the alarming discontinuity that occurs in many complex 
systems that suddenly collapse for apparently no reason. Imagine a sand pile built from 
grains of sand slowly dropping onto a flat surface. Over time a cone-shaped pyramid 
forms. As more and more grains of sand fall on the pile, the cone grows in height and 
breadth. Suddenly a portion of the cone breaks away, causing a landslide or avalanche. 
Per Bak asked if it was possible to predict the size of the landslide and compute exactly 
when the landslide would break away from the cone. As it turns out, the timing and size 
of individual landslides cannot be determined with any precision. Instead, Per Bak 
observed many different sized landslides and plotted them on an exceedence probability 
curve. Interestingly, the sand pile exceedence probability curve is a fat-tailed power law. 
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This curve has subsequently become the center of attraction for scientists from a variety 
of disciplines, because it keeps showing up over and over again. 
Exceedence probability curves like the one in Figure 1 simply plot the likelihood of an 
event such as a landslide occurring of size greater than or equal to x.7 They differ from 
frequency or histogram distributions, because of the “greater than or equal to” part of 
the definition of exceedence. Exceedence probability curves are used by the insurance 
industry to compute maximum expected loss due to a calamity, which is a form of risk. 
Multiplying exceedence probability times consequence yields probable maximum loss 
or PML risk, which is used as the basis for calculating insurance premiums. For 
example, the point in Figure 1 where the exceedence probability is 20% appears along 
the x-axis at x = 3, which is the likelihood of a landslide of size 3, 4, 5, … or 10. PML risk 
at this point is (0.20 x 3 = 0.6). This says that the probability of an event with 




Figure 1. Exceedence probability is a power law: EP(x) = x -q; where q is an exponent defining the rate of 
decline of the curve. The probability of an incident with consequence equal to or greater than x falls 
dramatically as the consequence of the incident increases. A power law is “fat- or long-tailed”, because it 
declines slower than an exponential function. 
 
Repeating Per Bak’s sand pile experiment many times, and measuring the sizes of 
landslides, we find that small landslides occur much more often than large ones. 
Extremely large landslides are extremely rare, but not impossible. Small incidents are 
much more common, but their consequences are much less. If the size and timing of 
each landslide were truly random, the exceedence probability curve would be S-shaped 
rather than shaped like a power law. The fact that an exceedence probability curve obeys 
a power law suggests a deeper meaning. The meaning of exceedence probability is 
probed further in this paper. Interestingly, real earthquakes obey a power law with 
exponent q = 0.41, as seen in Table 1 at the end of this article. [The larger the exponent, 
the more abruptly the curve declines as shown in Figure 1]. 
LEWIS, CAUSE-AND-EFFECT 
 
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME VI, NO. 1 (JANUARY 2010) WWW.HSAJ.ORG  
 
4 
Per Bak’s playful sand pile demonstration became known as the BTW experiment – 
from the initials of the three authors of the 1987 publication describing it.8 Its profound 
impact on a variety of disciplines is why so many writers from across many fields of 
study continue to reference and use it as the canonical illustration of SOC. Mark 
Buchanan may have been the first popular writer to note the generality of SOC, power 
laws, and catastrophes, but many others have adopted it as their own.9 Malcolm 
Gladwell’s popular “tipping point” book introduced the BTW experiment to a wider 
audience,10 and more recently, Joshua Cooper Ramo’s ”concept of world disorder” 
equates SOC with the unthinkable.11 SOC, power laws, and randomness seem to be a 
common property of both natural and human-made catastrophes. 
At first glance the BTW experiment seems too specialized to apply broadly to 
homeland security and infrastructure protection. However, Buchanan’s treatise on 
catastrophe provides additional evidence of the generality of SOC. Consider Buchanan’s 
description of an experiment proposed by Mark Newman that illustrates the role of 
randomness in SOC. Newman’s experiment (see Figure 2) is strikingly real and yet 
simple. Consider a collection of sticks varying in length from 0 to 100% (choose your 
own units of measurement – it doesn’t matter).  Repeatedly produce a random 
threshold number T, between zero and 100%, representing the length of survivor sticks. 
Replace sticks of length less than T with new sticks that are also of random length 




Figure 2. Newman’s Sticks: Sticks shorter than randomly selected threshold value T are replaced with 
sticks of randomly selected length, see six rows of sticks in top panel. Consequence is defined as the 
number of replaced sticks after each incident. The upper plot is experimentally obtained exceedence 
probability and the lower plot is experimentally obtained “number of survivors versus time”.  Download 
and run the Catastrophes simulation [.jar] at http://www.chds.us/?media/openmedia&alt&id=2260.12 
In this experiment, consequence is equal to the number of replaced sticks on each round 
of replacements. The exceedence probability curve is obtained by placing the fraction of 
replaced sticks into bins of size 1%, 2%, 3%.... 100% consequence, and normalizing the 
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fractions so they add up to 100%. Exceedence probability EP(x ! Consequence) is the 
sum of the subtotals in bins 100%, 99%, 98%… x%. That is, exceedence probability is the 
probability that x or more percent of the sticks are replaced after each round.   
The exceedence probability of this experiment is a power law like the exceedence 
probability curve of the BTW experiment. And they are both shaped like the curve in 
Figure 1. These two seemingly different examples produce power laws – with possibly 
different exponents. Power laws are fractal or self-similar (they look the same at all 
scales – magnifying a portion of Figure 1 produces a curve just like Figure 1). Regardless 
of the scale used to measure consequence, the resulting curve has the same power law 
shape. Because of the fractal or self-similar property of power laws, small incidents are 
just miniature versions of large incidents.  
Scientists from a number of fields of study have observed hazards and recorded their 
exceedence probability curves and found they are re-scaled power law fractals (see Table 
I). Hence, power law incidents are also called scale-free. Whether the incident is an 
earthquake, hurricane, terrorist attack, airline accident, or power grid failure, they all 
obey a power law. Thus, fractals, self-similar, and scale-free are simply different terms 
for the same power law property. Self-similarity is the important concept, because it 
relates small and large consequences to an underlying randomness. 
The rate of decline of the exceedence probability curve differs for different classes of 
catastrophe as shown in Table I, but they are all self-similar fractals. This intriguing 
result suggests a cause-and-effect, but in fact the author shows that power laws are 
produced by an underlying randomness, independent of any cause-and-effect. If an 
underlying cause-and-effect existed, the exceedence probability would not be a power 
law. For example, both BTW and the Newman stick simulation have an underlying 
randomness that produces a power law. But fatal automobile accidents in the USA do 
not.13  
Normal Accidents 
Charles Perrow’s 1984 book, Normal Accidents, pre-dates the BTW experiment.14 Even 
so, Perrow suggested that accidents such as the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant 
disaster were caused by many small fractures or failures building up into bigger failures. 
He recognized that disaster is the end-result of interactions internal to complex, highly 
connected systems. His near-encyclopedic treatment of accidents always led to the same 
conclusion: accidents are normal (as in to-be-expected) because of system complexity 
and connectivity. In reference to the Three Mile Island incident, Perrow says, “The cause 
of the accident is to be found in the complexity of the system….It is the interaction of the 
multiple failures that explains the accident.”15  
Small incidents spread and magnify into larger incidents as in the SOC model, but 
Perrow added an element: fractures in complex systems propagate via various forms of 
connection or links among the parts of the system. In other words, complex systems are 
networks. Their interacting parts are network nodes and their interactions travel via 
network links connecting them. This idea is dramatically illustrated by the simple “food 
network” experiment proposed by Amaral and Meyer, and described by Buchanan. 









Figure 3. Amaral-Meyer Network: Fractures or “extinctions” percolate up from random extinctions of 
nodes at the lowest level of the six-level network. Nodes go extinct whenever all links below them are 
removed. Consequence is defined as the number of extinctions following each random extinction 
occurring at the lowest level. Upper plot is the exceedence probability curve, and lower plot shows 
number of survivors versus time.  Download and run the Catastrophes simulation [.jar] at 
http://www.chds.us/?media/openmedia&alt&id=2260.17   
 
Consider a six-tiered ecological or “food network” consisting of niches, represented by 
nodes in Figure 3, and links, represented by lines connecting pairs of nodes. Nodes are 
colored black if they are occupied by a surviving species, and colored white, if 
unoccupied. Amaral and Meyer imagined a world in which species at each level 
occasionally and randomly mutate and fill an empty node or slot above, below, or on 
either side of themselves (at the same level). Mutations occur with small probability and 
tend to increase the population of occupied nodes, as long as they can link to at least one 
occupied node immediately below them. Linking establishes a food chain, supporting 
nodes above, but not below or at the same level. If a node is unable to establish a link, or 
if the link is broken because the lower-level node becomes extinct, the upper-level node 
also becomes extinct. 
A curious thing happens when a lower-level node randomly goes extinct and all of its 
links are removed. This small “accident” propagates to all of the nodes connected to the 
removed node. If all links are removed from a node in a level above the extinction, it too 
becomes extinct. The accident is propagated up to the next level by repeatedly removing 
links to higher-level nodes, etc. The Amaral-Meyer network simulates Perrow’s normal 
accidents.  
The supply of new nodes is replenished by mutations and diminished as extinctions 
remove them, so what eventually happens in the long run? The number of nodes 
steadily increases as the population fills out nodes and expands across levels. Then 
growth levels off and stays level for a long period of time (dictated by the rate of 
extinctions and the rate of mutations). Suddenly and unpredictably the network 
collapses. Like the BTW experiment, the timing of this collapse is unpredictable, but its 
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exceedence probability obeys a fractal power law. This suggests randomness as the 
underlying property of network collapse, rather than individual extinctions.18  
Meltdowns 
The Amaral-Meyer network may model many natural and human-made complex 
systems that unexpectedly fail after a long period of stability. Typically, these systems 
crash following a small, unassuming incident that upsets the system’s equilibrium 
rendering it unstable. The timing and size of consequence cannot be predicted ahead of 
time. But, eventually the Amaral-Meyer network self-organizes into a state of criticality 
and collapses. It is a beautiful illustration of SOC.  
Figure 4 casts the 2008 financial meltdown as an Amaral-Meyer network.19 This 
complex system had at least four levels of financial institutions, all dependent on lower 
level “feeder nodes”. Prior to the financial collapse, feeder nodes made loans, sold them 
to the nodes directly above them, which in turn packaged mortgage-backed securities 
together and sold them to upper level nodes. Eventually, the packaged securities and 
packaged credit default swap derivatives were sold to non-USA investors at the top level 
of this food network. As the number of links increased over time, the financial network 
evolved toward a self-organized criticality. In this case, criticality emerged because the 
number of network connections around “overly connected” institutions meant the 
institution was directly and indirectly connected to virtually all others. Like the BTW 





Figure 4. 2008 Financial Meltdown Network: A few of the nodes of a financial food network representing 
the financial system as of late 2008. Links are representative, only. The financial network is strikingly 
similar to a four-level Amaral-Meyer food network.   
Small numbers of extinctions have little overall effect unless they propagate along 
connections and spread to most other institutions. But the “no propagation assumption” 
turned out to be false, because the network became self-organized. As the network 
evolved, links between levels increased as well as the number of nodes, causing the 
network to edge ever closer to its tipping point. The closer the network came to its 
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maximum capacity (all nodes connected to all others below them) the closer it came to 
its critical point. The built-up network eventually collapsed; not because a large 
financial institution like Lehman Brothers was too big to fail, but because it was too 
heavily connected. (One can argue that Lehman Brothers Inc. was both big and 
connected, but its connectivity is what made it critical). 
FOOLED BY RANDOMNESS 
The foregoing simulations and the real world suggest that catastrophe is a combination 
of self-organized criticality, randomness, and self-similar system architecture. 
Newman’s Stick experiment illustrates the impact of a random external incident on 
failure of a simple system: extinctions may be caused by random externalities. The 
Amaral-Meyer experiment illustrates the impact of criticality in a connected system, 
whereby catastrophic failure is intrinsic to the system itself. Such systems can fail 
without any outside influence.  
These simple simulations suggest randomness as an alternative explanation for 
catastrophes. They support Perrow’s normal accident theory, but moreover, they can be 
explained as purely random phenomena. The author performed an even simpler 
simulation based on purely random number generation, and obtained results identical 
to the BTW experiment, Sticks, and Amaral-Meyer simulations (see Figure 5). 
Randomness yields consequences that obey a power law, independent of any hazard. 




Figure 5. Random Catastrophes. Upper plot shows results of multiplying six random numbers together to 
obtain consequence. The lower plot shows the size of these random consequences versus time. The 
upper plot shows the exceedence probability obtained by placing thousands of random products into bins 
and tallying them.  Download and run the Catastrophes simulation [.jar] at 
http://www.chds.us/?media/openmedia&alt&id=2260.20 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The random SOC theory described here provides an alternate explanation for financial 
system meltdowns, earthquakes, power grid blackouts, and epidemics that sometimes 
flare up instead of dying off. We know that many of our critical infrastructure sectors 
have reached their self-organized criticality.21 Overly-connected hubs are found in the 
public switched telecommunications network, near-capacity tie lines in the power grid, 
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congestion on highways, lack of surge capacity in hospitals, and viruses worming their 
way through the Internet. Fortunately, an understanding of SOC suggests new 
strategies. 
Several mechanisms can be used to reverse self-organized criticality.  Of course, the 
problem can be solved at the engineering level: addition of surge capacity, operating 
systems below capacity, and restructuring networks to back them away from SOC. Each 
of these solutions has corresponding costs, however, and is the subject of another paper. 
A more global solution is to change regulatory policy, affecting infrastructures across the 
entire nation. Re-design of regulation is a better approach, because it spreads the 
economic burden across the entire industry. An overhaul of regulatory policy can 
reshape these critical infrastructures, backing them away from SOC. Sub-SOC systems 
are more resilient, which means they withstand failures with lower consequences. 
For example, the electric power grid has evolved into a state of self-organized 
criticality after decades of operating at near capacity, compounded by incremental 
patching of its transmission network. Regulatory policies that motivate the utilities to 
build out more transmission capacity or promote locally-distributed generation 
(reducing the need for transmission capacity) would reduce the sector’s criticality. A 
similar criticality exists in the communications sector due to the rise of 
telecommunications hotels.22 The existence of telecom hotel hubs is a direct 
consequence of the 1996 Telecommunications Act that advocates peering among 
competitors and promotes co-location of switching equipment. This regulation needs to 
be changed before a normal accident results in a national telecommunications blackout. 
Similar self-organized criticalities exist in other infrastructure sectors. Financial 
systems tend to self-organize into criticality; public health/hospital systems have 
inadequate surge capacity; the World Wide Web/Internet is notoriously near its critical 
point with respect to denial of service attacks, worms, and cyber threats. However, these 
second-tier infrastructures have not been thoroughly studied from this new perspective. 
This work needs to be done.  
Table I enumerates two classes of hazards to infrastructure: low risk and high risk. 
Hazards with a power law exponent greater than or equal to one are considered low risk, 
while hazards with a power law exponent less than one are considered high risk. The 
high-low distinction is shown in Figure 6 as a risk curve that increases as consequence 
increases (high risk), versus a curve that decreases, after initially increasing. This 
classification of hazards has important implications for risk-informed decision making.  
To illustrate the application of this theory to an existing infrastructure, consider 
results for the telecommunications sector, circa 1990.23 Data collected by Richard Kuhn 
and analyzed by the author was used to construct the exceedence probability curve, and 
then plugged into the PML risk equation to obtain the high-risk curve of Figure 6. 
Consequence was measured in millions of customer-minutes lost due to all kinds of 
incidents. As you can see, high-risk systems rise more-or-less monotonically, as 
consequence increases. The telecommunications system studied by Kuhn exhibits high-
risk self-organized criticality. 
The form of these curves has an interesting bearing on strategy. Risk-informed 
decision making recommends prioritization of investments according to risk: buy down 
high-risk assets starting with the highest risk. In Table I, risk is highest when 
consequences are small for low-risk hazards such as airline accidents, floods, terrorism, 
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and large fires in cities. Conversely, risk increases with consequence for high-risk 
hazards such as hurricanes, earthquakes, wars, whooping cough, and measles, which 




Figure 6. PML Risk versus Consequence for low- and high-risk exceedence probability curves. Exponent 
q is shown for power law equivalents. The low-risk curve (q = 1.5) is hypothetical, while the high-risk (q = 
0.85) was obtained by analyzing telecommunications outages reported by Kuhn.24 Note: PML risk 
decreases for low-risk hazards as consequence increases. This is illustrated by the lower curve. 
Should a prevention strategy be applied to high-risk, low-probability hazards, because 
they are rare? Similarly, a response policy might be appropriate for low-risk, frequent 
hazards, because risk is highest for small consequence incidents. Perhaps an 80-20 
percent rule should be applied: invest 80 percent in prevention and 20 percent in 
response for high-risk hazards; and invest 80 percent in response and 20 percent in 
prevention for low-risk hazards. This dual-mode strategy avoids the dangers of putting 
all eggs in one basket. 
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Factors Affecting the Amplification or Attenuation of Public 
Worry and Dread About Bioterrorist Attacks 
Lulu Rodriguez and Suman Lee 
 
INTRODUCTION  
When the World Trade Center collapsed in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 
attacks, experts, and the public generally agreed that terrorism would be a facet of 
modern life in the foreseeable future, and that the likelihood of nuclear, chemical, and 
biological weapons being deployed against societies is real rather than apparent. Of 
these, perhaps the least understood is bioterrorism: “the unlawful or threatened use of 
microorganisms or toxins derived from living organisms to cause death or disease in 
humans, animals, or plants so as to create fear in the public or intimidate 
governments.”1  
In a situation where uncertainty is high, how do citizens react? Few studies have 
attempted to provide insights into the way the public may respond to issues, topics, or 
practices people think are threatening or risky.2 So far, decision analysts have suggested 
two approaches: the technical or rational and the normative or value-laden approach. 
This study investigates which of these two approaches predicts people’s level of worry 
and dread before, during and after a bioterrorist event, and offers suggestions to help 
mitigate such legitimate public reactions.  
Recent experiences with biological attacks have raised new and heightened national 
security concerns. In November 2009, perhaps as a scare tactic, envelopes mailed from 
Dallas to foreign consulates in Manhattan were found to contain a suspicious powder, 
but field tests came back negative for dangerous substances.3 An incident in 2001, 
however, was lethal. Letters contaminated with anthrax, sent to media companies and 
the Washington, DC offices of two senators, resulted in twenty-three cases of infection, 
five deaths, and the contamination of numerous U.S. Postal Service facilities.4 
Department of Homeland Security experts warned that the spores released in this case 
could be used to seed the bio-weapons programs of “rogue” countries like North Korea, 
and active terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda, the Marxist insurgents in Colombia, the 
Chechen resistance fighters against Russia, the Maoist rebels of Nepal, as well as 
domestic biological “unabombers.”5 Natural epidemics are terrifying enough, but the 
notion that pathogens can be harnessed as weapons is even more chilling.  
Historically, whenever biological weapons are deployed in terrorist events, they cause 
low casualties but high visibility.6 Today, however, experts say there is no weapon more 
effective in creating havoc than microorganisms spread to large swaths of the 
population.7 A 1993 report by the U.S. Congressional Office of Technology Assessment 
estimates that between 130,000 and three million deaths could follow the aerosol 
release of 100 kilograms of anthrax spores upwind of Washington, DC.8  
The prospect of epidemics caused by the deliberate release of biological agents on 
civilians, and the well-chronicled vulnerabilities of societies to large-scale disease 
outbreaks, fulfill the litany of factors hypothesized to lead to the amplification of risk: (1) 
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the projected fatalities and injuries are high; (2) exposure to bioterrorism agents is 
expected to be widespread; (3) the effects on civilians can be immediate; (4) the impact 
on the future looks devastating; (5) the news media are the major “social stations” for 
amplification; (6) the origin of fatalities may be unknown in the period immediately 
after the attack; (7) the risks are likely to be shared across society; and (7) there is much 
uncertainty concerning when, where, and how the attack is going to happen.9 As such, 
unlike most natural epidemics, bioterrorism incidents present atypical risk-
communication challenges.  
Even the prospect of experiencing bioterrorism incidents is likely to produce high 
levels of worry and dread among the public. Worry generally refers to mental distress or 
agitation resulting from concern for something impending or anticipated. Dread, on the 
other hand, is an emotion that ranges from extreme uneasiness to extreme fear in the 
face of a disagreeable prospect. The worry and dread factors involved in bioterrorism 
incidents may be intense because most biological weapons are inexpensive and can kill 
the same number of people as conventional, nuclear, and chemical weapons.10 Another 
advantage biological agents offer to terrorists is that they can target and infect a large 
area, they are easily transmitted, and they are difficult to detect.11 Their pathology 
mimics other illnesses so that by the time the cause is identified, precious time is already 
lost.  
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
In the late 1980s, risk was defined as either a physical attribute (the positivistic view) or 
a social construct (the constructivist view).12 Sociologists have offered cultural, 
individual, and systems approaches to understanding risks.13 Others have proposed a 
broader classification that differentiates between technical, psychological, sociological, 
anthropological, and geographical perspectives.14 Most of these classifications, however, 
are more descriptive than analytical.  
Although Ortwin Renn claims the positivistic view and the social constructivist view 
of risks are poor descriptions of reality,15 the risk amplification and attenuation 
framework he and his colleagues at Clark University developed incorporates the 
dimensions of these two foundational perspectives.16 Today, the technical or rational 
approach and the normative or value approach to understanding reactions to risky 
technology and events are still useful analytical tools with which to define and prioritize 
actions that must be taken for public safety and security.17 
If risk is indeed an objective property of events, measured as the probability of 
occurrence of adverse effects, Renn submits that the policy implications of these two 
approaches are obvious.18 Grounded on economic theories of rational citizens, the 
technical/rational approach holds that people make risk decisions based on a personal 
cost-benefit analysis informed by scientific and technical data. From this perspective, 
opposition to anything experts define as “safe” results from not understanding or not 
knowing the actual “objective” risks.19 Public opposition, in this case, is often defined as 
a problem in effective risk communication.20 Effective, in this context, usually means 
improved methods of presenting technical risk information. 
Sandman defines risk perception as ensuing from the combined impact of hazard and 
outrage (risk = hazard + outrage).21 The technical/rational approach is akin to how 
Sandman conceptualizes “hazard,” which he illustrates as resulting from experts’ 
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judgments and evaluations of risk. The hazard dimension of Sandman’s definition 
implies that public resources are allocated following objective measures of probability 
and magnitude of harm arising from risk and risk events as defined by experts.  
But the risks that do damage and the risks that raise concerns are completely 
different, Sandman observes.22 According to cognitive psychologists and decision 
analysts, this may be because the public is not composed of adroit technical decision-
makers. This observation leads to the proposition that there are psychological and social 
variables that mitigate risk perception. Among them are the signal potential of cultural 
symbols and signs whose impacts derive from the meanings people attach to them in 
active interaction with their social environment. If the risk is seen as a cultural or social 
construction, as in the case of the normative/value approach, risk priorities and 
management should reflect social values, lifestyle preferences, and people’s 
psychographic characteristics, among others. The task of risk communication, in this 
case, is to improve the correlation between technical assessments and public concern.23 
To enhance public confidence in the system that manages the risk, risk communicators 
must understand people’s underlying risk-assessment systems and values.  
According to the normative/value approach, people incorporate a number of 
“qualitative” dimensions in their decisions about risky technologies: the object or event’s 
catastrophic potential and controllability, the scientific uncertainty surrounding it, its 
equity dimension in terms of who should bear the risk, and the threat it poses to future 
generations, among others.24 Those stressing normative/value elements argue that the 
decision maker is not an isolated entity using a restricted range of information. They 
emphasize contextual factors, such as social networks, organizational memberships, 
social class, and cultural understanding evolving from a history of technological 
successes and failures.25 In other words, based on this perspective, debates about risky 
topics, issues and practices require far more than technical risk estimates; they involve 
religious, moral, political, and psychological considerations as well.26 
Which of these two approaches and the factors that constitute each of them have the 
greatest impact on the risk decisions of ordinary citizens? This question is of more than 
academic interest; it involves issues of resource allocation and the likelihood of success 
in overcoming or minimizing public opposition to a new technology or a new practice, or 
in preparing them for hazardous attacks.  
To account for people’s level of worry and dread about experiencing bioterrorist 
events following the technical/rational approach, we assess the relative impact of four 
potential predictors: (1) knowledge of bioterrorism, (2) exposure to news coverage of 
bioterrorism, (3) attention to news coverage of bioterrorism, and (4) education. The 
media variables are critical in this conception because the technical/rational approach is 
hypothesized to become stronger in the presence or absence of risk communications 
that impart scientifically-based information about the threatening event and how to 
protect people against the direct and indirect consequences of these events. 
Bioterrorism is an issue that requires some grounding in the sciences to be clearly 
understood. As such, level of education also is predicted to influence risk attitudes and 
degrees of worry.  
 Among those who advance the normative/value approach are the proponents of the 
social amplification of risk framework (SARF), who argue that the risk experience is “not 
only an experience of physical harm but the result of processes by which groups and 
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individuals learn to acquire or create interpretations of risk.”27 Using this framework, 
risk perception can be evaluated by recognizing the physical harm experts attach to a 
risk event, the social and cultural processes that shape interpretations of that event, the 
consequences of the event, and the response of risk managers and publics to that 
event.28 
An element important to SARF is the role of public trust in different institutions, such 
as regulatory bodies, government agencies, and the mass media in mediating public 
responses to potential hazards. Lynn Frewer proposes that the extent to which people 
trust or distrust these institutions may affect the way they process risk information.29 
Indeed, the importance of source characteristics such as credibility and honesty has long 
been recognized in social psychological models of attitude change.30 Intensive media 
coverage, according to Jeanne and Roger Kasperson, may not be a sufficient condition 
for amplification, but “trust may be a critical issue in the mediation of whether 
amplification occurs, as is public perception of the effectiveness of the handling of the 
hazardous event by authorities, which may, in turn, impact on the extent to which the 
authorities themselves are perceived to be trustworthy.”31 In this study, the dimension of 
trust is measured using people’s perceived satisfaction over the level of national and 
local preparedness to prevent, counter, and bear the brunt of bioterrorist attacks.  
Thus, if the normative/value perspective dominates public reactions, then the 
following factors are hypothesized to explain people’s levels of worry and dread about 
experiencing bioterrorist events: (1) trust in the news media, (2) trust in interpersonal 
communication sources, (3) trust in government agencies and institutions, (4) trust in 
universities and advocacy groups, (5) alienation from the government, and (6) the 
perceived preparedness and readiness of the nation to protect itself and to counter 
bioterrorist attacks.  
The conceptual framework that outlines the two approaches and the factors that 
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Figure 1. Conceptual framework showing the two sets of potential contributors to level of worry and level 
of dread regarding bioterrorist events 
METHODOLOGY 
Data for this analysis were gathered using a national mail survey. The original sample of 
2,000 names and addresses used in this study was randomly drawn from the white 
pages of city, suburban, and rural telephone directories across the continental United 
States. All respondents were adults, eighteen years of age and older, who responded to a 
structured survey questionnaire sent by mail. By sending a reminder postcard three 
weeks after the first wave, and mailing to a follow-up second wave two weeks later, 363 
completed questionnaires were received. Of the original 2,000, 229 were returned as 
undeliverable, reducing the total number of questionnaires successfully mailed to 1,771 
and resulting in a response rate of 20.5 percent.  
The Dependent Variables 
The first dependent variable – worry about bioterrorist events – was measured by 
asking respondents, “How worried are you about terrorism through biological means 
(such as the use of mail contaminants like anthrax and the release of other pathogens to 
cause human, animal and plant infections)?” The response range was 1 to 5 where 1 was 
“not worried” and 5 meant “very worried.”  
Nine items tapped the dimensions of the second dependent variable, level of dread. 
These items asked respondents the extent to which they agreed with the following 
statements: (1) I have enough information to protect myself and my family against 
bioterrorist attacks; (2) The government is well prepared to protect the nation against 
bioterrorist attacks; (3) The state and local governments are well prepared to protect 
their constituents against bioterrorist attacks; (4) More research needs to be done on 
how to protect the public against bioterrorism; (5) The idea that food and water can be 
contaminated with deadly pathogens frightens me; (6) The Department of Homeland 
Security's color-coded threat and security advisory helps considerably in alerting the 
public about all kinds of terrorist threats; (7) I know where to get help in case of 
bioterrorist attacks; (8) The media do a good job of informing me about the dangers 
posed by potential bioterrorist attacks, and (9) I am powerless against terrorist attacks. 
The response to these items ranged from 1 to 5, where 1 meant “strongly disagree” and 5 
meant “strongly agree.” The sum of the responses to all items was averaged to measure 
people’s level of dread.32 The items comprising this multidimensional variable were 
found to be internally consistent; the reliability of the scale was alpha=0.61.33   
The Predictor Variables Using the Technical/Rational Approach 
The technical/rational approach suggests a number of variables that may affect public 
perceptions of the risks inherent in bioterrorist acts. The variables of interest in this 
study were (1) knowledge of bioterrorism, (2) exposure to news coverage of 
bioterrorism, (3) attention to news coverage of bioterrorism, and (4) education.  
Knowledge of bioterrorism was measured by the respondents’ scores on a ten-item 
quiz composed of close-ended objective questions asking them about different aspects of 
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bioterrorism (i.e., bioterrorism agents, the most commonly used pathogens in terrorism 
acts, the “symptoms” of bioterrorist attacks, scientific risk assessments of hazards 
attendant to bioterrorist attacks, commonly recommended cures, and the things they 
should do if a deadly virus were unleashed in their town). Respondents were asked to 
indicate whether each statement was true or false. The sum of correct answers was used 
to measure knowledge. 
To gauge exposure to mediated news, respondents were asked how often they access 
newspapers, talk shows, magazines, websites or other programs that discuss 
bioterrorism on a scale of 1 to 5 where 1 meant “hardly ever” and 5 meant “every day.” 
The means of people’s answers to exposure questions across media – television, radio, 
print and online newspapers, print and online magazines, and other web-based sources 
– were computed to arrive at an overall measure of exposure to bioterrorism-related 
news coverage. A reliability test of the index gave an alpha of 0.69.  
Attention to bioterrorism coverage was measured by asking respondents to indicate 
how closely they attend to programs about bioterrorism they see on television, listen to 
over the radio, read in newspapers and magazines, and view in online news sources. The 
average of their answers to these questions across media was computed to arrive at an 
overall measure of attention to bioterrorism-related news coverage. The items 
comprising this scale were found to be internally consistent; the reliability of the scale 
was alpha=0.89. 
Education was a categorical variable measured by asking respondents the highest 
level of formal education they have completed. 
The Predictor Variables Using the Normative/Value Approach 
Using the normative/value approach, the following factors were hypothesized to explain 
levels of worry and dread: (1) trust in the news media, (2) trust in interpersonal 
communication sources, (3) trust in government agencies and institutions, (4) trust in 
universities and advocacy groups, (5) alienation from the government, and (6) the 
perceived preparedness and readiness of the nation to counter and respond to 
bioterrorist attacks.  
Respondents were asked how much they trust five mediated sources of information 
(magazines, radio and TV news programs, newspapers, and the online editions of 
newspapers and magazines) on a scale of 1 to 5 where 1 meant “do not trust at all’ and 5 
meant “trust very much.” The sum of the responses to these scales were averaged and 
used as a measure of trust in mass media. The alpha coefficient of internal reliability for 
these four items was 0.79. 
The respondents’ evaluations of trust in interpersonal communication channels were 
treated the same way, so that the trust estimates for family, friends, and doctor or 
primary health care provider were summed and averaged to form this index. The three 
items comprising the index were found to be internally consistent (alpha=0.68). 
The factor trust in government agencies and institutions was composed of the 
respondents’ assessments of six government entities most concerned with national 
security and protection: the Centers for Disease Control, the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration, the Environmental Protection Agency, the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, the Department of Homeland Security, and public health officials. The 
reliability of the index was ascertained at alpha=0.88. 
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Trust in universities and advocacy groups was measured by the overall assessments 
of trust in the American Medical Association, food companies, churches and religious 
organizations, university scientists, and consumer advocacy groups. The reliability of 
this trust index was alpha=0.65.  
The three-item alienation from government index measured the degree to which the 
respondents believed that (1) the federal government can protect the country in the case 
of a terrorist attack, (2) state and local governments can protect the country in the case 
of a terrorist attack, and (3) government at all levels is powerless against any terrorist 
attack. The items that constitute this index were found to be internally consistent 
(alpha=0.62).   
The respondents’ level of satisfaction regarding the preparedness and readiness of 
the nation to counter bioterrorist attacks was measured by computing for the average of 
their responses to six questions that asked how satisfied they were about (1) the safety of 
the country's reservoirs and water supply, (2) the inspection process for imported food, 
(3) the readiness of national government, (4) the preparedness of state and local 
governments to respond to a bioterrorist attack, (5) the potential availability of vaccines, 
and (6) the availability of antibiotics or antidotes in the event of a threat or in times of 
crisis. The answers to these scales ranged from 1 to 5, where 1 was “not satisfied at all” 
and 5 meant “highly satisfied.” This was found to be a reliable index (alpha=0.88).  
The impact of the demographic variables of age, income, and gender on the two 
dependent variables were also ascertained.  
Each of the two dependent variables was subjected to multiple and hierarchical 
regression analysis to determine the amount of change in levels of worry and dread 
accounted for by the thirteen predictor variables listed above.  
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The Sample’s Demographic Characteristics 
Of the 363 respondents, 244 or 67.2 percent were males. The sample is relatively 
mature, with a mean age of 54.85 years, ranging from eighteen to ninety-seven years. A 
little more than a quarter of respondents (105 or 28.9 percent, the mode) have gone to 
vocational schools or have had some college experience; ninety-three (25.6 percent) 
have completed college and eighty-five (23.4 percent) have had postgraduate training. 
The mode for total household income from different sources is $25,000 to $49,999, 
with the median lying at the $50,000 to $74,999 range. The majority was Caucasian (81 
percent). 
The sample did not meet the expectation that few would have much knowledge of 
bioterrorism – the agents that may cause it, the ways in which dangerous pathogens can 
be released, the symptoms of an attack, the nature of the ensuing epidemics, and the 
direct and indirect consequences of bioterrorist acts. Most of the respondents gave the 
correct answer to eight of the ten-item knowledge quiz (m=8.06, sd=1.64). 
The respondents’ high level of knowledge about bioterrorism is perhaps triggering a 
similarly high level of alienation from the government and the efforts it has shown so far 
to protect them against terrorist threats. This level of alienation may have been 
exacerbated by the fact that 69.3 percent of them disagree to strongly disagree that the 
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federal government is well prepared to protect the nation against bioterrorist threats 
(m=3.93, sd=1.03). Close to 73 percent disagree to strongly disagree that the state and 
local governments have developed strategies to protect citizens against such attacks 
(m=4.03, sd=0.97). However, a little more than half (50.2 percent) disagree to strongly 
disagree that the government is powerless against these threats (m= 2.47, sd=1.15). 
These findings indicate the presence of a high level of concern among citizens about the 
government’s ability to counter bioterrorist threats and a perception that government at 
all levels remain unprepared against such attacks. Nevertheless, most admit the 
government has the power to do something to quell attacks.  
The Sample’s Mass Media Habits 
As shown in Table I, the respondents report watching television news (60.5 percent) and 
reading about bioterrorism in print and online newspapers “once in a while” to 
“somewhat often” (71.8 percent). They say they were exposed “once in a while” (44.3 
percent) to bioterrorism content in magazines (print and online), other Web sources 
(53.4 percent), and radio news (54.9 percent), in that order. When asked how much 
attention they pay to news items about bioterrorism, they say they pay “fair” to “close 
attention” to TV (67.4 percent), newspaper, radio (46.8 percent) and magazine reports 
(36.6 percent), but “very little” to “fair” attention to news concerning this issue in Web 
sources (30.3 percent) outside of the online editions of newspapers and magazines. 
 
 
Table I. Exposure and attention to mass media bioterrorism content 
 
 N MEANS STD. DEV. 
Exposure to    
Television 339 2.36 1.10 
Radio 272 1.62 0.84 
Newspapers (print and online) 303 2.26 0.92 
Magazines (print and online 219 1.75 0.84 
Other online sources  178 1.62 0.80 
    
Attention to    
Television 339 3.24 1.10 
Radio 272 2.97 0.84 
Newspapers (print and online) 303 3.13 0.92 
Magazines (print and online) 219 2.93 0.84 
Other online sources  174 2.57 0.80 
Descriptive statistics were computed with exposure coded as 1= hardly ever, 2= once in a while, 3= 
somewhat often, 4= often, 5= every day. Attention was coded as 1= no attention at all, 2= very little 
attention, 3= fair attention, 4= close attention, 5= as closely as I can.  
The Sources the Respondents Trust 
Table II lists the different sources of information (categorized as interpersonal, mass 
media, government, and university and advocacy groups) and the respondents’ trust of 
these sources. The table shows that family members were the most trusted source of 
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information about bioterrorism, followed by the Centers for Disease Control, their 
doctor or primary health care provider, the American Medical Association, and public 
health officials, in that order. Two of the five most trusted sources were interpersonal 
communication sources, and the rest were government agencies and individuals in 
charge of health care and medical research. 
 
Table II. Trust in interpersonal, mass media, government and advocacy groups  
 




Interpersonal communication sources    
Family 349 3.83 1.15 
Friends 351 3.13 1.05 
Doctor or primary health care provider 347 3.61 1.09 
Mass media sources    
Magazines 349 2.72 0.93 
Radio 315 3.08 0.99 
Television 355 2.95 1.06 
Newspapers (print and online) 344 2.88 0.98 
Other online sources  333 2.45 1.01 
Government sources    
USDA 348 3.10 1.07 
CDC 351 3.78 1.04 
FDA 354 3.16 1.10 
EPA 353 3.22 1.05 
DHS 353 3.18 1.15 
Public health officials 347 3.34 0.92 
Universities and advocacy groups    
Consumer advocacy groups 335 2.75 1.03 
AMA 352 3.47 1.05 
Food processing corporations 353 2.43 0.99 
University scientists 349 3.04 1.21 
Churches and religious organizations 349 3.23 1.07 
Descriptive statistics were computed with trust measured on a scale of 1 to 5 where 1 means “do not trust 
at all” and 5 means “trust very much.”  
What Respondents Think About the Government and Bioterrorism  
The question “How worried are you about bioterrorism?” generated a slight majority 
(120 or a little more than 34 percent) saying they were “somewhat worried” about it 
(m=3.0, sd=1.18). As shown in Table III, only forty-four (12.5 percent) said they were 
“very worried” about bioterrorist threats. The clustering of responses, however, was in 
the “a little worried” to “worried” range (76 percent), a pattern that indicated some 
ambivalence about perceived threat. This level of worry is somehow incongruent with 
people’s optimism that the government has the ability to ward off a bioterrorist attack.  
As is evident in Table III, the level of dread is high, with majority of the respondents 
(70 percent) reporting they disagree to strongly disagree that they have enough 
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information to protect themselves and their family against such attacks, that the federal 
government is ready (70 percent), that the state and local governments are well 
prepared to protect the nation (73 percent), and that the media are doing a good job of 
informing them about the dangers potential attacks pose (49 percent). Most of them 
agree to strongly agree that more research needs to be done on how to protect the public 
(74 percent), and 56 percent were frightened by the possibility that food and water can 
be contaminated with deadly pathogens. Only 37 percent agree to strongly agree that the 
Department of Homeland Security’s color-coded threat and security advisory helps 
considerably in alerting the public to all kinds of terrorist threats. Less than 8 percent 
know where to get help in case of attacks. As Table III shows, the intensity of responses 
was higher for level of dread. 
 
 
Table III. Distribution of responses to the two dependent variables   
(level of worry and level of dread) 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES      N MEANS STD. 
DEV. 
Level of worrya 352 3.00 1.18 
Feelings of dread about bioterrorismb    
1. I have enough information to protect my family and myself.  212 3.96 1.09 
2. The government is well prepared to protect the nation.  213 3.93 0.96 
3. The state/local government is well prepared. 208 4.03 0.97 
4. More research needs to be done on how to protect the public 347 4.09 1.08 
5. The idea that food and water can be contaminated  
frightens me. 
349 3.66 1.22 
6. DHS’s color-coded security advisory helps the public. 213 3.31 1.28 
7. I know where to get help in case of attacks. 212 4.11 1.05 
8. The media do a good job of informing me of the dangers. 212 3.46 1.10 
9. I am powerless against these attacks. 347 3.00 1.33 
a. Level of worry was measured on a five-point scale, where 1=not worried at all and 5=very worried.  
b. Level of dread was measured using five-point scales, where 1=strongly agree and 5=strongly disagree, 
except for items 4, 5, 6, and 9, which were coded in the opposite direction. 
 
The Influence of Technical/Rational Variables on Level of Worry and Dread 
This study aims to determine what factors account for levels of worry and dread. Table 
IV presents the summary results of four separate multiple linear regression tests that 
sought to determine the impact of the technical/rational variables and normative/value 
variables on worry and dread about bioterrorism. For these analyses, the regression 
method “enter” was used, placing all variables in the equation in blocks regardless of 
their statistical significance.  
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The results show that the four technical/rational variables combined in one block 
were significant predictors of level of worry, accounting for 30.4 percent of the 
explained variance [F(4,63)=6.87, p=.000]. Controlling for the impact of media 
exposure, education, and knowledge of bioterrorism, a significant regression equation 
was found when testing for the influence of media attention on level of worry (t=4.17, 
p=0.000). Thus, of the technical/rational variables, attention to media was the only 
significant predictor. Based on the results, the respondents’ level of worry was fueled by 
exposure and attention to media, but reduced by years of schooling. 
 
Table IV.  A summary of multiple regression results showing the influence of 
technical/rational and normative/value variables on levels of worry and dread 
 
 DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES LEVEL OF WORRY 
STANDARDIZED 
BETA 
LEVEL OF DREAD 
STANDARDIZED  
BETA 
Technical/Rational   
      Media exposure 0.130 -0.111 
      Media attention 0.471*** 0.021 
      Education -0.071 0.108 
      Knowledge 0.012 -0.100 
Total R-square  0.304         0.039 
   
Normative/Value   
     Trust in media  0.144 0.041 
     Trust in government 0.141 -0.026 
        Trust in universities and 
advocacy groups 
0.120 0.159* 
     Trust in interpersonal sources -0.095 -0.114 
     Alienation from government 0.102 0.526*** 
     Perceived readiness of 
government 
-0.155* -0.195*** 
Total R-square  0.094 0.373 
 
*<.05; **<.01; ***<.001 
  
 
The results of a multiple linear regression test predicting the level of dread based on 
influence of technical/rational variables show a very different picture (Table IV). This 
time, none of the technical/rational independent variables significantly predicted level 
of dread. The regression equation was not significant [F(4,62)=0.619, p=0.651], with the 
four variables combined explaining only 4 percent of the variance. Therefore, none of 
the technical/rational variables had a bearing on level of dread.   
The Influence of Normative/Value Variables on Level of Worry and Dread 
A multiple linear regression was calculated to predict respondents’ level of worry about 
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a bioterrorist attack based on the six predictor variables hypothesized following the 
normative/value approach (Table IV). A significant regression equation was found [F 
(6,240)=4.14, p=0.001] for the influence of this combined block of independent 
variables on level of worry. Of these, the perceived preparedness of the country to stave 
off terrorist attacks contributed substantially to the variance (t=2.30, p=0.022). All of 
these factors were positive contributors to level of worry, except for trust in 
interpersonal communication and perceived readiness of the country to prevent attacks, 
both of which reduced worry. However, the extent to which people perceived the 
government as ready to protect them was the only significant predictor of the 
respondents’ level of worry.  
A multiple linear regression was calculated to predict respondents’ level of dread 
about a bioterrorist attack based on six predictor variables following the 
normative/value approach. This time, the block of normative variables was a very highly 
significant predictor [F (6,245)=24.29, p=0.000]. A significant regression equation was 
found for trust in universities and advocacy groups (t=2.122, p=0.035), alienation from 
government (t=9.019; p=0.000), and perceived readiness of the government to counter 
terrorist attacks (t=3.561, p=0.000). That is, trust in government and interpersonal 
sources, as well as perceived government readiness to counter threats, reduced level of 
dread. Because this equation showed more significant contributors to level of dread, the 
finding supports the contention that normative/value variables are stronger predictors 
of level of dread than rational/technical factors. 
Hierarchical Tests Controlling for Demographics 
To determine the strongest predictors of levels of worry and dread, two hierarchical 
multiple regression tests were employed. These stringent tests were meant to determine 
the influence of the two sets of predictor variables and demographic characteristics on 
worry and dread. In these two tests, the influence of gender, age and income were 
combined to form the first block of independent variables. The technical/rational 
variables constitute the second block, and the normative/value predictors made up the 
third block. 
Table V presents the results of a multiple regression analysis with level of worry as 
the dependent variable. The results show that the block of technical/rational variables 
contributed significantly to level of worry, but the block of normative variables showed 
limited contribution. The strength of the technical/rational block can be attributed to 
attention to mass media bioterrorism content (t=5.08, p=0.000). Demographic 
variables did not predict changes in the dependent variable. Although females were 
likely to be more worried about bioterrorism than males, attention to media content was 
the strongest predictor of the extent to which people were worried about bioterrorist 
incidents in the country.   
The influence of the same set of independent variables on level of dread was also 
determined (Table V). The results indicate that only the block of normative/value 
variables significantly predicted level of dread [F(13,39)=13.52, p=0.000], explaining a 
large percent of the variance (82 percent). Of the variables in this block, trust in 
interpersonal sources (t=2.84, p=0.007), feeling alienated from the government (t=5.32, 
p=0.000), and perceived ability of the government to counter threats (t=5.61, p=0.000) 
were the significant contributors to level of dread. In this examination of the combined 
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impact of other potential contributors, age (t=2.04, p=0.048) and income (t=2.25, 
p=0.030) also exerted some influence (those who were younger and have higher 
incomes dread bioterrorism more) although the block of demographics did not exhibit a 
significant contribution. Media exposure (t=-3.30, p=0.002) and attention to media 
(t=2.36, p=0.024) also showed some predictive power.  
 
As a block, however, the technical/rational variables’ contribution was not significant. 
The results again showcased the impact of the normative variables on dread. Trust in 
interpersonal sources, feeling alienated from the government, and perceived ability of 
 
Table V. Hierarchical regression results showing the influence of technical/rational and 
normative/value variables on level of worry and dread after controlling for demographics 
 
  LEVEL OF WORRY       LEVEL OF DREAD 
 Demographics   
     Age -0.094 -0.162* 
     Gender -0.307 -0.092 
     Income 0.083 0.209* 
R-square change 0.000 0.000 
Total R-square 0.055 0.032 
                     
Technical/Rational   
      Media exposure -0.019 -0.277** 
      Media attention 0.708*** 0.207* 
      Education -0.064 0.111 
      Knowledge 0.063 0.085 
R-square change 0.434*** 0.039 
Total R-square  0.489         0.071 
   
Normative/Value   
     Trust in media -0.056 -0.142 
     Trust in government 0.056 -0.065 
     Trust in universities and   
     advocacy groups 
-0.007 0.041 
     Trust in interpersonal sources -0.076 -0.233** 
     Alienation from government 0.124 0.453*** 
     Perceived readiness of  
     government 
0.089 -0.501*** 
R-square change 0.052 0.747*** 
Total R-square  0.541 0.818 
*<.05; **<.01; ***<.001   
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the government to respond to threats significantly predicted the respondents’ level of 
dread. 
In summary, the technical/rational variable media attention predicted level of worry 
when the impact of only the technical/rational variables was analyzed and when the 
influence of technical variables was combined with that of the normative/value 
predictors and demographic characteristics. The normative variable perceived 
government preparedness to counter terrorist threats was found to significantly reduce 




Table VI. Summary of variables that influence on levels of worry and dread based on 









Level of worry Attention to mass media Perceived government preparedness 
 
Level of dread None Trust in universities and advocacy groups 
Alienation from government 
Perceived government preparedness 
 
When the influence of the two sets of factors, including the demographic variables age, 
gender, and income were combined, the technical/rational variables media exposure 
and attention significantly predicted level of dread. Specifically, media exposure tended 
to heighten dread, but more attention to the content of media reports seemed to reduce 
this effect. The normative factors, however, had a greater impact on dread. Specifically, 
trust in interpersonal sources, feeling alienated from the government, and perceived 
government preparedness considerably lessened it (Table VII).  
 
 
Table VII. Summary of variables that influence levels of worry and dread based on 
multiple regression hierarchical test results 
DEPENDENT  
VARIABLES 




Level of worry Gender Attention to mass media None 
 
Level of dread Age 
Income 
Exposure to mass media 
Attention to mass media 
Trust in interpersonal sources 
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The mean of this national sample’s response showed ambivalence in respondents’ level 
of worry about the use of biological organisms as weapons of terrorism. Their level of 
dread, however, was more than their reported level of worry, indicating that they fear 
the prospect of bioterrorist attacks.  
The results of multiple regression tests indicate that although the two dependent 
variables, level of worry and level of dread, were significantly related (r=0.18, p=0.016), 
they were distinctly different, judging by the variables that predict their strengths. Level 
of worry was significantly influenced by variables representing the technical/rational 
perspective. In this case, attention to mass media was the dominant factor. On the other 
hand, variables that stem from the normative/value perspective – trust in university and 
advocacy groups, trust in interpersonal communication sources, alienation from 
government and perceived readiness of the government to protect the nation – 
accounted for level of dread. Those who paid more attention to mass media bioterrorism 
content were more worried about bioterrorist attacks, while those who felt satisfied that 
the nation is prepared to respond to terrorist threats were less worried about it. Even 
when the influence of other variables was considered, attention to mass media was the 
strongest predictor of level of worry.  
Variables from the two approaches accounted for level of worry, but the 
normative/value variables predicted higher dread. People who were alienated from 
government and who perceived the country as incapable of handling terrorist threats 
showed higher levels of dread. The results of the hierarchical regression analyses 
demonstrated the impact of trust in advocacy groups and on interpersonal 
communication sources on level of dread. Trust in these two sources figured 
prominently because bioterrorist threats are associated with too much uncertainty and 
too little government control. The factors that lead to higher dread suggest that effective 
risk communication may be more a problem of ensuring trust and confidence in the 
government’s ability to protect the nation from terrorist threats than it is an issue of 
explaining bioterrorism in lay terms.  
Implications for Policy 
People’s reactions before, during and after a threatening event can be intense and 
complex. Emergencies like bioterrorist attacks may engender more panicked reactions 
and may prompt a debilitating response, with people potentially acting in irrational 
ways. The findings of this study indicate that the mass media, specifically television and 
newspapers (print and online), are the best ways to reach people during such an 
emergency situation because people are exposed to and attend to them almost as a 
matter of habit. Indeed, exposure and attention to the mass media were found to 
mitigate levels of worry and dread. The results also suggest the need for the general 
public to be aware of and have access to preparedness plans because people have 
implicit trust in family members who are not likely to be experts on the hazards 
bioterrorist attacks engender.  
Any threatening event demands credible and accurate information from sources of 
authority. The findings clearly point to the Centers for Disease Control and the 
American Medical Association as entities that enjoy considerable public trust and can 
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therefore lead the communication effort. People also may resort to primary health care 
providers and other public health officials as trusted interpersonal sources of 
information. These individuals, therefore, constitute an important audience segment 
that may demand more information to be able to respond to face-to-face inquiries.    
Perhaps as important as identifying the outlets for information dissemination, risk 
communicators should endeavor to ascertain the factors that underlie levels of worry 
and dread. The results suggest that during such an uncertain period, normative/value 
factors exert a greater influence on the extent to which people may be worried or have 
feelings of dread. Trust in universities and advocacy groups and interpersonal sources; 
alienation from government; and perceived government preparedness to handle such 
attacks were found to be significant predictors of worry and dread. Thus, a preparedness 
plan must incorporate practices intended to enhance public trust.    
A bioterrorism incident offers a test case for crisis communication because such an 
event is characterized by a continuous sense of urgency and a rapid rate of change. In 
these situations, messages may be confusing, contradictory, and subject to change as the 
events evolve. In cases like this, people may experience a range of strong emotions, 
including fear, anger, panic, denial, laying blame, strong solidarity with others, a desire 
to help victims, and the need for personal control. All these may affect how they respond 
to a risk. Communication must account for these responses, including giving people 
reasonable and appropriate actions to take. Messages should not try to over-reassure or 
convince people there is nothing to be afraid of. Instead, it is important to acknowledge 
and accept that worry and dread are legitimate reactions, and then tell people what is 
being done and what they can do.  
Another trust-enhancing practice is to address misperceptions at the planning stage 
and during the emergency. Designated trained spokespersons should explain what is 
known at the time and what is unknown, pinpointing what is preliminary and indicating 
what is being done to find out more. They must also concede errors and modify previous 
statements as more information comes to light. This is so because people want honest 
and accurate information about terror-related situations even if it makes them worried 
and highly fearful.  
A public that has sympathized with its government in the aftermath of 9/11 has also 
been made irate by government inaction during and after Hurricane Katrina. This is 
perhaps why, although people indicate reservations about the government’s ability to 
protect citizens during terrorism incidents, they still believe it can do more to enhance 
national security and well-being. The measures outlined above tap into this sentiment 
and can serve as the basis for maintaining public trust. Simply put, as the findings 
indicate, if one can trust, one can take the risk.  
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Same Priorities, Different Perspectives:  
Tom Ridge and Michael Chertoff on Homeland Security 
Thomas Ridge with Lary Bloom. The Test of Our Times: America Under 
Siege…And How We Can Be Safe Again. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2009. 
Michael Chertoff. Homeland Security: Assessing the First Five Years. 
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009. 
Reviewed by Stephanie Cooper Blum 
INTRODUCTION 
On November 25, 2002, Congress passed the Homeland Security Act of 2002,1 which 
created the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), bringing together twenty-
two governmental agencies. DHS became operational in March 2003. The White House 
described DHS as “the most significant transition of the U.S. government in over a half-
century by largely transforming and realigning the current confusing patchwork of 
government activities into a single department whose primary mission is to protect our 
homeland.”2   
In 2010, as the third homeland security secretary begins her second year leading 
DHS, and as DHS analyzes the results from its first Quadrennial Homeland Security 
Review,3 it is clear that the department as an organization and homeland security as a 
concept are still, relatively speaking, in their infancy. Against this backdrop, former 
DHS Secretaries Tom Ridge and Michael Chertoff have each published historical 
retrospectives on homeland security and their experiences leading the government’s 
newest department. Both books should be read together as they each complement the 
other. Ridge’s The Test of Our Times: America Under Siege . . . and How we Can be 
Safe Again focuses on the politics of homeland security, the department’s creation, and 
its initial obstacles.4 Chertoff’s Homeland Security: Assessing the First Five Years 
places Islamic terrorism in historical context and provides a road map of homeland 
security priorities.5 After reading both books, one greatly appreciates the sheer 
magnitude of standing up the department in 2003 and the challenges and continuing 
evolution of homeland security where failure is unforgettable and success is often 
invisible.  
Both former secretaries focus on risk management and information sharing as 
integral components in reducing America’s vulnerability to terrorism and natural 
disasters; both describe the importance of gaining the cooperation of moderate Muslims 
in winning a war of ideas; both stress the symbiotic relationship between economic 
prosperity and security; both emphasize the need for international cooperation; and 
both urge comprehensive immigration reform, enhanced cyber security, stronger 
identification using biometrics, and improved public health surveillance. Most 
significantly, both lament the consequences of complacency, which they contend is one 
of America’s biggest risks to undermining what has been achieved in the last seven 
years. Yet, there are meaningful differences between their books – not so much in 
substance, as their priorities for homeland security are almost identical – but in their 
unique perspectives and the resulting assessment of the last seven years.   
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Ridge’s book is a poignant memoir depicting his personal experiences – both successes 
and frustrations – as head of the White House Office of Homeland Security (OHS) after 
9/11, which evolved into the Department of Homeland Security in 2003. While his book 
delves into the substance of homeland security, its insight lies in candidly discussing the 
“intersection of politics, fear, credibility, and security” (p. 239). By providing an honest 
assessment of his agreements and disagreements with the Bush administration and 
various officials, Ridge provides the reader with a behind-the-scene look at the politics 
of homeland security from the department’s creation to the forging of its mission. Ridge 
also provides a unique perspective as a former governor, especially when it comes to 
vertical information sharing and unfunded mandates. After reading Ridge’s book, one 
better understands, as he describes it, the “almost undoable” task of balancing 
transparency and disclosure with needed secrecy and creating a governmental entity 
capable of generating the confidence and trust of the American public (p. 74).   
In contrast, Chertoff’s book is not a personal memoir but instead consists of various 
substantive chapters on homeland security, each one previously published by various 
journals, and stitched together to make a compelling book. Whereas Ridge’s book is 
sensitive to state and local perspectives, Chertoff’s book is written from a decidedly 
federal perspective. This difference should not come as a surprise since Ridge is a 
former governor while Chertoff is a former federal prosecutor and former federal judge. 
While both perspectives have their own unique advantages, one consequence of 
Chertoff’s federal perspective is that his book only promotes the policies of the Bush 
administration, appearing to completely ignore policies that undermined homeland 
security or at least served as distractions.  
Chertoff’s book would appear more objective had he substantively addressed some of 
the Bush administration’s more controversial policies that directly impacted homeland 
security (e.g., Guantanamo Bay, invading Iraq, Abu Ghraib, the Terrorist Surveillance 
Program). In this way, a more accurate title for Chertoff’s book would perhaps be 
“promoting” as opposed to “assessing” the first five years. Nonetheless, the strength of 
Chertoff’s book lies in his historical insight and his ability to take complex topics and 
reduce them to understandable and memorable policy statements with a clear account 
of what has been accomplished and a road map of what remains to be done. 
In order to appreciate both books and their contribution to this new discipline of 
homeland security, the highlights of each book are discussed. In the end, it is only by 
reading these books together that one can truly grasp where we have been, where we are 
headed, and where our greatest challenges lie.  
Michael Chertoff’s Homeland Security: Assessing the First Five Years  
Chertoff’s book is a compilation of individual speeches and articles written for various 
journals in commemoration of the fifth anniversary of DHS. Each chapter discusses a 
separate homeland security topic, and his book progresses logically from describing the 
threat to prevention to reducing vulnerabilities to preparation and response, and 
concludes with international cooperation. While Ridge’s book has a stream-of-
consciousness feel as he depicts his personal struggles with creating and leading DHS, 
the strength of Chertoff’s book lies in its organization and clarity. Furthermore, while 
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Ridge’s background as a governor enabled him to appreciate the state and local 
perspective, Chertoff clearly wants to augment federal power. In fact, an underlying 
theme of his book is the power of the federal government to solve homeland security 
problems.  
 Chertoff’s book begins in an insightful way by providing a detailed and informative 
description and analysis of the terrorism threat itself, which he characterizes as 
“ideological” in nature. Chertoff explains how violent Islamic extremists have “hijacked” 
for their own ends the religion of millions of peaceful Muslims (p. 13). Interestingly, 
Chertoff places terrorism in its historical context by showing a modern parallel between 
radical Islam and Western totalitarianism ideologies such as Marxism, communism, and 
fascism. While Chertoff acknowledges that the threat of the twentieth century was 
nuclear annihilation, he asserts that a common element of the threats of then and now is 
a “unified, underlying ideology and worldview” (p. 13). While Marxists, communists, 
and fascists sought control of nations, Islamic extremists seek host states in which to 
train and flourish and create platforms. Notably, he describes four similarities between 
Islamic terrorists and the extremists of the twentieth century: (1) use of similar rhetoric 
such as “revolution,” “imperialist,” “capitalist,” and  “establishment,” as well as 
distortion of certain concepts such as jihad, which means spiritual struggle against sin 
or individual striving for self-improvement; (2) “indiscriminate violence,” rejecting the 
distinction between combatant and non-combatant; (3) the “macabre celebration of 
death,” as Osama Bin Laden said, “We love death. The U.S. loves life. That is the 
difference between us two;” and (4) the “rule of ideologically correct man over rule of 
law,” which for Islamic extremists means ignoring divine law as interpreted by moderate 
scholars (pp. 23-26). By placing Islamic terrorism in its proper historical context, 
Chertoff demystifies the threat and shows how the threat posed by Islamic terrorists is 
not so different from other ideological threats the United States has confronted and 
defeated.   
Chertoff also provides a strategy for countering Islamic extremists. As he describes, 
the “unending slaughter of innocent Muslims sows the potential seeds for Al Qaeda’s 
failure. Simply stated, these acts of extremism are alienating the very pool of people 
terrorists wish to convert to their creed” (p. 15). Significantly, Chertoff concludes that 
this war will be lost or won in the “recruitment arena” and he advocates a strategy: in 
the short run, the United States must capture and kill terrorists as well as disrupt their 
finances, communication, travel, and plots. He emphasizes, however, that the long-term 
strategic objective is to win the allegiance of a critical mass of Muslims (p. 16). 
While Chertoff’s strategy is convincing, he fails to address anywhere in his book U.S. 
policies that could be seen as undermining this strategy by alienating the very moderate 
Muslims he argues the U.S. needs to win this war. For instance, in Chapter 2 he 
describes the White House’s agenda as follows:  
Following 9/11, President Bush took decisive action, striking back against Al 
Qaeda in Afghanistan, deploying our intelligence assets across the globe, 
capturing or killing terrorists on nearly every continent, and partnering with our 
allies on shared intelligence against this common menace. Without such steps, 
the United States would have doubtless faced other, equally devastating attacks 
over the past eight years. (p. 33) 
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In Chapter 4, reiterating the above, Chertoff confidently asserts that the United States 
is safer than before September 11 as Al Qaeda no longer has a state sponsor and is losing 
in Iraq. In Chapter 5, Chertoff  proclaims:  
When the United States ended Taliban control of Afghanistan, deposed Saddam 
Hussein in Iraq, and proved willing to stand up to Al Qaeda around the world, 
countless Muslims were persuaded that the United States was committed to a 
policy that rejects both the hated status quo and the terrorists’ grisly 
alternative” (p. 66-67, emphasis added).  
While such conclusions are debatable, Chertoff’s failure to even mention any of the 
controversial policies or incidents that occurred during the Bush administration is a 
weakness in his otherwise solid book. For instance, nowhere does Chertoff substantively 
address Abu Ghraib, indefinite and incommunicado detention of enemy combatants, 
water boarding, rendition, the Terrorist Surveillance Program, Guantanamo Bay, or the 
consequences of invading Iraq. Rather, Chertoff argues that the United States must offer 
“alternative ideals of liberty and democracy” to defeat the terrorist agenda (p. 60-61). 
While Chertoff may believe the aforementioned policies did not undermine the U.S.’s 
long-term strategy of courting moderate Muslims, his book would appear more objective 
and more persuasive had he at least acknowledged these controversies and explained his 
reasoning for why he did or did not support them. Additionally, Chertoff argues that to 
defeat the terrorists’ extremist ideology, the United States needs to “promot[e] the rule 
of law, not the rule of man” (p. 55). Yet critics of the Bush administration have argued 
that the White House bypassed the law to support its counterterrorism mission. While 
such arguments may be overstated and are certainly a matter of passionate debate, 
Chertoff’s silence on such matters is deafening. 
By comparison, Ridge is not shy about addressing these issues and explaining where 
he agreed and disagreed with the administration’s approach. Like Chertoff, Ridge 
espouses the importance of having moderate Muslims reject dogma and repudiate 
terrorism and extremism. As Ridge too observes, most victims of terrorist attacks are 
Muslims. Yet, Ridge explicitly notes that “torture and indefinite detention without some 
form of due process are unacceptable practices” that undermine our moral authority (p. 
276). While Ridge supported Guantanamo Bay at the beginning, he began to have 
concerns when “it became clear no plan existed other than indefinite if not permanent 
imprisonment” (p. 145). Ridge further states that he agreed with the 2006 National 
Intelligence Estimate that concluded the Iraq war made the overall problem of terrorism 
worse and the “treatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo fueled anti-
American feelings” (p. 152). Such incidents, he explains, “provided more grist for the 
propaganda mill” and served as “recruiting posters for terrorists-in-waiting” (p. 152). 
With respect to the Terrorist Surveillance Program – where the National Security 
Agency spied on U.S. citizens without obtaining traditional FISA warrants – Ridge 
explained that while he agreed with the substance of what Bush was doing, the way he 
handled it “presented an appearance of employing unauthorized power” (p. 110). Such 
criticism – or at least acknowledgment – is notably silent from Chertoff’s book. The 
reader is left pondering whether Chertoff would support virtually limitless power to 
secure the nation. 
A similar phenomenon occurs with Chertoff’s discussion of Hurricane Katrina. While 
Chertoff devotes an entire chapter to the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
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(FEMA), arguing how critical it is for FEMA to remain in DHS, he never once mentions 
FEMA’s failure or responsibility during Hurricane Katrina. When Chertoff does discuss 
Katrina, it is in reference to the failure of New Orleans residents to construct a new gate 
for the 17th Street canal because of concerns that it would spoil the view or adversely 
affect the area’s ecology. Chertoff fails to even acknowledge any failure by the federal 
government in the humanitarian crisis of Katrina. By contrast, Ridge discusses how 
FEMA failed to communicate with DHS, which then failed to communicate effectively 
with the White House. Ridge also explains how FEMA failed to use the National 
Response Plan in a timely manner. Again, wherever the truth lies with the crisis of 
Katrina, Chertoff’s book would be stronger had he at least acknowledged the elephants 
in the room. 
 Despite Chertoff’s reluctance to criticize any policy of the federal government, the 
strength of Chertoff’s book lies in his ability to take complex concepts and reduce them 
to understandable and succinct policy statements. For instance, one particularly 
insightful part of Chertoff’s book is his explanation of why “Washington Won’t Work.”  
Chertoff asserts the government is hampered by three factors: (1) “anecdotalism,” where 
individuals make decisions based on isolated and compelling stories instead of the 
complete data (such as someone having a bad experience at the border or during 
screening, which may be an isolated problem and not symptomatic of an underlying 
problem with the program); (2) parochialism (or the NIMBY – Not In My Back Yard – 
phenomenon) where measures designed to promote the general good are countered by a 
small but highly concentrated and organized set of activists focused on their own 
interests (such as residents on the Southern border opposing border security fences); 
and (3) “short-term-ism” – an unwillingness to pay a short-term cost in order to achieve 
a vastly greater long-term benefit (such as New Orleans failing to fix the structural 
problems with the levee wall before Hurricane Katrina). By breaking down complex 
problems into easy-to-remember and clever phrases, Chertoff enables the reader to 
better appreciate and grasp the challenges in securing the nation, even if one does not 
ultimately agree in the infallibility of the federal government. 
One theme Chertoff touches on but does not explore in depth is the relationship 
between intelligence and inconvenience. In his chapter on how to handle improvised 
explosive devices (IED), Chertoff argues that, absent sufficient information and 
intelligence, the United States is forced to cast a wider security net, which can result in 
more inconvenience to passengers (i.e. inspecting passenger bags on mass transit). 
Better intelligence earlier on will result in less inconvenience to individuals 
downstream. As Chertoff notes, “Those who on privacy grounds seek to restrict our 
ability to obtain intelligence fail to take this into account” (p. 105). This is a particularly 
astute point and worthy of further exploration, yet Chertoff’s treatment of this theme is 
underdeveloped.   
Chertoff concludes his book by emphasizing how much the department has 
accomplished since 2003 and urging individual Americans, as well as businesses, to 
“become more educated consumers of information about national security” (p. 182).  
Chertoff’s belief is that the more informed individuals and businesses become, the more 
likely they “will back sensible, risk-based security measures” (p. 183). As explored next, 
Ridge concludes his book with the same hope. 
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Tom Ridge’s The Test of Our Times: American Under Siege…And How We 
Can Be Safe Again  
While Ridge’s book, like Chertoff’s, discusses a range of homeland security topics, Ridge 
is most insightful when he discusses (1) the disagreements he had with the White House 
and various government officials and how he reconciled those differences, (2) the 
politics of homeland security, and (3) his distinct perspective as a former governor.  
These three themes permeate the book, providing the reader with an appreciation of the 
evolution of homeland security. 
It is tempting to characterize Ridge’s book as focused on the differences of opinion he 
had with the White House. It is fairer to state that Ridge does not shy away from 
discussing these differences but instead embraces them. And for good reason: it is 
through these differences of opinion – among individuals committed to homeland 
security – that we can better appreciate not only what emerged but what could have 
been and what still can be (as homeland security is very much a nascent field). As Ridge 
explains, the creation of DHS was a struggle between the White House, which initially 
did not want the department, and Congress, which ultimately concluded it needed more 
oversight over homeland security. In recounting its contentious creation, Ridge does not 
start with 9/11 but instead explains how creating a border-centric department to 
enhance homeland security had been contemplated since the Nixon administration. In 
fact, nineteen different government studies recommended such a department and all 
had been shelved.  
Even the disaster of 9/11 did not result in DHS but rather the more limited Office of 
Homeland Security within the White House. While Ridge ostensibly had the president’s 
ear on homeland security issues, Ridge recounts how he needed more authority and 
resources than could be provided in an Executive Order and wanted to “pull together a 
core group of government agencies that could focus upon and rally around homeland 
security as its primary mission” (p. 126). As Ridge describes, “OHS was an office that 
often had to rely on smoke and mirrors to undertake some of the most daunting tasks in 
the federal government” (p. 128).   
Although Ridge was an early proponent of the creation of DHS, the White House 
initially was not supportive. As Ridge notes, President Bush’s focus was on 
strengthening the power of the executive branch that he felt over the years “had been 
improperly ceded to Congress” (p. 126). Hence, the White House wanted a strong 
cabinet around it. The real impetus for the creation of DHS came from Congress, which 
was increasingly frustrated by the lack of oversight of the billions of dollars over which 
Ridge had influence (but no real power). After the White House refused to allow Ridge 
to testify before Congress about his homeland security priorities, and after the legacy 
INS sent two visas to dead 9/11 hijackers to attend flight training school in Florida, DHS 
became a political inevitability. As Ridge recounts, Congress wanted him “unmuzzle[d]” 
and the White House realized “[i]t would be better for the administration to be the 
architect of the new department rather than allowing Congress to take the lead” (pp. 
127, 129).    
Although the White House eventually supported the creation of DHS – and asked 
him to lead it – Ridge describes how his vision of homeland security and that of the 
administration differed. As Ridge observes, “the silly prolonged debate with the White 
House over the design of the new department’s seal was as absurd as it was revealing” 
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(p. 71). The Bush administration wanted an eagle emblem to hold arrows in both talons 
as if to say the key to victory over terrorism was through aggression, forward-leaning 
military, and counterterrorism action. Ridge countered: “We thought differently. There 
was far more to defeating the enemy than military action” (p. 71). To his credit, Ridge 
discusses in detail what else his vision of homeland security entailed, which can be 
summed up as creating an environment of trust and credibility with the public. As he 
explains: “Only disclosure and transparency would generate the confidence and trust 
needed by our government as it waged its war domestically” (p. 72).   
Throughout his book, Ridge emphasizes how he was very careful not to play politics 
as that would undermine the public trust. Ridge describes how “questions of credibility, 
turf, and the politics of terrorism would soon overtake Washington, adding to the 
confusion and anxiety that gripped the nation” (p. 42). Ridge describes how homeland 
security became politicized, during the creation of DHS, as Republicans accused 
Democrats of caring more about political security than national security when the latter 
pushed for unionization and worker protections for DHS employees. He further admits 
that members of his own party carried out “shameless character assassination” during 
the 2002 midterm elections by accusing Democrats of being soft on national defense (p. 
112). Yet, his criticism goes both ways. Ridge recounts how the Democrats argued the 
White House and DHS were trying to scare the country into keeping Republicans in 
power whenever the DHS color-coded threat level was raised. And Ridge partly blames 
the media for the politicization of homeland security by resorting to “hyperbole and 
oversimplification” instead of presenting the complexity or the nuances of the issues (p. 
112). Ridge ultimately created a test to help insulate decisions from accusations of 
politicization: “Will the new measure make us safer? Will  it be consistent with 
constitution and law? Will it have good or bad economic consequences for our country?” 
(p. 109). 
Despite his best efforts, Ridge admits that he himself unwittingly politicized 
homeland security by adding, at the last minute, certain words to a threat-level warning 
for the financial sector.  On the recommendation of the White House, Ridge inserted 
that the “information available to us today is the result of the president’s leadership in 
the war against terror” (p. 233).  As Ridge describes, for the next several weeks he was 
not dealing with the “specifics of the threat but with the meaning of the inserted words” 
(p. 234). Ridge explains how he regrets his rash decision and wished he had delivered 
the unembellished statement followed by an apology to the White House for an 
“‘oversight’ in failing to include those congratulatory words” (p. 234). 
As alluded to above, one of the main areas of potential politicization of homeland 
security was the decision to raise the threat level of the DHS color-coded system. Ridge 
describes in detail the process for making this decision and the consequences of being 
wrong. As a preliminary matter, Ridge emphasizes how he was never directed to raise 
the threat level and instead a cabinet-member consensus of the Homeland Security 
Counsel drove the recommendation. Yet, importantly, he does acknowledge that DHS 
was the agency most reluctant to raise the threat level. As the leader of DHS, Ridge felt 
that the government needed to offer “more than a generic threat warning” lest the 
terrorists generate a broad psychological impact (p. 84). The crux of the problem was 
the level of specificity that could be provided with each warning. There was an inherent 
conflict between informing the public and holding information tightly so as not to 
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jeopardize the counterterrorism effort. Over time, Ridge developed a compromise: DHS 
could provide the reasons it felt the intelligence was credible (e.g. it was corroborated) 
without providing the specifics of the intelligence. Nonetheless, the color-coded system 
ended up as fodder for late-night comedians.  
In discussing the controversial color-coded scheme, Ridge describes how at times he 
disagreed with former Attorney General Ashcroft and former Secretary of Defense 
Rumsfeld about when the threat level should be raised. The main point of contention 
was the significance of the intelligence. At times Ashcroft felt the threat was big while 
DHS thought the attack plot was overstated. Ridge explains that when there was a 
disagreement between DOJ and DHS, DOJ prevailed. Nonetheless, Ridge emphasizes 
that Ashcroft believed he was doing the right thing and it was healthy for DHS to draw 
its own conclusions, as competitive intelligence should always be encouraged. And 
compromises could often be reached. For instance, after three-year-old tapes were 
found suggesting attacks on the financial sectors in New York, DHS limited the alert to 
just the financial sectors so as to prevent states and locals from having to incur 
unnecessary expense associated with a generic escalated threat level. As Ridge 
continually emphasizes, “credibility was always our goal while communicating to the 
public” (p. 233).   
Yet disagreements about the color-coded system contributed to Ridge’s decision to 
withdraw as secretary after the 2004 elections. Right before the election, Osama bin 
Laden delivered a new videotaped message, and Ashcroft and Rumsfeld wanted the 
threat level raised. Ridge strongly disagreed, contending that a threatening message 
alone, from people who hate us, was not enough to raise the threat level; no additional 
intelligence justified it. Ridge pondered “Is this about security or politics?” (p. 237; 
italics in original).  He believed raising the threat level could ultimately backfire as 
Democrats could argue Republicans were politicizing national security on the eve of the 
election. While Ridge ultimately won this specific battle (and the threat level was not 
raised), he felt he had spent his political capital and needed to follow through on 
resigning. As he left DHS in 2004, Ridge believed DHS had gained a “level of public 
trust that was significant but fragile” (p. 235). 
 Besides the politics of homeland security, another prominent theme in Ridge’s book 
arises from the unique perspective he brings as a former governor. One of the most 
compelling parts of Ridge’s book is the question of information sharing and how much 
information to share with the states and local governments. As a former governor, Ridge 
is particularly sensitive to this issue. He explains that he “viewed the states as our 
partners in the national efforts to combat terrorism” (p. 139) and was “determined to 
share as much information as possible with state and local officials” (p. 78). Yet finding 
the right balance of information to share was particularly challenging:  if too much 
information is shared, the economy could be hurt; if too little information is shared, 
people could underestimate the threat and fall into complacency.  
After much thought, Ridge implemented what he felt was an adequate compromise. 
DHS would provide detailed information about threats, “regardless of whether or not it 
could be actioned upon at the time,” to key officials at state and local governments but 
not to the general public (p. 75). This strategy backfired, however, when DHS shared 
uncorroborated general information about a possible plot against unnamed suspension 
bridges with western state governors. The plan had been to simply “inform the 
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appropriate state and local officials, sharing what we had learned, to foster a working 
relationship in the event that future information made action necessary” (p. 78). 
California Governor Gray Davis, however, alerted the general public to the threat with 
no specifics. As a result, people viewed the generic threat supported by no concrete 
information as being more about politics than security. While he concedes that Davis 
had the best of intentions, Ridge worried the public would become desensitized to actual 
threats. As Ridge observed, “we all had a lesson in the complexity of the issue” (p. 79).  
Besides deciding how much information to share, another problem related to states 
and local governments was the question of unfunded mandates. Ridge was particularly 
sensitive to the states not having the same resources as the federal government. When 
the United States invaded Iraq, for instance, DHS implemented “Liberty Shield,” placing 
the nation on high-alert to prevent and respond to any retaliatory attacks on the 
homeland. This was a colossal unfunded mandate for the states. As Ridge explains, DHS 
should not expect governors to pay for Liberty Shield, which was a federal operation. In 
general, Ridge laments how the states and local governments were asked to respond to 
federal terror alerts with “inadequate information, inadequate staffing, inadequate 
training, and, significantly, no means to procure financial help from the federal 
government” (p. 76). DHS was asking the cities and states to “be our front lines in a ‘new 
war,’ but we were not equipping or funding them properly” (p. 76). 
Ridge’s experience as a governor also greatly impacted his strategic vision for DHS. 
He wanted DHS to have regional offices instead of being so centralized and to “position 
a portion of this massive bureaucracy to the state and local governments” to achieve the 
department’s goals (p. 213). Regional offices would facilitate a national network of 
security by “establishing an institutional presence at the regional level to build 
relationships, share information, and prepare for such emergencies” (p. 217).  While the 
White House was initially supportive, it ultimately made an “about-face” and rejected 
the idea (p. 218). Ridge boldly asserts that his idea for regional offices, such as the one 
he had proposed for New Orleans, could have mitigated the humanitarian crisis with 
Hurricane Katrina. In the conclusion of his book, he implores Congress to consider 
reorganizing the department along regional lines to “improve its operational 
effectiveness” and its “ability to accomplish its mission.” He confidently argues that a 
“regional office and director would provide a single focus for state and local, public and 
private, interaction with the department” (p. 261).   
  While Ridge provides an honest and at times frustrated account of establishing 
DHS, his book ends on a philosophical note. After quoting theater critic Brooks 
Atkinson as stating “‘The most fatal illusion is a settled point of view,’” Ridge asserts 
that this “is where danger finds easy sanctuary” (p. 277). As Ridge compellingly argues, 
security must change with the times. While Ridge thinks we will never celebrate a 
victory over terrorism or extremist foes (as terrorism is just a tactic), and there are 
financial and philosophical limits to how far we as a nation will go to protect ourselves, 
he concludes that we need to accept risk and get on with our lives. As he ponders 
whether Americans will truly accept a certain level of risk of future attacks, one has to 
wonder whether that lingering question is what motivated him to write the book. As he 
continually emphasizes throughout, expecting the government to create a “fail-safe, 
risk-free environment” is not realistic (p. 270). In the end, no matter where one stands 
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on any specific homeland security issue, one can appreciate the contribution Tom Ridge 
made to the creation of DHS and the mission of homeland security.   
CONCLUSION 
These books by Ridge and Chertoff each tackle this new discipline of homeland security 
with passion and insight and provide differing perspectives. Ridge focuses on the 
politics of homeland security, his own internal struggles, and the state and local 
perspective; Chertoff focuses on placing Islamic terrorism in its proper historical 
context and the seeming invincibility of the federal government to solve homeland 
security problems. For all their differences in perspective and style, however, they both 
recognize the necessity of avoiding the extremes of hysteria and complacency, they both 
clamor for more information sharing, and they both repeatedly emphasize the 
significance of risk management over risk elimination. In the end, it is these similarities 
in homeland security priorities, rather than the differences, that stay with the reader.  
And in the end it is probably the similarities of her predecessors’ views that will provide 
the most insight to Secretary Napolitano as she confronts the never-ending and 
constantly evolving challenge of homeland security. 
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Emergency Operations 
Federal Nuclear Preparedness and Response Measures Reflect 
New Modeling Paradigms 
We, the authors, would like to thank Dr. Robert Harney for advancing the dialogue on 
nuclear preparedness in his recent article “Inaccurate Prediction of Nuclear Weapons 
Effects and Possible Adverse Influences on Nuclear Terrorism Preparedness” which was 
published in the September 2009 issue of this journal.  
We agree with Harney’s main conclusions that the size of a nuclear attack by 
terrorists in the current era is likely to be much smaller than what was conceivable in 
the Cold War era, and that while the devastation would still be enormous, the attack 
presents the opportunity and responsibility for robust planning and effective response.  
As Harney says, “terrorist attacks, no matter how devastating, should not be made to 
appear hopeless” and “people should not be persuaded to believe that a terrorist-
initiated nuclear attack is the end of the world.”1  We also agree that appropriate actions 
of local, state, and federal governments in the hours and days after the attack will be 
critical for the survival of many, that short-term sheltering-in-place will reduce 
casualties caused by fallout, and that the average citizen can undertake steps to improve 
personal preparedness in advance that will help mitigate the consequences of the attack.  
Although we agree with Harney on some counts, we strongly disagree with three 
themes running through his article:  
1. That if nuclear attack consequence estimates produce too many casualties, 
preparedness and planning  efforts will be abandoned;  
2. That the federal government is using seriously flawed models to guide response 
preparations; and  
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3. That the estimates advanced in his article are more accurate than what is 
currently being used for national medical planning.  
Effectiveness of Response Strategies, Not the Precise Number of Casualties, 
Drives Federal Preparedness Actions 
Dr. Harney argues that numerically accurate predictions of casualties from a nuclear 
attack are critically important because if the attack produces more than a certain 
number of casualties, it would be considered too daunting to plan for. In contrast, 
because there are so many uncertainties related to the enemy acquiring, deploying, and 
detonating a nuclear device in the U.S., appropriate federal planning must consider a 
range of possible assumptions leading to a variety of casualty scenarios, even those that 
suggest a very large number. Furthermore, when considering the risk of a nuclear attack 
by terrorists, the uncertainty in the consequences of an attack is dwarfed by the 
uncertainty in the probability that the attack will occur at all. Even though the risk of an 
attack is uncertain, it is important to note that the federal government is expending 
effort to prepare and plan for a nuclear attack because it is recognized that even a 
relatively small detonation would result in an inordinate number of casualties. It is 
useful to plan carefully and thoughtfully to minimize the consequence of any nuclear 
event, even those in which the potential number of lives saved is small compared to the 
number of lives lost.  
Although federal studies typically utilize a 10 kT detonation for planning purposes, a 
variety of weapon yields and heights of burst are being considered.  That being said, the 
worthiness of preparedness efforts is determined by the lives saved by effective actions, 
not the lives lost in the attack. It is for this reason that the exact number of casualties is 
secondary to the relative effectiveness of the response itself. Some readers of Harney’s 
article may mistakenly believe that because a nuclear attack may, in some unlikely 
scenarios, produce millions of casualties (unlike Harney’s estimates), that government 
preparedness efforts amount to capitulation.2  
The fact that many of the preparedness actions being taken by the federal 
government are not public may have led Harney to suggest that the U.S. government is 
not actively planning for an attack. In fact, the federal government is actively engaged 
not only in preventing, but in planning for a coordinated, effective response to a nuclear 
attack. This work is challenging and complex, but necessary and is an integral part of the 
U.S. government’s “all hazards” response paradigm. 
The authors of this letter agree with Harney that a nuclear event would initially 
overwhelm local and regional hospital capacity, and therefore, the federal government 
actively plans for establishing an effective, coordinated national-level medical treatment 
response with state and local governments in coordination with the U.S. Departments of 
Homeland Security, Health and Human Services, Veterans Affairs, Transportation,  and 
Defense and all agencies identified in the National Response Framework.  
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 While much remains to be accomplished, actions taken to date that support nuclear 
response include:3  
• Funding model development and analysis of urban nuclear attacks impacts; 
• Developing guidance for state and local governments regarding local 
preparedness and response to a nuclear attack;4 
• Developing playbooks, which are currently being updated and revised based on 
the newest modeling results, to help define how the federal response supports 
state and local response to a nuclear incident;  
• Developing a federal nuclear strategic plan, and response concept plan (currently 
in draft form); 
• Providing guidance for worker health and safety, and long-term restoration;5 
• Augmenting FEMA’s capabilities to respond to a nuclear attack; 
• Providing guidance on the medical management of radiation injury (Radiation 
Event Medical Management web portal (REMM), developed by HHS);6 
• Developing guidance to provide the greatest level of care in a setting in which 
resources are scarce while minimizing the risk posed to medical responders;7  
• Improving the coordination of the evacuation of victims from major incidents;  
• Tracking the availability of hospital bed capacity across the U.S., diverting 
patients to hospitals with adequate capacity and adding additional capacity, 
including specialty care for radiation injury;8  
• Developing systems for the tracking of victims who have been evacuated to 
facilitate reunion with their families; 
• Identifying which medical resources are likely to be in the shortest supply after 
an attack and supplementing these resources with federal and local caches;9 
• Supporting the development of biodosimetry capacity to identify victims who 
should be given aggressive care to minimize radiation injury and maximize 
resource utilization; 
• Ensuring connectivity of emergency communications; 
• Developing and promulgating sound guidance related to evacuation vs. sheltering 
in place; 
• Ensuring continuity of government (COG), continuity of operations (COOP), and 
continuity of essential services (COES) planning at the federal, state, and local 
levels;  
• Developing stockpiles of resources and conducting research and development for 
more effective medical countermeasures;10 
• Developing means to work with the private sector to ensure the acquisition and 
deployment of cost-effective and adequate supplies of countermeasures against 
acute radiation sickness. 
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Planning and Preparedness Efforts of the Federal Government are 
Based on Realistic Modeling 
Casualty modeling (prediction of casualty numbers, locations, and types) in support of 
response planning, while imprecise, has improved greatly in recent years, and these 
numbers certainly inform the strategy and  tactics behind the evolving federal response 
strategies. Using current models, planning is underway to maximize the efficient use of 
the limited number of health care providers and resources, ensure that responders know 
how to respond to radiation events, consider the operational difficulties of the post-
nuclear blast environment, develop strategies to bring casualties to facilities with extra 
capacity, and carefully and ethically consider the use of scarce resources. For these 
efforts, accurate models are important, which, is why we found Harney’s comment 
disturbing:  “Such ‘excessive’ estimates have been used to establish emergency response 
planning guidance. It remains to be seen whether this will result in over-preparation or 
under-preparation. Neither is desirable.”11 We believe good fidelity casualty estimates 
are critical to planning, and we believe the federal government has done the most 
comprehensive analysis of urban nuclear detonation impacts to date.  
Despite the importance of accurate models, Dr. Harney concluded that the federal 
government is performing shoddy modeling. Because he doesn’t explain his claim, we 
are unsure what information was used to support his conclusion. The specific document 
he cites for his claim that “excessive” estimates have been used to establish emergency 
planning guidance is the federal interagency “Planning Guidance for Response to a 
Nuclear Detonation” published by the Executive Office of the President.12 This 
document was designed to assist state and local emergency response officials in 
developing local response plans to a nuclear attack and therefore does not discuss model 
details of little interest to policymakers.  It is, however, based on extensive modeling and 
analysis. 
We recognize that Dr. Harney does not have the benefit of the most current analyses 
of urban nuclear impacts that served as the technical underpinnings for the “Planning 
Guidance” he references.  Under contract13 to the Department of Homeland Security and 
the Department of Health and Human Services, the nation’s nuclear weapons 
laboratories have undertaken detailed and in-depth modeling , simulation, and analysis 
of nuclear impacts on the urban cityscape and on human health, accounting for blast 
resilience of numerous building structural types, glass varieties in building construction, 
the attenuation of prompt neutron and gamma radiation by urban structures, rubble 
generation, fire potential, EMP, fallout generation and deposition from a ground-level 
explosion, and impacts on critical infrastructure. Optimized post-detonation shelter and 
evacuation strategies are being developed. Investigators are leveraging Cold War nuclear 
test data and Japanese data to validate results and numerous other data sources were 
mined in this effort, and with application of the most current modeling techniques the 
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authors believe this work constitutes the most comprehensive analysis of the urban 
nuclear attack to date.  
That being said, we question why Harney concluded that the modeling used to 
support this document was erroneous. In fact, comparison of Harney’s casualty 
estimates and those from the “Planning Guidance” reveals close agreement. For 
example, Harney wrongly assumes that federal guidance assumes an airburst, whereas 
the blast effect distances provided in the “Planning Guidance”14 are based on surface 
bursts. The estimates for blast effects in the document match those for a surface burst 
provided by Harney.15 (Compare Harney’s estimate of 5psi at 0.97km to 5psi at 0.9km in 
the guidance.)   
It should be clear that the “Planning Guidance”16 and most post-9/11 federal planning 
documents primarily consider terrorist-delivered surface nuclear detonations rather 
than airbursts from warheads delivered by missiles or aircraft. Because these models 
consider ground-level detonations, the models consider attenuation of the prompt 
thermal and ionizing radiation caused by buildings and a slightly attenuated blast wave. 
Nonetheless, various altitude bursts as well as a wider range of yields than those 
discussed by Harney have also been investigated and modeled to ensure preparedness 
for a wide range of possible scenarios.     
Casualties Produced by a Nuclear Weapon Will Likely Exceed 
Harney’s Estimate 
There are several factors that will significantly contribute to the number of casualties 
that Harney may not have adequately considered in his models. First, fallout could 
generate many casualties if victims do not receive or cannot perform the recommended 
protective actions, like sheltering-in place. Dr. Harney appears to agree that fallout may 
produce more casualties than the other effects of the bomb. He suggests (and we do not 
dispute) that a 20 square kilometer area may be blanketed with enough fallout to kill 
inadequately sheltered victims after a few hours exposure in some scenarios.  Although 
effective evacuation of the target city could greatly reduce fallout casualties, all studies 
of the evacuation of cities17 (and practical experience from the evacuation for hurricanes 
and daily rush hour) suggest that great numbers of potential victims will likely be 
trapped for hours in their motionless cars (poor shelters against fallout) or attempt to 
walk out rather than sheltering in heavy buildings. To improve the chance that the 
public will understand and follow actions to reduce their exposure to fallout, education 
and communication programs are currently in progress. Nonetheless, responsible 
planning and preparedness measures must consider that many victims will present with 
acute radiation sickness caused by fallout. For these victims, research is underway to 
develop effective treatments and to effectively deploy today’s medical countermeasures. 
Second, regarding thermal injury, Harney discounts burn victims based on the fact 
that opaque objects effectively block the thermal energy from a detonation. Some 
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models indicate that the number and severity of prompt burn cases will be substantially 
diminished in a ground burst. However, he fails to consider that the source of the 
thermal energy, the fireball, rises very quickly. In fact, a detailed, publicly available 
analysis has shown that, although a weapon may be detonated on the ground, the burst 
may cause burns distant from the point of detonation in a modern city because the 
fireball will rapidly rise above the height of buildings.18 Depending on meteorological 
conditions, thermal energy can also reflect off clouds and burn those without line of 
sight to the source (called “sky shine”). Furthermore, burns substantially reduce 
survivability when combined with any other injury type. Similarly, although the prompt 
ionizing radiation emitted by the detonation is attenuated by solid objects, scattering 
can cause substantial non-linearity through a city, leading to surprisingly high doses 
even behind robust structures. Unpublished analysis by Applied Research Associates, in 
which energetic particles emitted in a nuclear detonation were traced through a three-
dimensional model of a U.S. city, estimated how much dose an individual would receive 
in various distances from the detonation via direct line of sight and scattering.  
Third, Harney appears to omit the contribution of temporary flash blindness to the 
casualty pool. Although retinal scarring will occur only in those with a direct line of site 
of the detonation, many may be temporarily blinded by the bright flash even if they do 
not directly view the explosion. Although flash blindness victims will recover their 
eyesight after a brief period, many are likely to be driving at the time resulting in a 
significant number to auto accidents. The distance out to which temporary blindness 
occurs is a function of the ambient brightness (as the iris contracts in the day but is 
wider at night), albedo (the reflectivity of the sky on a cloudy or clear day), and any eye 
protection (sunglasses or tinted windows). Models in use consider that this effect could 
extend ten miles from the epicenter, and further at night.  And, fourth, the lack of 
medical resources may contribute to significant loss of life from otherwise treatable 
conditions, such as infections, although this is difficult to quantify. 
 
Finally, we, the authors, hope this letter has helped advance the dialogue on nuclear 
preparedness by clarifying that U.S. government preparedness strategy is based on 
sound consideration of the best science related to an urban nuclear attack. Further, we 
hope we emphasized that the federal approach to preparedness is suitable to various 
types of nuclear incidents, including those that produce many more and many fewer 
casualties than what some may consider the “most probable” scenario. Lastly, we feel it 
is important to emphasize that, even if we disagree on the magnitude of the impact of an 
attack, the federal government’s approach does not in any way include capitulation or 
appeasement, but accurate analysis and robust planning.  
 
The opinions, findings and conclusions in this letter are those of the authors 
and do not necessarily represent the views of the federal government, its 
departments, or components. 
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